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WELFARE POLLS: A SYNTHESIS
MATTFHEW D. ADLER*
"Welfare polls" are survey instruments that seek to quantify the determinants of
human well-being. Currently, three welfare polling formats are dominant: contin-
gent valuation (CV) surveys, quality-adjusted life year (QALY) surveys, and happi-
ness surveys. Each format has generated a large, specialized, scholarly literature,
but no comprehensive discussion of welfare polling as a general enterprise exists.
This Article seeks to fill that gap.
Part I describes the trio of existing formats. Part II discusses the current and poten-
tial uses of welfare polls in governmental decisionmaking. Part III analyzes in
detail the obstacles that welfare polls must overcome to provide useful well-being
information, and concludes that they can be genuinely informative. Part IV synthe-
sizes the case for welfare polls, arguing against two types of challenges: the
revealed-preference tradition in economics, which insists on using behavior rather
than surveys to learn about well-being; and the civic republican tradition in political
theory, which accepts surveys but insists that respondents should be asked to take a
"citizen" rather than "consumer" perspective. Part V suggests new directions for
welfare polls.
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INTRODUCTION
What are the avenues for citizen participation in the administra-
tive state? Citizen participation may be an intrinsic good, and at a
minimum surely can be instrumentally valuable in improving the
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quality of governmental decisions. But the traditional avenues for cit-
izen participation in administrative decisionmaking have familiar
flaws. Agency adjudications may be accompanied by oral hearing
rights for the targeted individuals,' who will typically have strong
incentives to exercise those rights. Yet agencies, with rare exceptions,
need not conduct oral hearings when they issue regulations or under-
take other general decisions 2-and, in any event, trial-like process in
these cases could be expected to generate low and unrepresentative
citizen participation, given free rider problems.
Free rider problems also beset the participatory mechanisms that
do currently accompany rulemakings. Citizens can lobby their legisla-
tors, who in turn can pressure administrators; they can join the notice-
and-comment process that agencies are required to conduct for most
legally binding rules, sending written comments that the agency will
be required to read and address;3 and they can show up and speak at
the informal public meetings that agencies often hold prior to the pro-
mulgation of important regulations. 4 But in each case the rational-
apathy dynamic will set in. Most individuals reasonably expect to
have little chance, via the mechanisms just described, of changing the
outcome of the administrative decision. Thus they do better by
remaining uninvolved. Those who do become involved will be a self-
selected, statistically biased sample of the public, and they will also
tend to be uninformed and make relatively little effort to understand
the issues at hand.
5
These are not novel observations, of course, and much recent
scholarly work has been undertaken that contemplates innovative par-
ticipatory devices-devices to produce citizen involvement in adminis-
trative decisionmaking that is better informed, more thorough, and
representative of the citizenry as a whole. Most of this scholarship is
inspired by the "deliberative democracy" or civic republican tradition
1 See generally 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 530-43
(4th ed. 2002) (discussing scope of statutory oral hearing rights in agency adjudications).
2 See id. at 415-24.
3 See generally id. at 424-63 (discussing notice-and-comment process in informal
rulemakings).
4 On agency use of informal public meetings, see, for example, Daniel J. Fiorino, Cit-
izen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 Sci.
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 226, 230-31 (1990).
5 See Mariano-Florentino Cu611ar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 411, 423 (2005) (summarizing skeptical literature on notice-and-comment
rulemaking). To be sure, some citizens do participate in rulemakings, and sometimes their
comments are quite sophisticated. See id. at 468-72, 486-89. But these facts are consistent
with the propositions that participants are self-selected, rather than a randomly selected
sample of the public, and that even those who participate are not generally very informed.
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in political theory.6 The tradition envisions a particular kind of citizen
participation: public-spirited, concerned with advancing the public
good rather than personal preferences or interests. A variety of con-
crete formats have been proposed for civic republican citizen delibera-
tion, including citizen advisory committees or review panels, citizen
juries, and "deliberative polling."
'7
But federal agencies have shown little interest in the deliberative
democrats' proposals. Advisory committees are frequently convened,
but (at least at the federal level) usually consist of technical experts or
interest group representatives rather than ordinary citizens.8 Citizen
jury and deliberative polling formats are more ambitious than citizen
advisory committees. These formats require a highly structured pro-
cess led by convenors, whereby representative citizens become
informed, deliberate, and then vote or state their views. Citizen juries
or deliberative polls have been used only very occasionally by U.S.
governmental entities, state or federal.9
6 The literature on civic republicanism and deliberative democracy is vast. For repre-
sentative contributions, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539 (1988), and DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (James Bohman & William Rehg eds.,
1997).
7 James Fishkin is a leading proponent of "deliberative polling." See JAMES S.
FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE 161-76 (1995) [hereinafter FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF
THE PEOPLE]; James S. Fishkin, Toward Deliberative Democracy: Experimenting with an
Ideal, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 279 (Stephen L. Elkin &
Karol E. Soltan eds., 1999); Robert C. Luskin et al., Considered Opinions: Deliberative
Polling in Britain, 32 BRIT. J. POL. Sc. 455 (2002) (article co-authored by James Fishkin).
Ned Crosby is a leading proponent of "citizen juries." See Ned Crosby, Using the Citizens
Jury® Process for Environmental Decision Making, in BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECI-
SIONS 401 (Ken Sexton et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Crosby, Using the Citizens Jury@ Pro-
cess]; Ned Crosby, Citizens Juries: One Solution for Difficult Environmental Questions, in
FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 157 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds.,
1995); Ned Crosby et al., Citizens Panels: A New Approach to Citizen Participation, 46
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 170 (1986). Other scholarship on citizen advisory committees, citizen
juries, deliberative polling, and similar formats includes: ANNA COOTE & Jo LENAGHAN,
CITIZENS JURIES: THEORY INTO PRACTICE (1997); FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CIT-
IZEN PARTICIPATION, supra; THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE (Maxwell McCombs & Amy
Reynolds eds., 1999); Jonathan Aldred, Citizens and Wetlands: Evaluating the Ely Citizens'
Jury, 34 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 217 (2000); John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects:
The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903
(1998); Thomas C. Brown et al., The Values Jury to Aid Natural Resource Decisions, 71
LAND ECON. 250 (1995); Wendy Kenyon et al., Citizens' Juries: An Aid to Environmental
Valuation?, 19 ENV'T & PLAN. C: GOV'T & POL'y 557 (2001).
8 See Applegate, supra note 7, at 922, 927-28. Citizen advisory committees appear to
be somewhat more widely used in the states. See Frances M. Lynn & Jack D. Kartez, The
Redemption of Citizen Advisory Committees: A Perspective from Critical Theory, in FAIR-
NESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra note 7, at 87, 88-90.
9 On the use of citizen juries, see Crosby, Using the Citizens Jury@ Process, supra note
7, at 404. On deliberative polls, see Luskin et al., supra note 7, at 461.
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This Article takes a different tack. It describes a set of par-
ticipatory devices that are much more widespread in actual govern-
mental practice than the formats proposed by deliberative democrats,
yet have eluded sustained theoretical attention. I will call these "wel-
fare polling formats," or "welfare polls" for short, to be contrasted
with "policy deliberation formats" such as citizen juries, citizen panels,
or deliberative polls. The thrust of this Article is that welfare polls
have substantial instrumental value by providing information about
well-being that is relevant in a wide range of governmental contexts.' 0
Welfare polls ask ordinary citizens about well-being, not policy.
Citizens are not asked for their all-things-considered views about what
government should do. Rather, they are posed questions that will
help measure the impacts of governmental choices on a scale of
human well-being. These well-being questions are, in crucial ways,
narrower and less ambitious than those contemplated by the delibera-
tive democrats. They do not ask citizens to bracket their own interests
and preferences. They do not ask citizens to take a stance about the
appropriate goals of government, for example, about the tradeoff
between equity and efficiency, or welfare and rights. Instead, welfare
polls start from the premise that welfare matters to governmental
choice. The participants in these surveys are brought into the conver-
sation not to interrogate this premise-to rethink normative funda-
mentals-but rather (more narrowly) to help determine what exactly
well-being means.
Welfare polls can use a variety of metrics and can inquire about
different aspects of welfare. Currently three specific formats are dom-
inant: contingent valuation (CV) surveys, which ask citizens for
money valuations and have been applied to value fatality risks, health,
psychological states, recreation, environmental goods, artistic and cul-
tural goods, and virtually every other aspect of welfare; quality-
adjusted life year (QALY) surveys, which ask citizens"1 to rank health
states on a nonmonetary scale with one representing perfect health
and zero death; and happiness surveys, which ask citizens to rank their
own "happiness" or "life-satisfaction" on various nonmonetary
scales.12
Each of these techniques has generated vast scholarly litera-
tures. 13 Further, the results of CV surveys and, increasingly, QALY
10 See infra Part IV.
11 As clarified below, QALY surveys are sometimes administered to doctors or other
health care professionals, but citizen surveys are also common. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 27-28.
12 See infra Part I (describing these formats).
13 See infra notes 20-22, 25, 31.
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surveys play a substantial role in agency policy analysis. The Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), the Army Corps of Engineers, the
Forest Service, and a number of other federal agencies that regulate
health, safety, or environmental hazards, or fund projects with envi-
ronmental impacts, have long relied on the results of CV surveys in
cost-benefit analyses. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
pioneered the practice of incorporating QALY-based valuations into
cost-benefit analysis-taking a QALY valuation of a health state and
translating that into a dollar figure through a conversion factor. Pur-
suant to regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior
(DOI) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), CVs are currently employed for purposes of natural
resource damage assessments. They are also used by various agencies
in preparing environmental impact statements under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
14
Happiness surveys, the third leg of the welfare polling triad, have
yet to play the role in U.S. governmental practice that CV and QALY
surveys do. But plausible scholarly proposals for happiness-based
policy analysis have been advanced. In any event, it is clear that some
of the main welfare polling formats (CV and QALY surveys) already
figure importantly in administrative decisionmaking-much more so
than the policy deliberation formats favored by deliberative demo-
crats-and that the potential role of welfare polls is yet larger.
So why has no one written about welfare polls? More precisely,
why has no one written about welfare polling as such? There is plenty
of writing about QALYs, CVs, and happiness surveys. Each of these
particular techniques has generated a vast outpouring of primary and
secondary work. But the writing almost always focuses on a particular
kind of welfare poll, rather than viewing QALYs, CVs, and happiness
surveys as instantiations of a more general category; and it is almost
always done by applied economists rather than political, legal, or
moral theorists. No one has described and evaluated welfare polls as
a generic structure for citizen participation in governance.
Why not? Political, legal, and moral theorists tend not to be
welfarists. Economists, who are welfarists, tend to be more interested
in modeling and measurement than in political, legal, or moral theory.
Some administrative law scholars are welfarists-but the ones who
care most about citizen participation often are not and assume that
14 See infra Part II (describing use of CVs and QALYs by federal agencies).
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 81:18751880
H inOnline  -- 81 .Y.U. L. Rev.  1880 2006
WELFARE POLLS
the novel forms of participation worth discussing should be modeled
on the civic republican ideal.
15
So, welfare polling has slipped under the theoretical radar. This
Article aims to redress that. Part I describes the existing polling tech-
niques: CV surveys, QALY surveys, and happiness surveys. Part II
surveys the range of contexts in which these techniques currently
inform decisionmaking by administrative agencies, and suggests other
possible uses.
Part III examines a range of technical, but critical, problems in
designing welfare polls. Welfare pollsters, like their civic republican
counterparts, need to overcome the obstacle of rational apathy. More
generally, there are a range of valuational and communicative condi-
tions that must be fulfilled for welfare polls to have substantial infor-
mational content: Respondents must be sufficiently well informed;
their preferences must not be distorted; they must be focused on well-
being (i.e., self-interested); they must engage in mental effort; they
must understand the question asked; they must answer the question
truthfully, or at least in a way that is correlated with the truthful
answer; and they must constitute a sufficiently representative sample
of the public at large. These conditions pose critical, practical
problems for those who conduct welfare polls. Even more fundamen-
tally, they are critical to a normative evaluation of welfare polling as a
practice.
That normative evaluation is undertaken in Part IV. Synthesizing
the material from previous parts, I provide a normative case for the
use of welfare polls, grounded in the moral and legal relevance of
well-being. It defends a moral framework, "weak welfarism," which
recognizes that non-welfare considerations may play a role in moral
evaluation, but insists that moral factors which make essential refer-
ence to well-being are an integral part of morality. These latter fac-
tors include, at a minimum, overall well-being, and also plausibly
include distributive factors framed in terms of the distribution of well-
being. Law and morality are not, of course, identical; but Part IV
explains why administrative officials are in fact legally required or
permitted (not just morally required) to attend to well-being.
But even if well-being information is relevant to governmental
decisionmaking, why should that information be secured through
surveys? And aren't welfare polls inconsistent with policy delibera-
tion formats? Part IV addresses both of these questions. It argues,
15 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation in
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 203-07 (1997) (discussing
rise of civic republican theory within administrative law scholarship).
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against the revealed-preference tradition in welfare economics, that
social planners have reason to rely on surveys and not just behavior in
estimating individual valuations. It further argues, against the deliber-
ative-democratic tradition in political theory, that these surveys need
not always ask citizens to put on the hat of policymaker. Welfare pol-
ling complements, rather than displaces, policy deliberation formats.
The two capture different kinds of citizen judgment, rather than being
mutually exclusive.
Part V looks to the future. It describes a variety of novel formats
with which welfare pollsters should experiment. The trio of CV,
QALY, and happiness surveys will surely remain dominant for some
time, but should be supplemented with new approaches.
I
WELFARE POLLS: EXISTING FORMATS
(CV, QALY, AND HAPPINESS SURVEYS)
Welfare polls or surveys, as I conceptualize them, have a number
of defining features. The respondents are lay people, not experts.
The respondents are not queried about their policy views or moral
judgments, but instead are asked to evaluate some human's life, or a
change in some human's life (the respondent's own life, or someone
else's), with respect to well-being. And the respondents are invited to
express this judgment quantitatively, in terms of some numerical scale.
This definition highlights what is both distinctive and normatively
attractive about certain existing survey practices, namely, CV, QALY,
and happiness surveys. At the same time, it leaves much room for
experimentation and improvement. What information should respon-
dents be given? How should they be debiased? Should they be asked
to think about their answers alone, or to deliberate together about
well-being? What scale should be used? These sorts of questions will
be examined in Parts III and V. The current welfare polling formats
may be far from optimal. Still, it is important to see that the project of
welfare polling is not a utopian one. The project is already well
underway, with CV, QALY, and happiness surveys as the leading
examples.
A. Contingent Valuation (CV) Surveys
CV surveys were invented by environmental economists in the
1960s. 16 They are now conducted not just for ecological goods, but for
16 Good reviews of the CV technique include: IAN BATEMAN ET AL., ECONOMIC VAL-
UATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES (2002); A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE
MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES 161-87 (2d ed. 2003);
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
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virtually every aspect of well-being: recreation, noise, smell, visibility,
fatality risks, health states, psychological states, cultural amenities,
and aesthetic values. 17 Respondents are selected members of the citi-
zenry or some subset of the citizenry-for example, the population
that uses some amenity or that is exposed to some hazard-and may
be randomly or nonrandomly selected, depending on the study
design. 18 Mail, telephone, and in-person surveys are all common, and
the rise of the Internet has created yet another possible way to admin-
ister CV surveys. 19 Surveys are typically undertaken by academic
researchers, usually applied economists, or by government agencies or
contractors working for agencies.
It is estimated that thousands of CV surveys have been under-
taken. 20 The secondary literature is correspondingly large.21 Whole
ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE
PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989); Kevin J. Boyle, Contin-
gent Valuation in Practice, in A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION 111 (Patricia A.
Champ et al. eds., 2003). Two important anthologies are VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREF-
ERENCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD IN THE US,
EU, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Ian J. Bateman & Kenneth G. Willis eds., 1999), and
CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993).
Helpful recent literature reviews are L. Venkatachalam, The Contingent Valuation Method:
A Review, 24 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 89 (2004), and Richard T. Carson et al.,
Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence, 19 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 173
(2001). Two other excellent reviews, published after this Article was drafted, are HAND-
BOOK ON CONTINGENT VALUATION (Anna Alberini & James R. Kahn eds., 2006), and
Richard T. Carson & W. Michael Hanemann, Contingent Valuation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 821 (Karl-Goran Maler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2005).
17 See, e.g., Richard T. Carson et al., Contingent Valuation and Revealed Preference
Methodologies: Comparing the Estimates for Quasi-Public Goods, 72 LAND ECON. 80, 81
(1996) (reviewing large bibliography of contingent valuation papers, and noting that "[t]he
goods valued are various forms of recreation (most outdoor), changes in health risks, and
changes in environmental amenities such as air pollution, noise pollution, water pollution,
or parks"); Maureen L. Cropper, Has Economic Research Answered the Needs of Environ-
mental Policy?, 39 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 328, 332, 335, 338, 340 (2000) (discussing use
of CV surveys to value fatality risks, morbidity, water quality, and visibility); Matthew D.
Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 1029-30 (2004) (discussing use of CV surveys to value fear and
anxiety, either directly or as independent variable in predicting willingness-to-pay or will-
ingness-to-accept (WTP/WTA) for other goods); B.R. Bamber & G.A. Khoury, Contingent
Valuation of Landscape, 135 PROC. INSTITUTION Civ. ENGINEERS-TRANSPORT 185 (1999)
(discussing contingent valuation of landscape); Eric Thompson et al., Valuing the Arts: A
Contingent Valuation Approach, 26 J. CULTURAL ECON. 87, 88-89 (2002) (discussing con-
tingent valuation of cultural amenities).
18 See infra text accompanying notes 207-10.
19 See BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 89-111; Patricia A. Champ, Collecting Survey
Data for Nonmarket Valuation, in A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 16,
at 59, 69-80.
20 See Stdle Navrud & Gerald J. Pruckner, Environmental Valuation-To Use or Not to
Use?, 10 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 1, 8 (1997).
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journals are focused on publishing primary CV studies or discussing
methodology.22
CV surveys employ a monetary scale of well-being. The basic
thrust of the methodology is to get the respondent to imagine some
change in the world that affects her well-being, and to determine how
much she is willing to pay for that change (if it benefits her) or how
much she would be willing to accept in return for it (if it harms her).
CV researchers have devised various ways to elicit monetary val-
uations. The simplest and oldest technique is to ask, "How much are
you willing to pay (or accept) in return for ?" One variation on
this technique presents the respondent with a series of "payment
cards," displaying different sums of money, and asks her to point to
the card that shows the amount she is willing to pay or accept. Or, in
the so-called "auction" format, the respondent is presented with an
initial "bid" amount ("Would you be willing to pay at least ?"),
and that amount is increased until the respondent says no. The sim-
plest technique is quite cognitively demanding; the payment card
approach helps, but the cognitive load is still substantial; and the auc-
tion technique leads respondents to anchor on the initial bid. Thus
many researchers now favor yet a different approach, which is to pre-
sent each respondent with a single "dichotomous choice" question-
"Are you willing to pay $X for ___?"-varying the $X amounts
among the survey group, and using econometric techniques to esti-
mate an average valuation from the pattern of responses.
2 3
Readers familiar with the CV approach may object to my charac-
terization of CV surveys as welfare-focused. Current practice is to ask
respondents for their willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept
(WTP/WTA) for various outcomes, given the totality of their prefer-
ences. Typically, no effort is made to screen out moral, altruistic, or
otherwise disinterested preferences. Is it not, therefore, more accu-
rate to characterize CVs as a strange kind of policy survey, rather than
a welfare poll? The answer to this important objection is that CV
surveys are effectively welfare-focused when used to value goods
21 See Wiktor L. Adamowicz, What's It Worth? An Examination of Historical Trends
and Future Directions in Environmental Valuation, 48 AUSTRALIAN J. AGRIC. &
RESOURCE ECON. 419, 420-25 (2004).
22 See V. Kerry Smith, JEEM and Non-Market Valuation: 1974-1998, 39 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 351 (2000) (discussing role of that journal in developing nonmarket valua-
tion, particularly contingent valuation).
23 For a discussion of CV elicitation techniques, see BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at
135-45, and Boyle, supra note 16, at 134-43. Variations on the straight dichotomous
choice question have also been developed; for example, the "one-and-a-half bound" and
"double bounded" dichotomous choice formats. See BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at
141.
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(such as recreation, smell, noise, health, psychological states, or
fatality risks) where self-interested preferences predominate-in con-
trast with environmental "nonuse" values. Further, the CV method-
ology might in the future incorporate discursive techniques to screen
out disinterested preferences. These points are developed in Part
111.24
B. Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) Surveys
QALYs were invented by public health scholars in the 1970s and
are now a cornerstone of research both in that field, and in the related
field of health economics. 25 Unlike CV surveys, which are applicable
to all types of welfare impacts, QALYs only measure health effects-
although researchers often adopt an inclusive definition of health,
encompassing pain, emotional distress, and mental handicaps as well
as physical changes.
26
QALY surveys ask respondents to place a given health state on a
0-1 scale, with zero representing death and one perfect health. These
surveys are sometimes given to experts (namely, health care profes-
sionals) but expert surveys are now viewed skeptically in the field,
27
and QALY surveys of laypersons (either patients or members of the
general public) are the preferred technique 2 8-hence my categoriza-
tion of QALYs as a kind of welfare poll. Like CV surveys, these can
be done in person, by phone, through the mail, or using the Internet.
29
A number of standard techniques are used for eliciting QALY rank-
ings: the time tradeoff method (where the respondent contemplates
the prospect of living a certain amount of time T* in the health state,
and is then asked to determine the amount of time To such that she
would be indifferent between living T* in the health state and living
To in perfect health); the standard gamble method (where the respon-
dent is asked for the probability p that makes her indifferent between
24 See infra text accompanying notes 106-16.
25 For overviews of the QALY method, see Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy
Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETmIcs 1, 1-2 n.1 (2006)
(citing sources). On the size of the QALY literature, see id. at 3.
26 See id. at 48-50.
27 See Paul Dolan, Whose Preferences Count?, 19 MED. DECISION MAKING 482, 482
(1999); G. Ardine de Wit et al., Sensitivity and Perspective in the Valuation of Health Status:
Whose Values Count?, 9 HEALTH ECON. 109, 110 (2000).
28 See Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Health-Related Quality of Life for Use in
Resource Allocation Decisions in Health Care, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS
1723, 1738 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (discussing whether
patients or members of the general public should be surveyed).
29 See, e.g., J. Brazier et al., A Review of the Use of Health Status Measures in Economic
Evaluation, 3 HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT 1, 114-32 (1999) (listing numerous QALY
surveys, including both interviewer- and self-administered studies).
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living a given amount of time in the health state, and a lottery with
probability p of living in perfect health for the same amount of time
and 1-p of dying instantly); and a simple rating task, which instructs
the respondent to rank the state on a scale of zero to one hundred.
30
C. Happiness Surveys
Let us turn, finally, to happiness surveys. 31 The U.S. General
Social Survey, conducted annually or biannually for more than thirty
years, surveys a large random sample (1500 or so) of the U.S. popula-
tion about a range of topics. Since its inception, it has included the
following question: "[T]aken all together, how would you say things
are these days-would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy,
or not too happy?" 32 A parallel large-scale survey conducted several
times a year in European Union member states, the Eurobarometer
Survey Series, asks "[O]n the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satis-
fied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?
'33
Similar questions have been asked in a host of nonperiodic surveys,
conducted by academics, governments, or other organizations, in the
United States and elsewhere, often involving very large samples.
34
The general format is to ask respondents to express their happiness or
satisfaction with their life (or perhaps some aspect of their life) on a
numerical scale, such as a scale from one to three, one to seven, or one
to ten; or to subsume their happiness or life-satisfaction in one of an
ordered set of categories (for example, "very satisfied," "fairly satis-
fied," "not very satisfied," and "not at all satisfied"). 3
5
30 On QALY elicitation methods, see id. at 23-56, and Dolan, supra note 28, at
1732-37.
31 For overviews of happiness surveys and the literature they have generated, see
BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS (2002); Ed Diener et al.,
Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 276 (1999);
Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, On Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of
Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 141 (2001); and
Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental Processes
and their Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY 61 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter WELL-BEING].
32 David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being over Time in Britain and
the USA, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1359, 1363-66 (2004); NAT'L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., UNIV.
OF CHI., GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972-2004: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK, at v, 224
(2005).
33 See Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 32, at 1367-69; European Comm'n,
Public Opinion Analysis: Methodolgy, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public-opinion/
description-en.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
34 See, e.g., Frank M. Andrews & John P. Robinson, Measures of Subjective Well-Being,
in MEASURES OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ATrITUDES 61, 65-68 (John
P. Robinson et al. eds., 1991); Michael Argyle, Causes and Correlates of Happiness, in
WELL-BEING, supra note 31, at 353.
35 See Andrews & Robinson, supra note 34, at 70-73.
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Psychologists pioneered happiness research and have undertaken
most of these surveys and generated much of the secondary literature
on happiness. But happiness has recently become a hot topic in eco-
nomics. There is now a large and growing body of work by econo-
mists that analyzes surveys to identify and quantify the determinants
of happiness, discusses the econometrics of these inferences, or makes
policy recommendations for increasing happiness.
36
II
WELFARE POLLS: CURRENT AND POTENTIAL
GOVERNMENTAL USES
Some intellectual tools that are influential in the academy never
make it into the public sector. But that is not the case with welfare
polls. This Part surveys their current governmental uses and inter-
weaves a discussion of potential uses. My focus here is on federal
agencies and to that extent is underinclusive as it does not include
state governments 37 or governments abroad. 38 The actual and poten-
tial uses surveyed here fall into three broad categories: First, welfare
polls can be used for policy analysis (specifically, cost-benefit analysis,
which currently incorporates both CV and QALY surveys; happiness-
based cost-benefit analysis; and alternative policy analysis). Second,
welfare polls can be used to calibrate individual obligations or entitle-
ments that are defined in terms of the welfare impact of individuals'
activities (specifically, by using welfare polls to determine natural
resource damages; other sorts of damages, fines, and fees; and credits
and allotments for environmental trading markets). Third, welfare
polls can be used to shape government communications (such as envi-
ronmental impact statements, "statements of basis and purpose"
accompanying rulemakings, and national well-being accounts).
36 This work is summarized in FREY & STUTZER, supra note 31.
37 State governments do use CV studies. See John B. Loomis, Contingent Valuation
Methodology and the US Institutional Framework, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFER-
ENCES, supra note 16, at 613, 618-20. Oregon relied on QALYs in a notorious episode
fifteen years ago, but it appears that state governments do not use QALYs much. See
Adler, supra note 25, at 3-4. As far as I am aware, happiness surveys have not yet been
employed by either state or federal governments.
38 "To date, techniques for the monetary valuation of environmental damage and bene-
fits [in particular CVs] have been more extensively developed and applied in the United
States than in Europe." Franqois Bonnieux & Pierre Rainelli, Contingent Valuation Meth-
odology and the EU Institutional Framework, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFER-
ENCES, supra note 16, at 585, 593. In contrast, QALYs play a larger role in health
policymaking in certain foreign governments than in the U.S. government. See Adler,
supra note 25, at 3-4.
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A. Policy Analysis
1. Current Use: Cost-Benefit Analysis
Since the days of President Reagan, federal executive agencies
have been required by presidential order to perform full-blown cost-
benefit analyses of major rules, for review by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB), and to conform all regulations to a
cost-benefit standard where statutorily permissible.39 In traditional
cost-benefit analysis, the money valuations of goods are derived using
"revealed-preference" techniques, which look to market prices or
nontransactional behaviors. However, as elaborated in Part IV, these
techniques are far from perfect, 40 and agencies now regularly incorpo-
rate the results of CV surveys into their cost-benefit analyses.
In particular, the EPA routinely relies on CV surveys when con-
ducting cost-benefit analysis for rulemaking-and it does so not only
to quantify "nonuse" values, but also "use" values, 41 in particular
mortality risk, health effects, visibility, and water quality.42 Agencies
39 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). On
the methodology of cost-benefit analysis and its use by the federal government, see gener-
ally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIc A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2006) [hereinafter ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS]; Matthew D. Adler
& Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 269 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Adler & Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis]; and Matthew D. Adler & Eric A.
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999) [hereinafter Adler &
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis].
40 See infra text accompanying notes 240-62.
41 The distinction between "use" and "nonuse" values is discussed below. See infra text
accompanying notes 106-16. As I explain there, the measurement of nonuse values with
CVs is problematic because such values are likely to be grounded in moral preferences.
But there is no such difficulty with use values.
42 The following are regulatory impact analyses (obtained from the AEI-Brookings
Joint Center database, see http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications), or Federal Register
notices accompanying rulemakings, in which the EPA has explicitly relied upon CV studies
to quantify use values. Because the Joint Center database is incomplete, and because the
RIAs and Federal Register notices are not always explicit about whether CV or revealed-
preference techniques were employed to estimate values, the list here is surely not
comprehensive. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Long Term 2
Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 654, 732 (Jan. 5, 2006) (mortality
risk); Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Stationary Internal Combustion Engine (RICE)
NESHAP, at 8-24 to -25 (Feb. 2004) (mortality risk); Effluent Limitations Guidelines and
New Source Performance Standards for the Concentrated Aquatic Animal Production
Point Source Category, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,872, 57,913 (Sept. 12, 2002) (water quality,
including use values); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifi-
cations to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,888,
38,945-46 (June 22, 2000) (mortality risk); Asbestos Worker Protection, 65 Fed. Reg.
24,806, 24,817 (Apr. 27, 2000) (mortality risk); Control of Air Pollution from New Motor
Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Require-
ments, at VII-38, VII-46 to -48, VII-57 (Feb. 10, 2000) (mortality risk, chronic bronchitis,
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also perform cost-benefit analysis outside the rulemaking context, and
CV surveys have been used here, particularly by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (in evaluating public works projects) and the Forest Ser-
vice (in evaluating forest plans), as well as by the Bureau of Reclama-
tion, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Parks Service.
43
How exactly do CV studies percolate into these agencies' cost-
benefit analyses? Who conducts the study? How wide will the study's
scope be? The answer is, "It depends." Sometimes, an agency or its
contractors will perform a CV study for a particular policy. But this
can be quite expensive, and it bears emphasis that there are alterna-
tive techniques that economize on decision costs. For example, an
agency might look to a study-its own or some other agency's-of a
similar policy. Or the agency might break down the policy's effects
into different dimensions, and turn to the academic literature for CV
studies regarding each dimension. A related idea: Some CV studies
inquire not just about an individual's WTP/WTA amount for some
policy but about the various individual characteristics and policy
effects on the individual that presumably determine the WTP/WTA
amount. From these studies one might estimate a "benefits function,"
correlating WTP/WTA with its determinants, and apply that function
to the particular policy at hand.
44
It is not particularly surprising that CV surveys are employed by
administrative agencies in performing cost-benefit analysis. After all,
asthma, visibility); Industrial Laundries, at 10-29, 10-59 (Aug. 18, 1999) (recreational bene-
fits, mortality risk); Regional Haze Rule, at 9-13, 9-30, 9-37 (Apr. 22,1999) (visibility, mor-
tality risk, upper respiratory symptoms); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations:
Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts, at 4-20 (Dec. 16, 1998) (bladder cancer based
on CV study of chronic bronchitis); Proposed Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Stan-
dards for the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Industry, at 7-8 (Sept. 21, 1998) (mortality
risk); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Proposed Regulations for Revi-
sion of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 63 Fed.
Reg. 1536, 1602 (Jan. 9, 1998) (water quality, including recreational values); Activities in
Target Housing and Child-Occupied Facilities, at 6-35, 6-39 (Aug. 29, 1996) (mortality risk);
Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance
Standards: Metal Products and Machinery, 60 Fed. Reg. 28,210, 28,261 (May 30, 1995)
(mortality risk); Municipal Solid Waste Landfills: NSPS, at 12-10 (Apr. 1994) (odors);
Sacramento Nonattainment Area, South Coast Nonattainment Area, and Ventura County,
at VII-11 (Feb. 15, 1994) (visibility); Pesticides and Ground Water Strategy: A Survey of
Potential Impacts, at 26 (Feb. 22, 1991) (groundwater contamination); Listing of Surface
Coal Mines for New Source Review, at VI-16 (Sept. 1985) (visibility).
43 See Loomis, supra note 37, at 613-18.
44 The alternative techniques described in this paragraph are all forms of "benefit
transfer," generally discussed in FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 453-56; StAle Navrud, Value
Transfer and Environmental Policy, in THE INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 2004/2005 at 189 (Tom Tietenberg & Henk Folmer
eds., 2004); and Randall S. Rosenberger & John B. Loomis, Benefit Transfer, in A PRIMER
ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 16, at 445.
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cost-benefit analysis employs a monetary scale for evaluating policies.
The welfare impacts, positive and negative, of a potential policy are
reduced to dollar figures; those dollar amounts are then aggregated to
determine whether the policy has net costs or benefits relative to the
status quo. The CV technique also uses a dollar scale, so the tech-
nique fits hand-in-glove with cost-benefit analysis.
But welfare polling formats that employ a nonmonetary scale can
also feed into cost-benefit analysis: The valuations they yield can be
translated into dollars via a conversion factor. This, in fact, has been
the primary way that QALYs have figured in agency decisionmaking
in the United States. Over the last decade, in several dozen cost-ben-
efit analyses accompanying major rulemakings, the FDA has valued
deaths or morbidity through QALY-to-dollar conversions. Loss of
health or loss of life is measured in QALYs. For example, if a food
substance causes 100 healthy individuals to die prematurely, each
losing 30 years of life, and causes 10,000 more healthy individuals to
suffer a temporary, 6-month disease that reduces health from level 1
to level 0.8, then the total QALY loss caused by the substance is 4000
quality-adjusted life years (100 x 30 + 10,000 x 0.5 x 0.2). The FDA
then translates the QALY measure of changes to health or longevity
into a dollar figure, to be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis, using a
conversion factor such as $100,000 or $300,000 per QALY.
45
Why would the FDA be justified in employing QALY-to-dollar
conversions, rather than ordinary WTP/WTA amounts elicited in CV
studies or inferred from market or behavioral evidence, in under-
taking cost-benefit analysis? I have addressed this question at length
elsewhere. 46 The answer, very briefly, is twofold. First, certain cogni-
tive distortions that interfere with CV studies can be circumvented by
QALY surveys.47 Second, even if elicited without distortion, WTP/
WTA amounts will not be perfect proxies for welfare. For example,
wealthier individuals will tend to have higher WTP/WTA amounts for
a given health impact or risk of death, not because that disease or risk
has a greater effect on their well-being, but because money is less
useful for them. Money's marginal utility is deflated by their wealth.
By contrast, QALYs are invariant to wealth. While Donald Trump's
WTP to avoid a year of emphysema is likely to be vastly greater than
my own, the QALY value of Donald's emphysema and mine are
exactly the same.
45 See Adler, supra note 25, at 57-60.
46 See id. at 24-42.
47 For more on this point, see infra text accompanying notes 162-63.
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Thus, under certain conditions, QALY-based money valuations of
health or risk can be more accurate welfarist measures than WTP/
WTA amounts. Cost-benefit analysis incorporating these nontradi-
tional money measures may be less likely to go astray-i.e., to pick
policies that actually reduce overall welfare-than cost-benefit anal-
ysis incorporating the traditional, WTP/WTA measures. My work on
QALYs elaborates this point and discusses how to set the QALY-to-
dollar conversion factor.
48
2. Potential Use: Happiness-Based Cost-Benefit Analysis
Happiness surveys, still confined to the academy in the United
States, have various potential roles in governmental decisionmaking.
One such role parallels the FDA's practice with respect to QALYs.
Just as the FDA currently incorporates QALYs into cost-benefit anal-
ysis via QALY-to-dollar conversions, so welfare impacts valued on a
happiness scale could be translated into money with a conversion
factor and then fed into cost-benefit analysis.
Some academic work in this vein has been undertaken. For
example, economists Bernard Van Praag and Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell
derived money valuations of the noise impact of the Amsterdam air-
port from happiness surveys. 49 They surveyed a random sample of
individuals living near the airport, inquiring both about their happi-
ness and about other characteristics, including noise exposure and
income, and then estimated an equation explaining happiness values
(the dependent variable) as a function of these characteristics (the
independent variables). Happiness was negatively correlated with
noise, and positively correlated with income.
The ratio of the coefficients establishes a noise-to-dollar tradeoff
ratio R, which can be used to monetize the noise-reduction benefits of
a policy to deal with airport noise. If a policy reduces the amount of
noise by N noise units, the monetary equivalent of this reduction is
RN. Since R is itself the product of the noise-to-happiness tradeoff
rate and the happiness-to-dollar tradeoff rate, the Van Praag/Ferrer-i-
Carbonell technique is equivalent to translating the noise-reduction
effects of a policy into happiness units, and then converting those hap-
piness units into dollars. 50 This approach for monetizing welfare
48 See Adler, supra note 25, at 57-74.
49 See BERNARD VAN PRAAG & ADA FERRER-I-CARBONELL, HAPPINESS QUANTIFIED
219-38 (2004).
50 The description in the text above of the Van Praag/Ferrer-i-Carbonnell technique is
not quite accurate, since in fact they estimated happiness using a functional form that
allowed interaction effects between independent variables rather than a straight linear
form, and measured the independent variables using a logarithmic scaling. But the simpli-
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impacts-let's call it "happiness-to-dollar conversions "-is directly
analogous to the FDA's technique of valuing health effects on a
QALY scale and then converting the QALY amounts into dollars.
Andrew Clark and Andrew Oswald have generalized the Van
Praag/Ferrer-i-Carbonell approach. With data from the British
Household Panel Survey, they estimate a happiness function that
depends both on income and other characteristics, and use that func-
tion to calculate happiness-to-dollar conversion amounts for changes
in employment, health, and marital status. And they point out that
the method, in principle, is applicable to any life change-the relevant
characteristics simply need to be documented, along with happiness
levels and income, in a happiness survey.51
The rationale for using happiness-to-dollar conversions, in lieu of
or in addition to traditional WTP/WTA amounts, 52 as an input to cost-
benefit analysis is parallel to the QALY case. Consider the example
of noise. Being exposed to noise is not a health impact, and is not
picked up by current QALY surveys; thus, the QALY-to-dollar tech-
nique is unavailable. The variation in housing prices as between
noisier and quieter neighborhoods might be used to estimate WTP/
WTA for noise, but this revealed-preference technique will be accu-
fied description communicates the basic idea of their technique. Imagine that our survey
provides data on respondents' happiness as well as income, noise exposure, and other char-
acteristics, and we use the survey data to estimate an individual's happiness level as a
simple linear function of income, noise, and other characteristics. The coefficient on the
noise variable is -H, which means that reducing noise by one unit increases happiness by H
units. The coefficient on the income variable is D, which means that increasing income by
one dollar increases happiness by D units. Define R, the noise-to-dollar conversion rate,
as HID. The Van Praag/Ferrer-i-Carbonnell technique monetizes a noise reduction of N
units by multiplying it by R. But note that RN = (HID) x N = (HN)/D. So this is the same
as translating the noise reduction into happiness units (HN) and then translating that hap-
piness change into dollars (HN/D).
51 Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, A Simple Statistical Method for Measuring
How Life Events Affect Happiness, 31 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1139 (2002). Similarly, in a
recent paper Frey and Stutzer use happiness data to monetize the effect of terrorism.
Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Happiness Research: State and Prospects, 62 REV. Soc.
ECON. 207, 220-23 (2005).
52 Happiness-to-dollar conversions based on happiness surveys that focus on the
respondents' positive and negative affects are clearly distinct from conversions derived
from CV surveys, since CV surveys inquire about an individual's WTP/WTA for a policy
given the totality of its effects on the individual's well-being, while these sorts of happiness-
to-dollar conversions yield the amount of money sufficient to produce an affective impact
on the individual counterbalancing the affective impact of the policy. Happiness-to-dollar
conversions based on life-satisfaction questions are closer to CV-based conversions,
although even here the valuations may be different-for example, if CV and life-satisfac-
tion surveys are differentially affected by various preference distortions, or if respondents
to the two formats have different informational deficits. See infra note 60 (discussing affec-
tive versus life-satisfaction conceptions of happiness surveys); infra Part III.B-C (dis-
cussing informational deficits and preference distortions).
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rate only if relocation costs are low.53 CV studies are of course avail-
able, but individuals may have some difficulty determining their WTP/
WTA to avoid noise, and wealth effects may skew these valuations.
Even if cognitive distortions and wealth effects are not expected to be
large, happiness-to-dollar conversions furnish useful, additional infor-
mation for the cost-benefit analyst.54
3. Potential Use: Alternative Policy Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis is the dominant technique for policy analysis
in the United States. By "policy analysis," I mean some technique for
evaluating governmental choices: the choice of issuing one or another
regulation, the choice of undertaking some project or doing nothing.
But cost-benefit analysis is not, and should not be, the sole policy-
analytic technique. Alternative methods may be legally required, or
morally preferable, and the nonmonetary valuations furnished by cer-
tain welfare polling formats (such as QALYs or happiness surveys)
can provide numerical inputs into these alternative methods.
Health and safety regulation provides an obvious example. Some
important statutory provisions, such as the provision governing non-
carcinogenic pollutants in the Clean Air Act, the food additive
licensing provision in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and the
toxins provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, preclude
cost-benefit analysis. Instead, these provisions instruct the agency to
protect the public health and safety, perhaps with some gross cutoff
(for example, maximize public health and safety up to the point that is
technologically feasible, or up to the point that firms begin to go bank-
rupt).5 5 Although fatalities furnish a crude index of public health and
safety, air pollutants, workplace toxins, and dangerous foods can
cause all manner of nonfatal diseases. QALYs, which subsume both
death and other health impacts, provide a better index of public
health and safety than total fatalities, the level of fatality risk, or total
population longevity without health adjustments. QALY-maximiza-
tion (perhaps with a cost or feasibility cutoff) is therefore the most
attractive way to interpret health- and safety-focused statutes such as
53 See VAN PRAAG & FERRER-1-CARBONELL, supra note 49, at 220-24.
54 Cf Paul Dolan & Tessa Peasgood, Valuing Non-Market Goods: Does Subjective
Well-Being Offer a Viable Alternative to Contingent Valuation? (June 2006) (unpublished
paper, on file with the New York University Law Review) (suggesting that happiness
surveys are a promising alternative to CVs for valuing nonmarket goods, but that lack of
robust relationship between income and happiness undermines happiness-to-dollar
conversions).
55 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 73-80; Matthew D.
Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1293, 1414-17 (2003).
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those just mentioned.5 6 This point, it should be stressed, applies not
only to agencies such as the FDA that have traditionally interested
public health researchers, but to any agency implementing a statute
that requires the maximization of health or safety-for example, the
EPA or the OSHA.
57
A different reason for departing from cost-benefit analysis is
moral rather than legal. Eric Posner and I have argued at length, in
various publications, that cost-benefit analysis is morally defensible as
a decision procedure implementing overall well-being.58 But the sum
of WTP/WTA amounts becomes an increasingly imperfect proxy for
overall well-being as wealth effects and the variable marginal utility of
money become pronounced.5 9 Consider an extreme example: tax-
and-transfer policy. A tax scheme that would raise $100 million dol-
lars from the middle and upper classes and transfer that money to the
poor, with $10 million in administrative costs, will be viewed by tradi-
tional cost-benefit analysis as an inadvisable project, with $10 million
in net costs. The total WTP of the impoverished persons who would
benefit from the scheme is $100 million, and the total WTA of the
taxpayers who would fund the scheme is also $100 million. Thus the
transfer itself is seen by cost-benefit analysis as a wash; add adminis-
trative costs, and the tax scheme looks like a loss. But of course, if the
56 QALY-maximization should be seen as a sophisticated variant of "risk-risk" analysis:
one that takes account of health quality as well as loss of life. On "risk-risk" analysis, see,
for example, RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). To be sure, the language of
the safety-focused statute might prohibit a risk-risk approach, requiring the agency instead
to focus on the reduction of certain kinds of risks. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S. 457, 464-71 (2001) (interpreting section 109 of Clean Air Act to preclude risk-risk
approach). But even in this sort of case QALYs can be useful in quantifying the degree to
which the relevant kind of risk has been reduced. And in any event, a strong case can be
made that health and safety statutes should be read to permit risk-risk analysis absent a
clear congressional statement to the contrary.
As noted in the text, an agency might couple QALY-maximization with a feasibility or
cost cutoff. The latter sort of procedure-maximizing QALYs within a cost budget-is a
kind of "cost-effectiveness analysis." Cost-effectiveness analysis is the approach to health
policy choice often favored by public health scholars. See Adler, supra note 25, at 8-17.
57 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (sug-
gesting that EPA can cure constitutional difficulties in Clean Air Act by measuring benefits
of air pollution regulations using QALYs), rev'd in part, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Rafael A.
Ponce et al., Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) and Dose-Response Models in Environ-
mental Health Policy Analysis-Methodological Considerations, 274 ScI. TOTAL ENV'T 79
(2001) (discussing use of QALYs for risk assessment with heterogeneous health impacts).
58 ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39; Adler & Posner, Imple-
menting Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 39; Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit
Analysis, supra note 39.
59 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 95-100, 130-31,
142-46; Adler & Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 39, at 286-87,
300-05; Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 39, at 224.
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marginal utility of money decreases with income, a transfer of money
from the middle and upper classes to the poor may increase overall
welfare, and the tax scheme as a whole may do so even with adminis-
trative costs.
One way to reduce the inaccuracy of cost-benefit analysis in
tracking overall welfare is to adjust WTP/WTA amounts using so-
called distributive weights. (These would deflate WTP/WTA amounts
as the affected individuals become wealthier.) Another technique,
discussed in the previous Section, is to evaluate a policy by monetizing
certain of its welfare effects through QALY-to-dollar or happiness-to-
dollar conversions, adding them to the WTP/WTA numbers valuing
the policy's remaining effects. A third possibility is to circumvent dol-
lars entirely and measure all of the policy's effects as negative or posi-
tive amounts on some nonmonetary scale. Which of these three
techniques is best for maximizing overall welfare is a complicated
matter, one that is beyond the scope of this Article. But it seems at
least plausible that policy evaluation with a nonmonetary scale should
be considered as an alternative or supplement to cost-benefit analysis,
not only in contexts where cost-benefit analysis is legally precluded,
but even in contexts where it is not-even in contexts where statutes
permit or require agencies to maximize overall welfare.
What would the nonmonetary scale be? It could be a QALY
scale, but since there are many aspects of well-being that are distinct
from physical or mental health, QALY maximization is more easily
justified as implementing a statutory mandate to focus on health and
safety than as a proxy for overall welfare. Happiness maximization is
probably a better proxy for overall welfare (although not a perfect
one). 60 A number of scholars have proposed that government eval-
uate policies by determining which one maximizes happiness. For
example, Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer write:
The use of measures of happiness allows for a new way of evalu-
ating the effects of government expenditure.... The problem has
been approached scientifically by using cost-benefit analysis. The
60 The standard view in the happiness-survey literature is that the psychological item
being measured "consists of three interrelated components: life satisfaction, pleasant
affect, and unpleasant affect. Affect refers to pleasant and unpleasant moods and emo-
tions, whereas life satisfaction refers to a cognitive sense of satisfaction with life." Ed
Diener & Eunkook Suh, Measuring Quality of Life: Economic, Social, and Subjective
Indicators, 40 Soc. INDICATORS RES. 189, 200 (1997). Maximizing positive and negative
affect is not the same as maximizing overall well-being, because well-being is not just a
matter of mental states. See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at
28-31, 50. Maximizing the extent to which individuals are satisfied with their lives is the
same as maximizing well-being only if individuals are accurate in perceiving and valuing
their achievements with respect to well-being.
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benefits are the recipients' marginal willingness to pay, which is best
measured by a contingent valuation analysis.... This method is best
suited to relatively small and isolated public projects, but it breaks
down when it comes to more extensive expenditure policies. Simu-
lations using microeconomic happiness functions with a large
number of determinants may be better able to evaluate the wide-
spread effects of such policies.
61
Thomas Griffith has suggested that happiness surveys be employed to
help set tax policy. Tax policy scholarship often begins with a utilita-
rian "social welfare function" that maximizes the sum of individual
utilities, in turn calculated as the logarithm of individual income. 62
This function is mathematically tractable and increases in income at a
decreasing rate, thus justifying redistributive taxation, 63 but it is not
based in any systematic research on how income translates into well-
being. Griffith argues that the survey data on the correlation between
income and happiness confirm the basic supposition of declining mar-
ginal income utility and should be used to determine the specific
shape of the social welfare function.64
Admittedly, tax-and-transfer policy is more the domain of legisla-
tures than administrative agencies. Even so, happiness-based valua-
tion of income redistribution could have some place in agency
practice-for example, at agencies that provide foreign aid or that
administer domestic welfare programs. A different and more broadly
applicable approach to happiness-based policy analysis builds on work
by Ruut Veenhoven, a leading happiness scholar, who proposes that
"happy life expectancy" be used as a metric for comparing different
nations. The happy life expectancy (HLE) of a given country is simply
average longevity multiplied by average happiness levels expressed in
61 FREY & STUTZER, supra note 31, at 176 (emphasis omitted); see also NICK
DONOVAN & DAVID HALPERN, CABINET OFFICE, UNITED KINGDOM, LIFE SATISFACTION:
THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT 35-36 (2002), available
at http://www.e-democracy.gov.uk/knowledgepool/default.htm?mode=l&pkdocument=28
(suggesting that happiness surveys could be used for policy analysis).
62 Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1363,
1367-68 (2004).
63 A utility function is increasing in income if higher income maps onto higher utility,
and increases at a decreasing rate if it has declining marginal utility-in other words, if the
increase in utility for an incremental dollar of income is lower at higher income levels.
Intuitively, the relation between money and well-being should have these two characteris-
tics, and they provide a strong case for redistributive taxation-one that even the utilita-
rian can accept.
64 Griffith, supra note 62, at 1397-98. For other suggestions that happiness surveys be
used to set tax policy or (relatedly) to measure poverty or inequality, see FREY &
STUTZER, supra note 31, at 176-77, and VAN PRAAG & FERRER-I-CARBONELL, supra note
49, at 239-317.
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surveys.65 HLE policy analysis would be an analogue to QALY-max-
imization. The aim in both cases is to maximize quality-adjusted lon-
gevity. In the latter case, longevity is adjusted for health quality, using
QALY surveys; in the former case, it would be adjusted for happiness,
using happiness surveys.
66
The Nobel prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman sug-
gests a policy-analytic technique which is broadly similar to HLE anal-
ysis.67 Kahneman is skeptical of the standard happiness surveys. He
prefers a moment-based format that asks people to express the quality
of different momentary experiences on a numerical scale, rather than
the standard format which elicits individual statements of overall hap-
piness or life-satisfaction. 68 Still, the basic idea is the same as HLE
analysis, namely happiness maximization. Kahneman's approach
predicts how policies will change individual experiences; translates
those changes into a happiness scale via survey data (in Kahneman's
case, momentary data); and picks the policy with the biggest net hap-
piness benefit.
B. Calibrating Individual Obligations and Entitlements
Up until this point, I have discussed the actual or potential use of
welfare polling data in policy analysis: either cost-benefit analysis or
some alternative policy-analytic technique. But welfare polls have
additional uses. Imagine that a wrongdoer injures some person or
resource. How much should the wrongdoer pay in compensation?
CV surveys, or perhaps other kinds of welfare polls, can help answer
the question.
65 Ruut Veenhoven, Happy Life-Expectancy: A Comprehensive Measure of Quality-of-
Life in Nations, 39 Soc. INDICATORS RES. 1, 29-31 (1996).
66 Veenhoven himself does not propose that the HLE measure be used to evaluate
policies. See id. at 45. But HLE maximization would seem to be at least as plausible as
QALY maximization, which certainly has been proposed by many. See Adler, supra note
25, at 8-10 (discussing view of many public health scholars that QALYs should be effec-
tiveness metric for purposes of health policy cost-effectiveness analysis, i.e., that QALYs
should be maximized subject to cost constraint).
67 Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based
Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 673, 689-92 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000).
68 Id.; see also Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 31,
at 3 [hereinafter Kahneman, Objective Happiness]; Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to
Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1997) [hereinafter
Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham].
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
December 20061
H inOnline  -- 81 .Y.U. L. Rev.  1897 2006
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1. Current Use: Natural Resource Damage Assessment
The Superfund statute (CERCLA), 69 the Oil Pollution Act
(OPA), 70 and the Clean Water Act (CWA) 71 create a federal liability
regime for oil spills and other releases of hazardous substances that
harm publicly owned natural resources.72 The statutes define natural
resources broadly as "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground
water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources. ' 73 State or
federal governments are authorized to assess damages for such harms
and to sue polluters for recovery of these damages. Regulations
issued by the DOI guide assessments under CERCLA and CWA,
74
and the NOAA regulates assessments under OPA.
75
An early version of the DOI regulations contemplated the use of
CV studies. This aspect of the regulations was challenged by industry
but upheld by the D.C. Circuit in an important 1989 decision that
solidified the role of CVs for damage assessment. 76 CVs were given a
further boost in 1993 when a high-profile advisory panel convened by
NOAA, including Kenneth Arrow and other eminent economists,
endorsed their use if conducted in accordance with the panel's guide-
lines. 77 Current DOI regulations explicitly permit the use of CVs in
Type B assessments (those that do not use a standard computer
model). 78 While NOAA regulations do not explicitly authorize the
use of CVs, an appendix lists CVs as a potential tool.
79
CV surveys were in fact employed in the damage assessment for
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill; the multibillion dollar damage esti-
mates generated by the studies helped induce Exxon's large settle-
69 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
70 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2000).
71 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
72 See Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees: Whose Side Are
They Really On?, 5 ENvTL. LAw. 407, 413-18 (1999) (describing relationship between
statutes).
73 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16); 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20). The statutes and implementing regula-
tions are summarized in Charles B. Anderson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs
of Restoration, 72 TUL. L. REV. 417 (1997), and Dale B. Thompson, Valuing the Environ-
ment: Courts' Struggles with Natural Resource Damages, 32 ENVTL. L. 57 (2002).
74 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (2005).
75 15 C.F.R. pt. 990 (2005).
76 Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 474-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
77 See Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602,
4610-11 (Jan. 15, 1993).
78 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(2)(vii) (2005).
79 61 Fed. Reg. 496, 498-99 (Jan. 5, 1996). The D.C. Circuit has upheld the use of CVs
in Oil Pollution Act assessments. Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767,
772-74 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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ment.80 CVs have also been used in a number of less high-profile
cases.
81
2. Potential Use: Damages, Fines, Fees, Taxes
Using CVs in natural resource damage assessments is only the tip
of the iceberg: Whenever monetary damages are meant to compen-
sate for a welfare loss, CVs have a potential role. They can be used on
a one-off basis to make natural resource damage assessments, as has
in fact occurred under the federal regime just described. Alterna-
tively, they might be used to generate a schedule of natural resource
damages, or some other such standardized procedure. The federal
regime includes a standard computer model for smaller pollution
spills, and a number of states use schedules to calculate natural
resource damages.
8 2
Damages, of course, need not be limited to natural resources;
they might compensate harms to persons, too. Of course, given tort
law's solicitude for case-by-case decisionmaking, the notion of using
CVs or other welfare polls to establish a damages schedule for death,
physical injury, pain and suffering, and other nonpecuniary losses
seems quite unrealistic. 83 More feasible is expert testimony at the
damages phase that is grounded in CV surveys.84 These surveys might
also inform workers' compensation schedules, which to a limited
80 Loomis, supra note 37, at 622; see also Richard T. Carson et al., Contingent Valuation
and Lost Passive Use: Damages from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 25 ENvTh. & RESOURCE
ECON. 257, 278 (2003).
81 Loomis, supra note 37, at 621; cf. Thompson, supra note 73, at 78-84 (noting that CV
studies have been prepared in number of natural resource damages cases, often leading to
settlement, but that in the very few adjudicated cases, courts have rejected CV evidence).
Although it appears CVs are most frequently used in this area to estimate damage to
nonuse values, estimating nonuse values has not been their exclusive use and certainly
need not be. See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 37, at 621 (discussing Colorado survey of
residents near hazardous mine and planned California survey to estimate both use and
existence values of beaches and wetlands). The DOI regulations, in fact, prefer CVs for
use values as opposed to nonuse values. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(2)(vii) (2005). The NOAA
appendix, which suggests CVs as a possible method of analysis, mentions their use for both
direct and passive use values. 61 Fed. Reg. at 499.
82 See Anderson, supra note 73, at 457-63 (discussing standard computer model for
federal natural resource damage assessments); Murray B. Rutherford et al., Assessing
Environmental Losses: Judgments of Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 76-80 (1998) (discussing state schedules). Indeed, CVs were, at least at
one point, used as inputs to the federal schedule. See Loomis, supra note 37, at 620;
Rutherford et al., supra, at 78.
83 See Rutherford et al., supra note 82, at 74-76 (discussing personal injury scheduling
abroad and proposals to do so in United States).
84 See, e.g., Brendan I. Koerner, What's Your Happiness Worth?, 3 LEGAL AFF. 56,
56-58 (Jan.[Feb. 2004) (describing economist who testifies as expert in tort cases regarding
size of hedonic damages using WTP measure).
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extent cover not merely lost wages and out-of-pocket medical costs
(where welfare polls would not be useful), but also pain and suffering
(where they would).
85
To be sure, tort law and workers' compensation are the province
of the states. On the other hand, setting fines or fees for behavior that
threatens life, health, natural resources, or other determinants of well-
being falls within the jurisdiction of various federal agencies. And
there is a strong economic justification for doing so where these wel-
fare impacts are "externalities" of the behavior (i.e., where the trans-
action costs of negotiations between actor and cost-bearers are high).
"Fines" have the flavor of a sanction that is clearly established prior to
the welfare-affecting behavior; "fees" (or taxes) have the flavor of a
price that is clearly established ex ante; "damages" have the flavor of
a sanction that is established ex post. But these are fairly thin distinc-
tions. The basic idea is that regulators have good reason for mea-
suring the welfare effects of certain private behaviors on a money
scale and making the actors pay those amounts (either to the state, or
to the harmed parties).
CV studies, in turn, can be used to help determine what the
amounts should be. In one illustrative study, Mauzerall, Kim, Sultan,
and Bradford show how to calculate fees for nitrogen oxides emissions
from power plants. They correlate the location of the plant with pre-
dicted morbidity and mortality effects per unit of pollution
(depending on meterorological conditions and demographics at that
location), and then attach a price to predicted deaths and illnesses
using WTP/WTA for these effects derived from CV as well as
revealed-preference studies. 86
3. Potential Use: Environmental Trading Markets
Environmental trading markets (ETMs) such as "cap-and-trade"
pollution regimes or wetlands banks present a similar potential appli-
cation for CV studies. The basic idea of such markets is that actors
are allotted limits to the amount of environmental damage they can
produce, and can comply with these limits either by reducing their
own harmful behavior or by purchasing credits from other actors.87 A
crucial issue for any ETM is the "currency" for the market. Are
actors allotted limits, and assigned credits for reductions in environ-
85 See Rutherford et al., supra note 82, at 72-73.
86 Denise L. Mauzerall et al., Charging NO, Emitters for Health Damages: An Explora-
tory Analysis 23-25 (CESifo Working Paper No. 1442, 2005) available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=706782.
87 See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environ-
mental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 616-22 (2000).
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mental harm, that are expressed in physical units (tons of pollutant,
acres of wetland)? In nonmonetary units of environmental harm
(fatalities caused, acres of wetland adjusted for environmental quality
in some sense)? Or perhaps in monetary units? The last practice, not
typically employed in current ETMs, might seem unrealistic given the
costs of CV studies.88 But this objection overlooks the possibility of
an ETM function or schedule that converts physical impacts into dol-
lars, depending on characteristics of the environmental resources, the
affected population, and so on. For example, rather than telling a pol-
luting firm that it cannot emit more than X tons of nitrogen oxides
and giving it a tradeable credit for every ton that its emissions are
below the limit, the polluter might instead be told not to emit more
than Y dollar-equivalents of nitrogen oxides, and given a tradeable
one dollar credit for every dollar-equivalent its emissions are below
the allotment. This approach, in contrast with the use of physical units
(the main approach in practice), has the virtue of recognizing that pol-
luting activities with identical physical impacts can have quite hetero-
geneous welfare effects.
A final important note: CVs would seem to be the natural wel-
fare polling format for setting damages, fines, and fees, which after all
are dollar amounts. But QALY-to-dollar and happiness-to-dollar con-
versions could in principle be used here, as in cost-benefit analysis-
and with similar justification. Heinz Welsch has in fact used happiness
surveys to quantify the monetary cost of nitrogen dioxide pollution,
using a methodology very similar to Van Praag/Ferrer-i-Carbonell's
happiness-based monetization of noise.8 9
C. Government Communications
1. Current Use: Environmental Impact Statements and Rulemaking
Notices
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal
agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement to accompany
all "proposals for .. major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment." 90 This brief language has made
environmental scoping a pervasive aspect of federal agency decision-
making, as evidenced by the large body of federal case law about the
88 See id. at 634-35.
89 Compare Heinz Welsch, Preferences over Prosperity and Pollution: Environmental
Valuation Based on Happiness Surveys, 55 KYKLOS 473 (2002), with VAN PRAAG &
FERRER-I-CARBONELL, supra note 49. Note also that QALYs or happiness units could, in
principle, be used as the ETM currency rather than dollars.
90 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
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impact-statement requirement 91 and by the sheer number of impact
statements and preparatory documents. It is estimated that roughly
five hundred impact statements and fifty thousand environmental
assessments (preliminary documents that consider whether the federal
action requires an impact statement) are issued by federal agencies
every year.92
It is now clear that purely human impacts do not trigger NEPA.
An action must have an effect on the physical environment-on "the
air, land, [or] water" 93-to come within the scope of the statute. 94
But, once triggered, the statute requires an impact statement that
describes the health, economic, and social effects of the agency action
that are proximately caused by its physical impact-not merely the
physical impact itself.95 The bottom line is that the kinds of effects
described by the NEPA statements are multifold, including health and
mortality, land transformation, changes in land use, changes to water
or air quality, effects on basic services (schools, police, fire), ecological
impacts, noise and vibration, effects on transportation systems, aes-
thetics, recreation, and even housing quality or employment. 96 CV
surveys are an obvious technique for quantifying these sorts of effects,
and indeed agencies have used CVs to prepare environmental impact
statements under NEPA.
97
NEPA is the quintessential example of a "communication-
forcing" statute: It does not give substantive priority to
environmental considerations, but simply requires agencies to publicly
91 See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (2d ed. Release
4, 2006) (reviewing NEPA case law).
92 NICHOLAS C. YOST, NEPA DESKBOOK 9 (3d ed. 2003).
93 Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995).
94 Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772-73 (1983);
see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (2005) (defining "human environment" for purposes of
NEPA).
95 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 106-07 (1983).
96 See, e.g., CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A COM-
PREHENSIVE GUIDE TO PROJECT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING 175-82 (2000); R.K. JAIN ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 239-79 (2d ed. 2002).
97 Loomis, supra note 37, at 614-16; John B. Loomis, Use of Contingent Values of Wild-
life and Habitat Preservation in Policy and Benefit-Cost Analyses, in HANDBOOK ON CON-
TINGENT VALUATION 292 (Anna Alberini & James R. Kahn eds., 2006); E-mail from
Charles Eccleston, Member, Bd. of Dirs., Nat'l Ass'n of Envtl. Prof'ls, to author (Dec. 22,
2005) (on file with the New York University Law Review); see also Venkatachalam, supra
note 16, at 89 ("The CV method is a widely used nonmarket valuation method especially in
the areas of ... environmental impact assessment."); DAVID JAMES, Economic Valuation
Techniques, in THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC TECHNIQUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 63, 86-90 (1994) (discussing potential use of CVs in environmental impact
assessment); RICHARD K. MORGAN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A METHOD-
OLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 230-32 (1998) (same). It is difficult to quantify how frequently
CVs are used under NEPA, because there is no searchable database of impact statements.
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communicate environmental effects, which might be useful insofar as
it forces the agency to give those effects the weight required by
existing statutes, or mobilizes political action by interested groups to
amend the statutes. An even broader communication-forcing statute
is § 553(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which generally
obliges an agency to provide a public "statement of basis and pur-
pose"-typically in the Federal Register-when it enacts legally
binding rules.98 When welfare polls figure in internal agency delibera-
tions preceding the enactment of a rule, the § 553(c) statement accom-
panying the rule may well discuss the polls.
The most frequent cases involve cost-benefit analysis-because,
to date, the leading function of welfare polls has been to inform cost-
benefit analysis. For example, the FDA's Federal Register statements
frequently use QALYs to describe the health effects of rules, since the
FDA frequently incorporates QALY-to-dollar conversions in its cost-
benefit analyses. 99 Or the EPA, having relied on a CV survey in
conducting its cost-benefit analysis of a rule, may then publish this
analysis in the Federal Register. 100 The communicative role of welfare
polls in this context flows from their function in policy analysis, but is
conceptually distinct. It is easy enough to imagine a nonpublic pro-
cess of policy analysis, as indeed can occur for decisions that are not
§ 553(c) rules or covered by NEPA or some other communication-
forcing mandate.
2. Potential Use: Other Government Communications
Government communications to the public are multifold,
including but hardly limited to communications that describe pro-
posed policies. Consider communications about governmental
agendas, structures, or laws, or communications about the world (the
state of the polity, say). GNP reports are an obvious example of the
latter. Because welfare is morally and legally relevant in many con-
texts, it will often be appropriate for government communications to
include facts about well-being, potentially bringing welfare polls into
play.
98 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000). Rules of "agency organization, procedure, or practice" are
exempted from the notice-and-comment requirement, id. § 553(b), as are the categories of
legislative rules described in 5 U.S.C. § 553(a). However, in the case of rules relating to
"public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts," id. § 553(a)(2), agencies often vol-
untarily choose to follow the § 553(c) procedures. PIERCE, supra note 1, at 505.
99 See Adler, supra note 25, at 58 n.195 (citing Federal Register statements where FDA
has used QALY-to-dollar conversions).
100 See supra note 42 (citing Federal Register statements where EPA relied on CVs for
cost-benefit analysis).
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I will not attempt to discuss these potential communicative func-
tions systematically, but here are some exemplary proposals.
Kahneman and co-authors propose the creation of "national well-
being accounts," analogous to GNP. Total well-being would be calcu-
lated based on the time spent by U.S. citizens in different activities,
multiplied by the happiness measures for those activities, as derived
using Kahneman's experiential surveys:
The goal of public policy is not to maximize measured GDP, so a
better measure of well-being could help to inform policy. Here we
propose measuring national well-being by weighting the time allo-
cated to various activities by the subjective experiences associated
with those activities....
The [national well-being account] can be used to summarize
the average affective well-being of a population. Three potential
uses are the following: (i) Changes in well-being in a country over
time can be tracked .... (ii) For subpopulations (e.g., rich vs. poor)
at a given time, differences in well-being can be attributed to [differ-
ences in time allocation plus differences in affect from a given
activity]. (iii) Differences in well-being between countries can like-
wise be compared and decomposed. 10 1
The psychologist Ed Diener, one of the leading happiness
scholars, has a parallel proposal for a "national index of subjective
well-being," which would incorporate data from more traditional hap-
piness surveys. 10 2 Finally, numerous scholars propose environmental
accounts that would track the state of the environment, and some
have suggested that CVs could be used in preparing these. 103
III
Do WELFARE POLLS PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL
INFORMATION ABOUT WELFARE?
The preceding Part described a range of contexts in which gov-
ernment officials currently do, or potentially might, rely on valuations
derived from welfare polls. Whether officials ought to do so, of
course, depends on the informational content of these polls. Do they
indeed provide substantial evidence about human well-being?
Think of the worry this way. As Eric Posner and I have argued at
length elsewhere, well-being consists in the satisfaction of preferences
101 Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON. ASS'N
PAPERS & PROC. 429, 433 (2004).
102 Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a
National Index, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 34, 40 (2000).
103 See, e.g., Navrud & Pruckner, supra note 20, at 15-16 (discussing possibility of envi-
ronmental accounting, including use of CVs).
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that are self-interested (this rules out moral and other disinterested
preferences) and that survive some degree of idealization. 10 4 Com-
bining these conditions on preferences with conditions for surveys to
evidence the preferences that respondents actually have, one might
worry (1) that the preferences driving the survey are disinterested.
One might also worry that, even if they are self-interested, the prefer-
ences are nonideal in the sense of being (2) poorly informed, (3) dis-
torted by cognitive bias, or (4) not the result of sufficient mental
effort. Further, the respondent's preferences might be self-interested
and sufficiently idealized, but there may be slippage between the pref-
erences and the answer provided in the survey, either because (5) the
respondent is behaving strategically and not answering the question
truthfully, or (6) is answering a different question from the one liter-
ally asked by the survey. Finally, it might be objected that, even if
each and every respondent in the survey has truthfully revealed her
self-interested and sufficiently idealized preferences, the sample of
respondents is (7) not representative of the population that will be
affected by the policy that the survey's numbers will inform.
There is in fact a large scholarly literature concerning the validity
of CV, QALY, and happiness surveys, and most of the specific objec-
tions raised in this literature fall under one of the seven headings just
stated. This Part surveys these difficulties. I conclude that none dis-
ables the enterprise of welfare polling but that many point to ways in
which simplistic polling formats should be improved.
A different worry is philosophical: Perhaps I have specified the
idealizing conditions for valuation incorrectly. Arguably, the respon-
dent's preferences might be self-interested, undistorted, fully
informed, and the product of sufficient mental effort and still not
track her well-being. In particular, "objective list" theorists of well-
being might insist that individual interest consists in the attainment of
goods such as accomplishment or friendship, not in the satisfaction of
preferences (even ideal ones). This is an important concern that I
have grappled with at length in other work and will only briefly
address here.10 5 First, the distance between a full-information prefer-
104 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 28-39; Matthew D.
Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 241, 264-67, 289-302 (2000); Adler & Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis,
supra note 39; Adler, supra note 25, at 17-30; Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit
Analysis, supra note 39, at 197-204.
105 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 28-39, 51-52; Adler,
supra note 104, at 264-67, 297-302; Adler, supra note 55, at 1303-10.
A third standard account of well-being is hedonism, which construes well-being as
pleasure and the avoidance of pain or (somewhat more inclusively) the satisfaction of the
subject's preferences regarding her own mental states. This theory, even in the more inclu-
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entialist and an objectivist account of well-being may be very small;
quite plausibly, objective goods are just those features of life-histories
that individuals who have full information and satisfy other idealizing
conditions generally converge in preferring. Second, even if it is pos-
sible for an individual's self-interested, undistorted, fully informed,
and effortful preferences to diverge from her well-being, there is
surely some substantial correlation between the two. So even the
objectivist should concede that surveys that satisfy the idealizing con-
ditions surveyed in this Part will provide substantial (if not perfect)
information about well-being.
But it is an open question whether surveys can indeed be
designed to sufficiently approximate those idealizing conditions: to
screen out disinterested or distorted preferences, provide respondents
with sufficient information, induce them to make a mental effort, and
ensure they understand the question and answer it truthfully-and to
do all this with a sufficiently representative sample of respondents.
These are genuine obstacles to the enterprise of welfare polling-even
for the preferentialist about well-being, let alone the objectivist. It is
these obstacles that are surveyed in this Part.
A. Moral and Other Disinterested Preferences
Much of the scholarly criticism of CV surveys concerns moral
preferences. 10 6 This is of particular concern when it comes to the val-
uation of the environment. Environmental economists distinguish
between "use" values and "nonuse" values. A subject's use value is
her WTP/WITA for an impact on some part of the environment with
which she physically interacts, such as a park that she visits or a lake in
which she fishes. Her nonuse value is her WTP/WTA for some envi-
ronmental change that does not physically affect her, such as degrada-
tion in some wilderness area that she never plans to visit, or the
extinction of an endangered species that she has never seen.
sive version, is too narrow as a full account of well-being, because events and states outside
the subject's mind can be intrinsically good or bad for her welfare. See A.DLER & POSNER,
NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 28-31; supra note 60.
106 For critical scholarship that points to the role of moral or otherwise "noneconomic"
preferences in producing CV values, and the related problem of scope or embedding
effects, see, for example, Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is
Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1994) [hereinafter Diamond
& Hausman, Is Some Number Better than No Number?]; Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A.
Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VAL-
UATION, supra note 16, at 3; and Daniel Kahneman et al., Economic Preferences or Attitude
Expressions? An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, 19 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 203 (1999). This scholarship is surveyed in Carson et al., supra note 16, at 177,
181-84.
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CVs for environmental nonuse values often display certain anom-
alies. First, stated valuations are often extreme. Respondents claim
an infinite WTA for the disappearance of the good, or a zero WTP to
preserve it, or refuse to answer the question entirely. Second, nonex-
treme stated valuations are often insensitive to the scope or scale of
the good.107 For example, one well-known study by Desvousges told
three different groups of respondents that some number N of
migrating birds die each year by drowning in uncovered waste-oil
ponds, and inquired about WTP to save the birds by putting covers on
the ponds. The number N was varied among the groups: The first
group was asked about WTP to save 2000 birds, the second 20,000, the
third 200,000. Mean WTP values for the different surveys were virtu-
ally identical, despite the ten-fold differences in the size of the bird
population saved: $80, $78, and $88.108 Similarly, Kahneman and
Knetsch found that Toronto residents were willing to pay only slightly
more to clean up all the polluted lakes in Ontario than to clean up
polluted lakes in one part of Ontario.10 9
Moral preferences plausibly explain, or help explain, both of
these anomalies.110 By "moral preference," I mean some sort of
choice-relevant attitude that is directly based in the respondent's
moral views, opinions, beliefs, and so on, rather than concern for her
own interests. Moral preferences may well be lexicographic: Moral
prohibitions on degrading the environment may be seen as absolute,
or at least never overridable by benefit to the respondent. This
explains infinite WTAs. A perceived moral prohibition on degrada-
tion might translate into an objection to the very enterprise of contin-
gent valuation and thus "protest votes": refusals to answer, or zero
WTPs, or (once again) infinite WTAs.
107 See Carson et al., supra note 16, at 181-84; Venkatachalam, supra note 16, at 95-102.
108 William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent
Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra note 16, at
91, 100.
109 See Kahneman et al., supra note 106, at 213 (discussing this study).
110 See sources cited supra note 106; Jonathan Baron, Biases in the Quantitative Mea-
surement of Values for Public Decisions, 122 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72, 74-77, 82-84 (1997);
Russell K. Blarney, Citizens, Consumers and Contingent Valuation: Clarification and the
Expression of Citizen Values and Issue-Opinions, in FORESTRY, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 103 (W.L. Adamowicz et al. eds., 1996); Brett R. Gelso & Jeffrey M.
Peterson, The Influence of Ethical Attitudes on the Demand for Environmental Recreation:
Incorporating Lexicographic Preferences, 53 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 35 (2005); Clive L. Spash
& Nick Hanley, Preferences, Information and Biodiversity Protection, 12 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 191 (1995); Thomas H. Stevens et al., Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife:
What Do CVM Estimates Really Show?, 67 LAND ECON. 390 (1991); Arild Vatn, Environ-
mental Valuation and Rationality, 80 LAND ECON. 1, 11-13 (2004).
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Further, and a bit more subtly, scholars have identified a number
of mechanisms by which moral preferences could produce scope-
insensitivity. Respondents might understand the CV survey as asking
about their willingness to make a charitable contribution in the service
of their moral preferences, which is limited by their perceived budget
for charity. They might get a "warm glow" from promoting those
preferences, a kind of positive feeling occasioned by charitable acts,
and state a valuation which is really their WTPIWTA for that warm
glow, not for the object of the preferences. Or the preferences might
be weakly lexicographic, ordering any degree of degradation over any
money loss to the subject, up to some threshold.
Critics are right to worry about the extreme-value and scope
anomalies. But it is hard to see how the role of moral preferences in
fueling anomalous valuations in CV studies targeted at nonuse values
would justify a general disavowal of CV surveys. Rather, it justifies a
narrowing of the surveys' focus. Respondents should be focused on
their self-interested preferences; moral and other disinterested prefer-
ences should be screened out.
My position, it should be stressed, is not that citizens' moral and
other disinterested preferences have no role to play in the political
process. That would be an absurd position. The claim, rather, is that
CV studies are not the appropriate mechanism for rendering govern-
mental choice sensitive to such preferences. Other mechanisms (for
example, deliberative polls) are better. CV surveys ask the respon-
dent to express her WTP/WTA for policies, taking into consideration
her existing wealth. Because money is a "primary good" (i.e., generi-
cally useful for well-being), this is a plausible, if rough, way to capture
the impact of the policies on her well-being. 1 ' By contrast, it is very
hard to see why an individual's WTP/WTA for a policy is the correct
measure (even roughly) of the degree of influence that her moral pref-
erence for the policy should have. Both the democratic procedure of
one person/one vote, and deliberative procedures that (in effect)
weight moral preferences in proportion to how persuasive and cogent
they are, constitute procedures for incorporating citizens' moral pref-
erences into governmental choice that have a much stronger norma-
tive grounding than the CV procedure. In any event, that is the
position taken here-that citizens' disinterested preferences surely
ought to influence governmental choice, but not via CV studies, which
are best defended as a mechanism for measuring welfare impacts. CV
III See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 62-123 (defending
cost-benefit analysis as proxy for overall well-being); Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis, supra note 39, at 216-38 (same).
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studies should therefore be structured to screen out moral and other
disinterested preferences.
To be sure, there is a need for much research, theoretical and
applied, on how to perform the screening. First, there is some fuzzi-
ness, as a theoretical matter, about where the boundary between self-
interest and disinterest lies. For example, are "altruistic" preferences
concerning friends or family members welfare-enhancing or disinter-
ested? 112 But at a minimum, it seems clear that purely moral prefer-
ences fall within the disinterested category.
Second, how should surveys be structured to wash out moral pref-
erences? Should respondents simply be reminded to direct their
attention to their own well-being? Will exhortations to provide self-
regarding valuations work to screen out moral preferences-or will
they trigger a protest reaction by respondents? The applied econo-
mists who work on CV design have done very little to answer this
second set of questions 13 because of the mistaken orthodoxy in eco-
nomics that simply denies a distinction between disinterested and self-
interested preferences.
114
At a minimum, moral preferences can be screened out in a rough
and ready way by limiting the survey population to those who (on our
best current theory of well-being) have a welfare stake in the project
or resource. In the case of environmental goods-again, the area
where CVs have bumped up against moral preferences most vio-
lently-the distinction between use and nonuse works fairly well.
1 5
112 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 39.
113 Economists have used second-order techniques to determine whether moral prefer-
ences are influencing valuations, for example "includ[ing] questions in the survey to probe
respondents' understanding and motivations." Boyle, supra note 16, at 145 (citing exam-
ples). It is also fairly routine to ignore extreme valuations. See, e.g., Kevin J. Boyle & John
C. Bergstrom, Doubt, Doubts, and Doubters: The Genesis of a New Research Agenda?, in
VALUING ENVIROMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 16, at 183, 196-99. However, elimi-
nating numerical outliers is not a full solution, since moral preferences can also produce
nonextreme values, for example through a charitable contribution or "warm glow" effect.
There is a literature on the use of so-called "cheap talk scripts" to reduce "hypothet-
ical bias" in CVs (i.e., the tendency of respondents to overstate what they actually would
pay). See, e.g., James J. Murphy & Thomas H. Stevens, Contingent Valuation, Hypothetical
Bias, and Experimental Economics, 33 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 182, 186-87
(2004). Researchers have not conceptualized these scripts as a way to screen out moral
preferences, but in fact some of them might (inter alia) do that. See, e.g., James T. Murphy
et al., An Empirical Study of Hypothetical Bias in Voluntary Contribution Contingent Valu-
ation: Does Cheap Talk Matter? 1-2 (U. Mass., Working Paper No. 2003-2, 2003)
(describing "cheap talk script" that enjoined respondents not to articulate fair price for
given good).
114 See, e.g., W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valu-
ation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 33 (1994).
115 1 say "fairly well" because nonuse values subsume not merely existence values but
also option values-self-interested preferences to preserve some environmental good that
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
December 20061
H inOnline  -- 81 .Y.U. L. Rev.  1909 2006
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Those who do not physically interact with some environmental
amenity should not be asked about their WTP/WTA for it; those who
do should be asked questions that are targeted at the interaction (e.g.,
how much are you WTP/WTA to visit the park, see the view, etc.) and
not at the sheer existence of the amenity. In point of fact, administra-
tive agencies already implicitly do this outside the area of environ-
mental law. 116 The Department of Agriculture does not ask animal
rights activists for their WTP/WTA to have slaughterhouses closed;
the Postal Service does not ask religious activists for their WTP/WTA
to prevent the shipping of pornography through the mail; the FDA
does not ask libertarians for their WTP/WTA to prevent the imposi-
tion of paternalistic regulations on others.
The discussion to this point has focused on the CV instrument.
What about QALY and happiness surveys? QALY surveys can
inquire about the respondent's own actual or hypothetical health state
(as in patient or general population surveys), or about someone else's
health state (as in surveys where physicians are asked to rate a
patient's health). 117 In principle, the same is true of happiness states:
Someone might be asked to rate her own happiness or someone else's.
It is easy to see how the latter sort of QALY and happiness surveys
might elicit preferences that are not welfare-focused. Health profes-
sional H, asked to evaluate patient P's health state on a scale from
zero to one, might give a number that expresses (1) the contribution
that the health state makes to P's well-being; (2) how healthy the state
is, as a matter of pure "healthiness," detached from well-being; 118 or
(3) how morally important it is to redress the state. Similarly
(although the point is harder to see), psychologist H asked to rate P's
the respondent does not currently use but might use in the future. Nonuse values might
also incorporate bequest values, but (as with existence values) these will presumably be
substantially moralized, involving a sense of obligation to future generations.
116 See ADLER & POSNER, NEw FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 126-27, 133-36; Adler
& Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 39, at 282; Diamond &
Hausman, Is Some Number Better than No Number?, supra note 106, at 59.
117 Another example of a QALY format that asks the respondent to value someone
else's health is the so-called "person tradeoff" (PTO) format, which asks about tradeoffs
between programs that benefit different numbers of persons in different health states; nat-
urally invites the respondent to make a moral judgment; and is not much used in practice.
See, e.g., Brazier et at., supra note 29, at 26-27, 39-41. Unlike CVs, PTOs may well be an
appropriate way to elicit citizen moral preferences. That is not an issue I will pursue
here-since survey instruments such as deliberative polls, or perhaps PTOs that focus on
moral preferences, and welfare polls are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
See infra text accompanying notes 277-82. The critical point for my purposes is that stan-
dard QALY survey formats, namely time tradeoff and standard gamble questions that ask
about the respondent's health, seem well-suited to serve as welfare polls even if physician
surveys or the PTOs are not.
118 See Adler, supra note 25, at 11-13.
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happiness on a scale from one to seven might answer purely as a
matter of psychological intensity (in some sense), rather than in terms
of the contribution that the state makes to P's quality of life.
By contrast, QALY and happiness surveys that ask the respon-
dent to rate her own health or psychological state (actual or hypothet-
ical) on a numerical scale-like CV studies that ask about the
subject's WTPiWTA for her own health or psychological state, or
about her use of environmental goods-would seem naturally to
invite a self-interested perspective. More research on the issue is cer-
tainly needed. It should be noted, however, that the critics of QALY
and happiness studies have not identified extreme value or scope
anomalies analogous to those that affect CV studies for nonuse values.
The possibility of moral preferences is not a theme in the scholarly
literature that is critical of QALY and happiness studies, in contrast
with the literature that is critical of CV studies. This is some (admit-
tedly preliminary) evidence that moral or otherwise disinterested
preferences do not in fact substantially affect QALY and happiness
studies that ask respondents about their own health or happiness
states-the main variants currently in use.
B. Information
Welfare surveys will provide valuable data about well-being only
if survey respondents are sufficiently informed. As the prestigious
NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation notes: "Adequate information
must be provided to respondents about the environmental program
that is offered. It must be defined in a way that is relevant to damage
assessment.' 19 But the Panel's bland advice is not very helpful here.
What specific steps can welfare pollsters take to inform respondents?
And how successful can these techniques be expected to be in over-
coming respondents' informational deficits?
Start with CV surveys. These surveys do typically provide some
information to the respondent, at least about certain attributes of the
good at stake and the change in those attributes for which WTP/WTA
is being elicited, and sometimes about other facts, such as substitute
and complementary goods.1
20
119 Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4608 (Jan.
15, 1993).
120 For discussions about the provision of information in CV surveys, see BATEMAN ET
AL., supra note 16, at 308-10, 331-32; Boyle, supra note 16, at 123-33; Boyle & Bergstrom,
supra note 113, at 193-95; Alistair Munro & Nick D. Hanley, Information, Uncertainty, and
Contingent Valuation, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 16, at 258;
and Venkatachalam, supra note 16, at 103-05. On information provision in preference
surveys generally, see John W. Payne et al., Measuring Constructed Preferences: Towards a
Building Code, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 254-56 (1999).
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Provision of information on the item being valued is the funda-
mental component of a contingent valuation survey. Personal inter-
views have the highest ability because visual information is provided
and an interviewer is available to explain the information and
answer questions. A mail survey is more limited because no inter-
viewer is present to explain the visual information. Ability to pro-
vide information in a telephone survey is much more limited
because no visual information is available. Mixed mode surveys
using a telephone interview after respondents have received written
and visual information in the mail ... is one way to overcome the
informational deficiencies of telephone interviews.
121
There is a literature that examines the effect of information on contin-
gent valuation, which tends to find that information provision-or at
least new information, not already known to the respondents-does
shift WTP/WTA amounts.
122
Even in the face-to-face format, the information provided in CV
surveys is nothing close to the full information that an idealized-pref-
erence account of well-being requires. Outcome 0 is better than out-
come 0* for person P only if P, under ideal conditions that include
something like complete information, or at least the total amount of
information that P can comprehend, prefers 0 to Q*. However these
idealizing conditions are specified, 123 they presumably require a much
richer description of the world than CV surveys actually provide.
Why the shortfall? To begin, there is a tradeoff between the
amount of data provided and other desiderata, such as respondent's
motivation and her success at processing the data. P, packed to the
gills with information, might be bored or overwhelmed.
124
The CV literature does not systematically discuss this important
problem, namely how to optimize the amount of information given
the cognitive and motivational costs of total information. 125 Part of
the solution, presumably, is to use information-provision devices (such
as helpful visual aids) that facilitate comprehension and processing.
126
121 Boyle, supra note 16, at 121.
122 Munro & Hanley, supra note 120, at 259-61; Venkatachalam, supra note 16, at
103-05. For a parallel finding about the effect of information on the policy judgments of
respondents to deliberative polls, see Luskin et al., supra note 7.
123 For a discussion, see THOMAS L. CARSON, VALUE AND THE GOOD LiFE 219-39
(2000).
124 See, e.g., BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 309; Payne et al., supra note 120, at 255.
125 See generally Boyle & Bergstrom, supra note 113, at 195 (arguing for more research
on information effects and fewer ad hoc practices).
126 Payne et al., supra note 120, at 255. Cf. Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent
Valuation, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4612 (Jan. 15, 1993) (stating that pictures can be helpful in
providing information but can also generate unwanted effects); Boyle, supra note 16, at
127 (same).
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Surveys can also omit irrelevant information, which can interfere
with the processing of relevant data. In practice, at least implicitly,
agencies often do this by using CVs that redescribe the goods at stake,
focusing on the attributes that (the agency believes) are directly wel-
fare-relevant rather than merely having some causal connection with
the respondents' well-being. For example, health or safety agencies
that perform cost-benefit analyses of policies to reduce ambient, food,
or workplace toxins do not employ CV studies that ask respondents
about different concentrations of the toxins or different mitigation
technologies. Rather, these studies ask about WTP/WTA for a
change in fatality risk. Similarly, an environmental agency doing a
cost-benefit analysis of improved hunting and fishing opportunities
would probably not describe at great length the variety of ecological
changes producing larger game or fish stocks, but would ask about
WTP/WTA for the relevant end-result of these changes, namely
increased numbers of game or fish or increased catch rate.
12 7
A yet more systematic version of this idea-that the informa-
tional base for surveys should include only directly welfare-relevant
information-is exemplified by the so-called "conjoint analysis"
variant of contingent valuation. In this format, various dimensions
along which options can vary are defined, including both money costs
to the respondents and other dimensions. The respondent is then
asked to choose among options described in terms of their locations
on the dimensions.12 8 For example, recreational users of a lake might
be asked to choose between the status quo and a clean-up measure
characterized in terms of the tax burden, the size of the fish popula-
tion, water clarity, and whether or not the water is potable.
A very similar approach is often used in QALY valuation. In the
QALY context, the problem of incomplete information is often dis-
cussed with reference to the choice between patient and general popu-
lation surveys. Various noninformational considerations arguably
weigh in favor of surveying the general population-for example, the
fact that patients may be more prone to certain preference distortions
or more likely to behave strategically. 129 On the other hand,
patients-by virtue of their direct experience of the health state-will
be better informed about it.
127 See Adler & Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 39, at 283;
Adler, supra note 17, at 1009-10, 1012-13.
128 On conjoint analysis in the CV context, see generally BATEMAN ET AL., supra note
16, at 248-95, and Thomas P. Holmes & Wiktor L. Adamowicz, Attribute-Based Methods,
in A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 16, at 171.
129 COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 100 (Marthe R. Gold et al. eds.,
1996); Dolan, supra note 28, at 1739.
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In assessing health states, a [general population] sample may be
asked to consider a not-heretofore-experienced health state as well
as to perform the unfamiliar task of comparing and rating health
states against one another. The level of understanding of the nature
of particular health states by members of the general public or by
others who are not experiencing the health state is not always accu-
rate .... Although efforts can be made to provide in-depth descrip-
tions of the health state, lengthy descriptions can result in cognitive
overload .... 130
The use of conjoint analysis in general-population QALY surveys
is one response to this dilemma. Consider: A citizen asked to assign a
health state to a 0-1 scale might be (1) simply told the name of the
state ("pancreatitis," "diabetes"); (2) given detailed information about
the bodily changes that constitute the health state; (3) given some of
that information, plus some information about the effect of the state
on the subject's life (how painful it is, how much mobility is
restricted); or (4) be provided this welfare-relevant information in a
systematic way. Many QALY surveys take this last approach, using
"health classification systems" to characterize health states-a direct
analogue of the conjoint analysis approach to CVs. 13 1 For example,
the Health Utilities Index, one of the most widely used health classifi-
cation systems, characterizes health states as a combination of loca-
tions along eight dimensions: vision, hearing, speech, ambulation,
dexterity, emotion, cognition, and pain.
132
Conjoint analysis is an important tool for QALY and CV surveys,
but it should be stressed that the technique is no panacea. First,
bringing into play all the welfare-relevant dimensions may be cogni-
tively overwhelming for survey respondents. Second, and more fun-
damentally, part of the function of welfare polling formats is to help
determine what the dimensions of welfare are, not merely to quantify
the tradeoffs among dimensions. Conjoint analysis is no help in the
former task. This observation suggests that the practice of welfare
polling, ideally, should have a bifurcated structure. Many QALY or
CV surveys surely should take for granted a set of welfare dimensions,
using conjoint analysis or less formal techniques to focus respondents
on the relative contributions of those dimensions to well-being; but
other surveys should be undertaken to identify the dimensions them-
selves. Indeed, some survey work of this latter sort has occurred.
133
130 COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE, supra note 129, at 100.
131 See Brazier et al., supra note 29, at 57-81; Dolan, supra note 28, at 1731-32, 1744-45.
132 David H. Feeny et al., Health Utilities Index, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND
PHARMACOECONOMICS IN CLINICAL TRIALS 239, 241-43 (Bert Spilker ed., 2d ed. 1996).
133 See infra Part V (describing WHOQOL survey).
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I have focused on the tradeoff between the epistemic costs and
benefits of information provision. Surveys, ideally, should evidence
what people in an idealized informational, cognitive, and motivational
state prefer; but providing more information may impair respondents'
cognition and motivation. A different kind of cost of information pro-
vision is more prosaic.1 34 Providing fuller information is expensive:
In-person surveys, which do that best, are more expensive than mail
or telephone surveys. This problem-the resource cost of securing or
transmitting information-is of course a general one in policy analysis
and is not limited to surveys. 135 Part of a solution has been already
discussed: Rather than do a series of quick CV or QALY studies for
particular decisions, agencies might perform a few very high-quality
CV or QALY studies and incorporate their results in a multitude of
decisions, for example, via schedules. The resource costs of informa-
tion provision can be spread over multiple decisions.
Standard happiness surveys do not typically concern themselves
with information provision: The respondent is presumed to know
about her own life and is just asked to rate it. One central thrust of
the critical literature is to challenge this assumption. The subject may
have forgotten facts about her own life (even her experiential states),
or those facts may not be present to her mind.
When asked, "Taking all things together, how wouldyou say things
are these days?" respondents are ideally assumed to review the
myriad of relevant aspects of their lives and to integrate them into a
mental representation of their life as a whole. In reality, however,
individuals rarely retrieve all information that may be relevant to a
judgment. Instead, they truncate the search process as soon as
enough information has come to mind to form a judgment with suf-
ficient subjective certainty. Hence, the judgment is based on the
information that is most accessible at that point in time.
136
Kahneman's competitor proposal to the standard happiness-survey
methodology137 is an attempt to survey individuals about aspects of
their experiential life about which they can be assumed to be well
(indeed, perfectly) informed-namely, what a current experience feels
like-and to circumvent their fallible memories about past exper-
iences. This eases the informational demands of surveys and may well
be an improvement on the standard format.
134 See Munro & Hanley, supra note 120, at 272-78 (discussing socially and privately
optimal level of information for CV surveys, given that securing information can be costly).
135 See, e.g., Maxine E. Dakins, The Value of the Value of Information, 5 HuM. & Eco-
LOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 281, 287-88 (1999).
136 Schwarz & Strack, supra note 31, at 63 (citation omitted).
137 See supra notes 6"-68 and accompanying text.
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C. Preference Distortions
The idealized preferences that constitute well-being are rational
preferences. They must satisfy certain structural conditions. Those
conditions plausibly include the axioms of expected utility theory. To
be sure, the correctness of that particular theory of rationality is open
to debate. 138 But however "preference distortions" are defined, it
seems clear that respondents to welfare polls are often in their grip.
And this fact about respondents (like the other features discussed in
this Part, for example, that respondents may be disinterested, lack suf-
ficient information, and so on) potentially undercuts the utility of wel-
fare polls.
What, then, are the plausible preference distortions that charac-
terize the respondents to CV, QALY, and happiness surveys, and how
might they be addressed?
The CV literature identifies a number of major distortions. We
have known since the seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman that
ordinary individuals deviate from expected utility theory in processing
probabilities, 139 so it is not surprising that survey respondents in par-
ticular do. Expected utility theory implies that WTPIWTA for small
increments in risks should be roughly proportional to the size of the
change; but many studies have found that stated WTP/WTA amounts
tend to fall far short of proportionality, often changing very little in
response to risk changes (a kind of scope-insensitivity).1 40 Second,
CV surveys regularly show large disparities between WTP and WTA,
even where income effects are not in play (for example, in the well-
known study where respondents endowed with a coffee mug had
WTA values much higher than the WTP values of respondents not
138 Expected utility theory's failures as a descriptive theory of human action are clear.
See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 139, 142. Whether it fails as the best normative account
is less clear. On that issue, see Matthew D. Adler, The Puzzle of "Ex Ante Efficiency":
Does Rational Approvability Have Moral Weight?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1255, 1257 n.2
(2003) (citing sources presenting expected-utility account of rationality); Matthew D.
Adler, Rational Choice, Rational Agenda-Setting, and Constitutional Law: Does the Consti-
tution Require Basic or Strengthened Public Rationality?, in LINKING POLITICS AND LAW
109, 112 (Christoph Engel & Adrienne Hfritier eds., 2003) (same); and id. at 112-13,
127-31 (discussing challenges to expected utility account).
139 See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 84-188
(1993).
140 E.g., Baron, supra note 110, at 74; Jane Beattie et al., On the Contingent Valuation of
Safety and the Safety of Contingent Valuation: Part 1-Caveat Investigator, 17 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5, 20-21 (1998); James K. Hammitt & John D. Graham, Willingness to Pay
for Health Protection: Inadequate Sensitivity to Probability?, 18 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
33 (1999).
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thus endowed).' 4 1 These disparities are, to a substantial extent, a
product of "loss aversion": Individuals frame effects as losses or gains
relative to some arbitrary reference point, weighting losses more
heavily than gains. 142 Even if one rejects expected utility theory as the
correct account of rational choice, a strong normative case can be
made that loss aversion is a kind of preference distortion.
Third, respondents evince "tradeoff resistance"-in particular, a
resistance to trading off "priceless" goods such as health, life, or
friendship for money. Tradeoff effects (like moral preferences) are
evidenced by protest votes or scope-insensitivity for the priceless
goods. 143 Whether tradeoff resistance is really a preference distortion
depends on large issues about the incommensurability of welfare
dimensions that I cannot pursue here, but there is a plausible case that
certain aspects of tradeoff resistance are irrational. 44 Finally, a
variety of other distortions have been observed in CV research-for
example, a tendency to anchor on the initial bid in the auction format,
or a "range bias" in the case of the payment card format.
1 45
QALY surveys have parallel distortions. The "standard gamble"
format assigns numbers to health states by asking respondents for a
probability that makes them indifferent between a lottery over death
and life, and the health state. Respondents may fail to value such lot-
teries in accordance with expected utility theory.' 46 The "time
tradeoff" format asks respondents for the time span spent in a per-
141 The empirical literature on the WTP/WTA disparity is reviewed in John K. Horowitz
& Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTP/WTA Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGr,,rr.
426 (2006). There is a large theoretical literature about the sources of this disparity. Two
good discussions are FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 43-94, and Robert Sugden, Alternatives
to the Nec-Classical Theory of Choice, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra
note 16, at 152.
142 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991). It should be noted that the first two cate-
gories of preference distortion mentioned here may overlap. Loss aversion, along with
probability weighting, may explain departures from expected utility theory in processing
probabilities. See, e.g., REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD 289-99 (2001). Still, the distortions are partly distinct, in that loss
aversion does not wholly explain probability distortions (probability weighting is also part
of the picture), and it affects choice under certainty.
143 Adler, supra note 25, at 37-38; Baron, supra note 110, at 77; Payne et al., supra note
120, at 257-58.
144 See generally ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 158-66 (dis-
cussing incommensurability); Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371 (1998) (same).
145 VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 16, at 138-39; Ian J. Bateman
et al., Willingness-to-Pay Question Format Effects in Contingent Valuation Studies, in
BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 511, 512-16; Boyle, supra note 16, at 137-43;
Venkatachalam, supra note 16, at 105-10.
146 Brazier et al., supra note 29, at 30-34.
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fectly healthy state that is equivalent to the time in a diseased state.
This format demands a tradeoff between life and health, one that
respondents sometimes resist. 147 The simple rating format avoids
both tradeoffs and probabilities, but may be characterized by
"response spreading," a kind of range bias: Respondents feel
impelled to use the whole 0-1 scale, even where the health states
being valued are quite similar.
148
Finally, there appear to be substantial preference distortions in
standard happiness surveys. Kahneman's work has emphasized a par-
ticular kind of distortion, the so-called "peak-end rule," which appar-
ently determines memories of temporally extended experiential
episodes: "[T]he remembered utility of pleasant or unpleasant epi-
sodes is accurately predicted by averaging the Peak (most intense
value) of instant utility... recorded during an episode and the instant
utility recorded near the end of the experience.1 149 The duration of
the experience is ignored. The peak-end rule might be seen as a kind
of availability heuristic, and indeed Kahneman suggests that the
answers to questions such as "How satisfied are you with your life
now?" are generally driven by the facts about their lives that are most
available to respondents.
1 50
Schwartz and Strack, in a comprehensive critical review of happi-
ness surveys, identify a number of recurrent distortions.151 They
emphasize framing effects: For example, an individual who remem-
bers a particular positive life event and construes it as part of her cur-
rent life tends to give higher answers to questions about current
happiness or life-satisfaction than one who views it as part of her past
life (and thus as a standard for comparison). University freshmen told
to remember something good that happened "two years ago" reported
greater happiness than those told to remember something "two years
ago, that is, before you came to the university.
' '152
How should preference distortions in CV, QALY, and happiness
surveys be handled? One possibility is to employ debiasing measures.
A number of CV studies have sought to redress probability distortions
by employing devices to help respondents better grasp what probabili-
ties mean, such as verbal analogies, pie charts, risk ladders, or graph
147 See id. at 36-39. A recent suggestion in the QALY literature is that both standard
gamble and time tradeoff values are also affected by loss aversion. See, e.g., Han
Bleichrodt, A New Explanation for the Difference Between Time Trade-Off Utilities and
Standard Gamble Utilities, 11 HEALTH ECON. 447 (2002).
148 Brazier et al., supra note 29, at 34-35.
149 Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham, supra note 68, at 381.
150 Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 68, at 21.
151 See Schwarz & Strack, supra note 31, at 62-74.
152 Id. at 66 (emphasis omitted).
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paper with blacked-out squares.15 3 Probability aids have also been
used in eliciting QALY values when the standard gamble format is
employed. 154 Research on the efficacy of these aids in reducing
probability distortions is mixed.
155
QALY and CV researchers should consider experimenting with
more intensive probability debiasing techniques, for example familiar-
izing respondents with the axioms of expected utility theory (or
whichever competing account of rational choice under uncertainty is
taken to be correct).
As for loss aversion: CV researchers have tried to reduce the
WTP/WTA disparity, a product (in part) of loss aversion, by using
formats in which each subject's valuation is repeatedly elicited, on the
theory that familiarity with the valuation task will reduce the extent of
loss aversion. Again, results are mixed. 156 Finally, it has been sug-
gested that so-called "multi-attribute utility theory" techniques, in
which respondents are prompted to think through their internal
tradeoff rates for the different attributes of choices that they care
about, could reduce tradeoff biases in the CV context. 157 These sorts
of techniques could also be used in QALY surveys. Multi-attribute
utility theory debiasing techniques would be most naturally paired
with the conjoint-analysis approach to eliciting QALYs and CVs.
158
A second possible approach to preference distortions is to change
the elicitation method. For example, the anchoring bias characteristic
of the auction format widely used in CV studies in the 1970s and 1980s
can be eliminated by shifting to the payment-card or the open-ended
question formats, and can be reduced, if not eliminated, by shifting to
other formats.159 Carthy finds that a novel "chained" method for
determining WTP/WTA for the risk of death reduces probability dis-
tortions;160 and Hammitt and Graham find the same for a novel
153 Phaedra S. Corso et al., Valuing Mortality-Risk Reduction: Using Visual Aids to
Improve the Validity of Contingent Valuation, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165, 169-70,
177-79 (2001).
154 See Brazier et al., supra note 29, at 25.
155 Corso et al., supra note 153, at 169-70, 177-79.
156 Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 141, at 440-42.
157 See Payne et al., supra note 120, at 257-58.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 128-32.
159 See sources cited supra note 145. To be sure, the open-ended and payment-card
formats may trigger biases that are avoided by the auction format, such as cognitive load
bias (in both cases) and range bias (in the latter case). The point here is only that certain
biases are more strongly associated with certain formats; if those biases produce a particu-
larly large degree of preference distortion, shifting to a different format may be justified.
160 Trevor Carthy et al., On the Contingent Valuation of Safety and the Safety of Contin-
gent Valuation: Part 2-The CV/SG "Chained" Approach, 17 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 187
(1999).
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"indifference-risk" elicitation method that holds constant the price of
a safety device and varies the risk reduction.
161
The QALY literature offers a striking illustration of the point that
a given bias may be differentially problematic for different elicitation
approaches. The standard gamble technique assigns QALY values to
particular health states by asking respondents for their indifference
probabilities; deviations from expected utility theory will therefore
directly affect standard gamble valuations. By contrast, the time
tradeoff method eschews talk of lotteries, asking respondents to trade
off certain health states that vary in their duration. Probability distor-
tions are thereby circumvented.
162
A third, more radical debiasing possibility is to change the kind of
welfare polling format entirely. I have argued at some length else-
where that QALYs may, on balance, be a better basis for measuring
the health and fatality impacts of policy choices than CV surveys.
163
Part of the advantage is that QALY surveys never ask respondents to
value health or life in money-a particularly demanding and emotion-
ally laden tradeoff.
A different advantage of QALYs is that policymakers' valuations
are constrained-by virtue of the additive formula used to value
impacts-to be proportional to the amount of the impact. Scope-
insensitivity is therefore automatically circumvented. Remember that
the role of citizen responses to QALY surveys is to place health states
on a 0-1 scale. Those numbers are then incorporated into policy anal-
ysis by multiplying the change in health by the duration of the change.
For example, if a policy abates the effects of a toxin that causes a
population of 10,000 individuals to suffer an uncomfortable respira-
tory condition, and does so for one month, and the value of the condi-
tion is 0.85 on a 0-1 scale, then the policymaker's valuation of the
change would be (0.15)x10,000x(1/12)=125 QALYs. If the policy
161 Hammitt & Graham, supra note 140, at 47, 57-58.
162 Adler, supra note 25, at 41-42; Sylvie M.C. van Osch et al., Correcting Biases in
Standard Gamble and Time Tradeoff Utilities, 24 MED. DECISION MAKING 511, 515 (2004)
("The epithet of the [standard gamble technique] as gold standard has faded during years
of practice. [Time tradeoff] seems to have been accepted as a practical gold standard.").
To be sure, if probability distortions are a product of loss aversion plus probability
weighting, and loss aversion also affects time tradeoff values, then shifting to the time
tradeoff technique will not wholly eliminate the underlying biases. But probability
weighting, at least, should go away. Bleichrodt, supra note 147, at 450, 453-54 & tbl.1.
Some recent QALY research also experiments with novel variants of standard gamble
or time tradeoff elicitation formats that may help reduce distortions. See, e.g., Anne
Spencer, The Implications of Linking Questions Within the SG and TTO Methods, 13
HEALTH ECON. 807, 807-08 (2004) (discussing two-stage, "chained" approach to eliciting
values).
163 See Adler, supra note 25, at 24-42, 69-83.
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abates the toxin for a year rather than a month, then the QALY
formula would automatically value that impact as twelve times the
month-long impact, i.e., as 1500 QALYs. By contrast, individuals
asked for WTP to avoid a year rather than a month of the condition
might well be in the grip of preference distortions that cause scope-
insensitivity, and therefore fail to express valuations that are twelve
times larger.
Kahneman's proposal similarly aims to circumvent preference
distortion by shifting welfare polling formats. As discussed above, he
criticizes traditional happiness surveys and proposes to use hedonic
surveys to value moments of experience and then to have policy-
makers (not citizens) value temporally extended experiential episodes
by aggregating momentary values.1 64
D. Mental Effort
Economic theory traditionally assumes that mental operations
are costless and instantaneous. Survey respondents, on this model,
have preexisting preference orderings over complete outcomes; they
can costlessly process information, using it to ascribe probabilities to
outcomes; and they can costlessly derive preferences over goods,
choices, and so on from their underlying outcome preferences and
probabilities. If respondents were indeed costless computers, they
might still lie about their preferences-truthtelling would still be a
problem for welfare polls-but respondents would never have a
reason to shirk in exerting mental effort.
But the assumption of zero-cost computation is wildly unrealistic
for actual humans. 165 It is therefore quite possible that respondents to
welfare surveys will economize on mental effort. The potential for
164 This Section has focused on the use of debiasing techniques, the choice of elicitation
technique within a general welfare polling format, and the choice of overall format, as
methods for reducing preference distortions. Two other possibilities should be mentioned:
(1) screening out respondents with especially distorted preferences; or (2) using calibration
factors. On the first approach, see, for example, Nancy J. Devlin et al., Logical Inconsis-
tencies in Survey Respondents' Health State Valuations-A Methodological Challenge for
Estimating Social Tariffs, 12 HEALTH ECON. 529 (2003); Hammitt & Graham, supra note
140, at 48-52 (distinguishing in one survey between respondents who correctly or incor-
rectly answered probability comparison question, and in another between respondents who
expressed high confidence or less confidence in their answers); and Murphy & Stevens,
supra note 113, at 186 (discussing surveys that ask respondents about their degree of cer-
tainty regarding WTP/WTA). On the second, see, for example, van Osch et al., supra note
162 (discussing and employing methods for estimating QALY values that attempt to cor-
rect for various biases).
165 The locus classicus for discussions of bounded rationality is, of course, Herbert A.
Simon's scholarship. See generally 1 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATION-
ALITY (1982); 2 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); 3
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1997). For more recent work
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rational apathy, exhaustively discussed by economists in contexts such
as voting, 166 readily carries over to the construction of preferences and
valuations, given realism about human mental abilities. Why should
the participant in a QALY, happiness, or CV survey take much
trouble to figure out how she ranks the health state on a 0-i scale,
how happy she is, or what her WTP/WTA for some good is, once she
realizes that her particular response (truthful or not) has a vanishingly
small chance of changing the governmental policy to which the survey
will be an input?
The problem of insufficient mental effort-strategic laziness, as it
were-is little discussed by the welfare polling literatures.1 67 Scholar-
ship about CVs almost completely ignores it, focusing a bright spot-
light instead on the sister problem of strategic deception. Strategic
laziness surfaces to a limited extent in some of the critical literature on
happiness studies-for example, in the observation that the availa-
bility bias, which skews answers to standard happiness questions, is a
heuristic device for answering such questions quickly and easily.
168
Nor is mental effort a key focus of the general literature on
survey design. There is a large subliterature on survey nonre-
sponse.169 But survey or individual item nonresponse-an outright
refusal to answer a question-is only one manifestation of the conser-
vation of mental effort. The psychologist Jon A. Krosnick, in an
unusually good treatment of the problem of mental effort, discusses
different ways in which survey respondents might "satisfice" rather
than exert the mental energy required for a high-quality response,
including "selecting the first response alternative that seems to consti-
tute a reasonable answer," "agreeing with any assertion the inter-
viewer makes," "endorsing the status quo instead of endorsing social
change," "failing to differentiate among a set of diverse objects in rat-
in this area, see, for example, GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE
US SMART (1999), and ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, MODELING BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1998).
166 See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 303-32 (2003).
167 See Adamowicz, supra note 21, at 435. By contrast, the issue has been more fully
discussed in the literature on policy deliberation formats. See, e.g., Luskin et al., supra
note 7, at 456-61. Deliberation, after all, involves making a substantial effort to think
about some issue.
168 E.g., Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 68, at 21-22; Schwarz & Strack,
supra note 31, at 63.
169 See, e.g., BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 115-16 (discussing use of tailored design
method to increase response rate and survey quality for CV surveys); DON A. DILLMAN,
MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD (2d ed. 2000); ROBERT
M. GROVES & MICK P. COUPER, NONRESPONSE IN HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SURVEYS
(1998); SURVEY NONRESPONSE (Robert M. Groves et al. eds., 2002).
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ings," "saying 'don't know' instead of reporting an opinion," and "ran-
domly choosing among the response alternatives offered. '170
If (1) lazily constructed valuations were normatively on par with
effortful valuations, or if (2) lazy valuations were statistically unbiased
estimates of effortful valuations, then welfare pollsters would not
need to worry about laziness. But neither of these premises holds
true. Mental effort, like good information, is normative for welfare:
Outcome 01 is better than 02 for P only if P, under sufficiently ideal
conditions (including sufficient effort), prefers 01. Indeed, it would
be incoherent to contemplate an idealized subject who must be
presented with lots of information but is free to apathetically ignore it.
And (2) seems quite counterfactual. Information and measures to
reduce preference distortion can surely systematically change prefer-
ences, at least for some groups and goods.171 In other words, distorted
or poorly informed preferences will not be unbiased estimates of ide-
alized preferences, at least for some groups or goods. Therefore, pref-
erences constructed without efforts to absorb information or to
participate in debiasing will not (at least for some goods and groups)
be unbiased estimates of idealized preferences.
A leading manual on CV studies, discussing the problem of non-
response and protest responses (zero or very high WTP/WTA
amounts), states:
[A]nalysts usually make the assumption that the true WTP of non-
responders [and protest responders] will be similar to that quoted
by households with comparable characteristics.
Following the removal of non-respondents from the sample,
therefore, analysts should ensure that the characteristics of the
sample have not been systematically biased. Analysts should
examine the distribution of key characteristics of households in the
sample (for example, household income, age profiles and access to
the non-market good) and ensure that it does not differ significantly
from the distribution of these characteristics in the population. 172
This purely statistical technique may or may not be adequate to the
problem of outright nonresponse, but it offers no solution to the
problem of lazy responses. A solution to that problem, presumably,
will mean designing surveys to trigger the motivators of mental effort.
Krosnick suggests that these motivators include: the extent to which
respondents "get intrinsic rewards from effortful mental exercises";
"the degree to which the topic of a question is personally important to
170 Jon A. Krosnick, Response Strategies for Coping with the Cognitive Demands of Atti-
tude Measures in Surveys, 5 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 213, 215-20 (1991).
171 See sources cited supra notes 122, 155, 156.
172 BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 178-79.
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the respondent"; the extent to which respondents "think that the
survey in which they are participating is important and/or useful to
some segment of society"; "interviewer behaviour"; the respondent's
sense of "accountability" to the interviewer; and the length of the
interview. 173 The substantial survey literature on reducing outright
nonresponse rates will be helpful here, since the norms, emotions,
interests, etc., that motivate respondents to take the initial step of par-
ticipating in a survey can also presumably be deployed to motivate
more effortful participation.1
74
E. Truthtelling
Welfare surveys will have epistemic value for regulators only if
respondents are sufficiently rational and informed and exert enough
mental effort. But these are necessary, not sufficient, conditions.
After all, well-informed and rational respondents who make a mental
effort might still lie to their interviewers. The problem of eliciting
truthful valuations has been discussed at some length in the CV litera-
ture,1 75 less so in the other literatures. Consider the simplest CV elici-
tation format: the open-ended question, which asks "How much are
you willing to pay?" for some good. If the respondent prefers having
the good together with its predicted cost to her (for example, the pre-
dicted increase in her taxes) to not having the good, then she has an
incentive to overstate her true WTP-because a larger stated WTP
increases the chance that the good will be provided. More precisely:
Faced with an open-ended question [about WTP for a public good],
a very large WTP response does turn out to be the optimal strategy
for an agent who believes (a) the cost of the public good to the
agent is fixed, (b) her true willingness to pay for the good is larger
than the cost if provided, and (c) the good is more likely to be sup-
plied the larger the sum of the willingness to pay responses given by
agents. 176
173 Krosnick, supra note 170, at 223-25.
174 For example, Dillman, an influential expert on nonresponse, argues that increasing
survey response is a matter of inducing "social exchange," specifically by (1) providing
rewards, (2) lowering costs, and (3) establishing trust, and offers a number of concrete
recommendations in each category. DILLMAN, supra note 169, at 14-21.
175 For two particularly important discussions, see Richard T. Carson et al., Incentive
and Informational Properties of Preference Questions (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manu-
script, available at http://weber.ucsd.edu/-rcarson/cgm.pdf) [hereinafter Carson et al.,
Incentive and Informational Properties]; and Robert Sugden, Public Goods and Contingent
Valuation, in VALUINc ENVIRONMENrAL PREFERENCES, supra note 16, at 131. See Carson
et al., supra note 16, at 189-93, for a summary of the literature.
176 Carson et al., Incentive and Informational Properties, supra note 175, at 28.
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Reacting to this problem, some scholars have sought to identify
"incentive-compatible" elicitation formats for CV surveys. A format
is incentive-compatible if respondents maximize their preference-sat-
isfaction by truthfully stating their valuations. It turns out that, under
some conditions, a dichotomous choice question will be incentive-
compatible. This is intuitively clear: If an individual is asked to vote
in a referendum between the status quo and a single alternative, and
she believes that her vote increases the chance of the selected option
being implemented, then clearly she best advances her preferences by
voting for the option she actually prefers. Similarly, if an individual
(1) is asked, as per the dichotomous choice format, whether she pre-
fers the status quo or, instead, having a good provided by a govern-
ment agency at a cost to her of $X; (2) believes that the agency will
pick one of these two options; and (3) believes that her statement to
the interviewer raises the probability of the agency picking whichever
option she claims to prefer; then her rational response is to truthfully
articulate her preference.
177
Not only is it the case that dichotomous choice questions can be
incentive-compatible. It also turns out, quite strikingly, that only
dichotomous choice questions can be incentive-compatible. 178 Finally,
the research on incentive compatibility shows that even dichotomous
choice questions may not always prompt truthful answers.179 Imagine
the respondent is told and believes that the good will be costless to her
unless she voluntarily contributes to its provision, and is asked
whether she would contribute $X for the good. In that case, she has
an incentive to answer the question affirmatively, even if $X exceeds
her true WTP.
The apparent conclusion from this line of research is that CV
survey designers can address strategic bias by using the incentive-com-
patible variants of dichotomous choice questions. Indeed, the prestig-
ious NOAA panel on CVs made precisely this recommendation:
[T]he referendum format, especially when cast in the willingness to
pay mode-"Would you be willing to... be taxed ... D dollars to
cover the cost of avoiding or repairing environmental damage
X?"-has many advantages. It is realistic: referenda on the provi-
sion of public goods are not uncommon in real life. There is no
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strategic reason for the respondent to do other than answer
truthfully .... 180
But there is a problem. Consider the fully rational, self-inter-
ested individual whose valuation of, say, cleaner air is elicited by
means of this supposedly incentive-compatible question: "Would you
vote in favor of a measure to produce cleaner air, to be funded
through taxes that will increase your tax bill by $X?" Imagine that the
respondent believes the actual policy alternative on the table to be
regulation of polluters, not taxation-and-spending for cleaner air, and
believes that the cost of regulation to her (in higher product prices,
say) will be $Y instead of $X. She will then answer the question
affirmatively or negatively depending on how her valuation of cleaner
air compares to $Y, not $X.
Supposedly incentive-compatible dichotomous choice CV ques-
tions pair policy measures on the government's agenda with hypothet-
ical cost figures that are picked by the interviewer (and, usually,
varied among respondents) so as to elicit valuations in a statistically
efficient way.181 But this technique will elicit truthful valuations from
a self-interested respondent only if the respondent misunderstands
how the CV technique works-only if she believes the "cost" figure to
be the interviewer's prediction of the measure's cost, rather than a
hypothetical number-and, further, only if the respondent is gullible
enough to believe this cost "prediction.
'182
Robert Sugden, mindful of this difficulty, writes: "I can see no
escape from the conclusion that, if survey respondents are motivated
solely by rational self-interest, the CV method is fatally flawed."'
8 3
Presumably the conclusion carries over to happiness and QALY
surveys, which use open-ended questions that seem even less likely
than CV "referenda" to be incentive-compatible.
Does this conclusion sound the death knell for welfare polls? I
suggest not. Incentive-compatibility research about surveys has asked
whether fully rational individuals maximizing their preferences (spe-
cifically, in accordance with expected utility theory) and lacking a
preference for truthtelling (or the prospect of sanctions for lying)
would answer truthfully. To begin, individuals may not be fully
rational. Preference distortions-failures of full rationality-may
180 Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4606 (Jan.
15, 1993).
181 See, e.g., Anna Alberini, Optimal Designs for Discrete Choice Contingent Valuation
Surveys: Single-Bound, Double-Bound, and Bivariate Models, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGmrr. 287, 287-88 (1995) (discussing optimal design of dichotomous choice surveys).
182 See Sugden, supra note 175, at 136-37.
183 Id. at 137.
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actually help the polling enterprise elicit truthful valuations. Actual
respondents may not realize that lying is in their interest or may not
be up to the cognitive strain of keeping track of their lies.184 As for
sanctions, while formal sanctions for lying are of course unavailable in
the survey context, social norms may come into play. "[T]he social
setting of interviewer and interviewee [may] evoke[ ] norms of hon-
esty. ' 185 Relatedly, respondents may have some preference not to lie,
and the interview format can be designed to take advantage of this
preference-for example, by paying the respondent a token amount
(which might strengthen guilt feelings about lying).
186
Further, even if some (perhaps large) fraction of survey respon-
dents does lie, that does not imply that survey responses are epistemi-
cally worthless. It is a large fallacy to leap from the premise that
respondents are strategically misstating their preferences to the con-
clusion that those misstatements have zero informational value for
policymakers. For example, if the respondent has an incentive to
overstate his valuations, the policymaker can infer that the respon-
dent's true value is no higher than the stated value. Nonzero WTP
responses to open-ended contingent valuation questions could be seen
by policymakers as upper bounds to true WTP amounts. More gener-
ally, if stated valuation amounts are correlated with true valuations,
rather than being random, then the statements will be at least some-
what useful to policymakers in updating their estimates of true
valuations.
Indeed, much evidence suggests that statements about valuations
in welfare polls are correlated with respondents' true valuations (how
they truly value the good at the time of the statement). One body of
research looks to correlations between stated preferences and
behavior. 87 In one particularly extensive study of this sort, Carson
and his co-authors performed a meta-analysis of studies that provided
both CV and revealed-preference (RP) estimates of the same good.
They found that the average CV/RP ratio was 0.89, 0.77, or 0.92,
184 Id. at 137; BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 380-81. See generally Chris William
Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L. REV. 291
(2004) (analyzing value of cognitive imperfection for evidentiary processes).
185 Sugden, supra note 175, at 137.
186 On the use of money or gifts as incentives in surveys, see, for example, DILLMAN,
supra note 169, at 14-21. Dillman suggests providing a "token of appreciation"-not full
monetary compensation-as a step to establish the respondent's trust. Id. at 19-20.
187 E.g., Carson et al., supra note 16, at 194-95; James J. Murphy et al., A Meta-Analysis
of Hypothetical Bias in Stated Preference Valuation, 30 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 313
(2005); Venkatachalam, supra note 16, at 110-12; Christian A. Vossler & Joe Kerkvliet, A
Criterion Validity Test of the Contingent Valuation Method: Comparing Hypothetical and
Actual Voting Behavior for a Public Referendum, 45 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 631 (2003).
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depending on whether a complete, weighted, or trimmed sample was
used, and that CV and revealed-preference measures were substan-
tially correlated using two standard measures of correlation.
18 8 Sim-
ilar research has been done for happiness surveys, finding correlation
between survey answers and non-self-report evidence of the respon-
dent's happiness, such as assessments by spouses, family, or friends;
the duration of authentic smiles; heart rate, blood pressure, and skin-
resistance measures of stress; psychosomatic illnesses; and EEG mea-
sures of brain activity.189 There is less work in this vein on QALYs, 190
but there is "internal" evidence that responses to QALY surveys track
underlying valuations to some extent. For example, intrarater relia-
bility is high (respondents provide the same valuations over time),
respondents give lower values to health states that are unambiguously
more serious, and the standard gamble and time tradeoff formats cor-
relate reasonably well. 191 All of this would be puzzling if QALY
responses were simply random.
Given this evidence of the correlation between stated and true
valuations, one might naturally think that stated valuations should be
adjusted by a calibration factor. For example, if welfare polls on
average produce CV values that are twice those evidenced by counter-
part revealed-preference studies, then policymakers could apply a fifty
percent discount to CV values. Indeed, a substantial body of scholar-
ship seeks to estimate such calibration factors. 192 A note of caution
188 Carson et al., supra note 17, at 86, 91-92. A different body of scholarship focuses on
comparing CV valuations for particular goods with the amounts that are actually paid for
these goods in experiments. This work tends to find that the CV value is higher than the
value actually paid. E.g.. Murphy et al., supra note 187, at 314. For my purposes in this
Section, the crucial point evidenced by the Carson meta-analysis is the fact of correlation
between CV and revealed-preference measures, not the size of the multiplier.
189 Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 32, at 1360-61 (citing James Konow & Joseph
Earley, The Hedonistic Paradox: Is Homo-Economicus Happier? 6 n.3 (1999) (unpub-
lished manuscript, available at http://myweb.lmu.edu/jkonow/Hedonistic%2OParadox.
pdf)). For other discussions of the correlation between survey and nonsurvey evidence of
individual happiness, see, for example, Diener et al., supra note 31, at 278; Rafael Di Tella
et al., The Macroeconomics of Happiness, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 809, 811-812 (2003); and
Ed Sandvik et al., Subjective Well-Being: The Convergence and Stability of Self-Report and
Non-Self-Report Measures, 61 J. PERSONALITY 317 (1993).
190 See Brazier et al., supra note 29, at 18.
191 Adler, supra note 25, at 41-42; Brazier et al., supra note 29, at 30-46. There is analo-
gous "internal" evidence that CV and happiness surveys correlate with respondents' true
valuations, in addition to the behavioral evidence summarized in the text. See, e.g.,
Richard C. Bishop et al., Contingent Valuation, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL Eco-
NOMICS 629, 629-46 (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1995); Carson et al., supra note 16, at 193-95;
Sandvik et al., supra note 189, at 319-21.
192 E.g., Murphy et al., supra note 187. NOAA once considered requiring that a fifty
percent calibration factor be applied to CV values in calculating natural resource damages.
See Navrud & Pruckner, supra note 20, at 13.
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needs to be sounded: Calibration factors derived from the correlation
between stated preferences and behavioral evidence need to be used
with care, because (as elaborated below, in Part IV) behavioral evi-
dence is no gold standard for valuation. Among other things, the
actors whose behaviors undergird revealed-preference work may be
poorly informed, may have distorted preferences, and may economize
on mental effort. The best solution to problems of deception would
be to use norms and incentives to encourage truthtelling; but if that
seems unavailing, calibration factors offer a second-best approach to
deriving information about underlying valuations from welfare
polls.
1 93
On the topic of truthtelling, it also bears note that welfare polls
are just a small part of a vast survey literature that encompasses polit-
ical opinion polls, censuses, psychological surveys, and consumer
product research. By one estimate, "[a]bout 20 million interviews are
conducted each year in the United States. ' 194 Many of these surveys
are not incentive-compatible-either because they are "inconsequen-
tial" (the response will not change what government or other actors
do) or, if "consequential," they give the respondent an incentive to
lie.1 95 Still, there remains great demand for these surveys by politi-
cians, psychologists, and others.196
Consider, in particular, consumer product research-the closest
parallel to welfare polls. Incentive-compatibility problems afflict
these surveys: For example, the respondent who is asked whether she
would purchase a new widget at some price might as well say "yes"
even if her WTP for the widget is lower, since the widget's introduc-
tion into the market gives her a free option to buy it if her preferences
193 This Section has focused on the main source of concern about truthtelling discussed
in the welfare polling literature-namely, that respondents will strategically lie. A dif-
ferent set of worries about the truthfulness of survey responses, grounded in psychology
rather than economics, is that the respondent will have a "compliance bias": She will pro-
vide a socially acceptable answer, or the one that she thinks the interviewer wants to hear,
rather than the true answer. E.g., Colin Green & Sylvia Turnstall, A Psychological Per-
spective, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 16, at 207, 237-38.
Here, as with strategic deception, the best response is to use survey design to mitigate the
bias. See id. at 237-38. Calibration is second-best.
194 FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7, at 80.
195 Carson et al. define an "inconsequential" preference survey question as one where
"the survey responses are not seen as having any influence on agency decisions or the
agent is indifferent to all possible outcomes of the agency decision." Carson et al., Incen-
tive and Informational Properties, supra note 175, at 3 (emphasis omitted). They argue
that economic theory makes no prediction how respondents will answer inconsequential
questions-in particular, economic theory does not predict truthful responses-and then
go on to analyze when consequential surveys will be incentive-compatible. See id. at 3-5.
196 See Di Tella et al., supra note 189, at 811-12; Sugden, supra note 175, at 137-38.
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change.' 97 But firms continue to conduct these surveys at substantial
cost; this would be surprising if the surveys had little informational
value about consumers' preferences. 198 In fact, the informational
value of consumer product research has been confirmed by studies
showing a correlation between the degree of interest in a new product
expressed in surveys and actual purchases of the product.199 Correla-
tional data of this sort is now regularly used to derive calibration fac-
tors for consumer surveys2 00-a close analogue to the use of
calibration factors for welfare polls.
F. Question Formulation
Welfare polls will be informative to policymakers only if respon-
dents answer the question posed in the survey, or (more precisely)
answer the question that policymakers believe to be posed, or (more
precisely yet) answer a question sufficiently close to that which policy-
makers believe to be posed. Consider an extreme case: effortful, sin-
cere, and well-informed respondents whose answers to valuation
question I, which they take the survey to pose, are uncorrelated with
their answers to valuation question II, which the pollster reads the
survey as posing.
Survey questions can be misunderstood for various reasons:
[What follows are] the major classes of interpretive difficulty that
survey designers encounter. The question's grammatical structure
(its syntax) may be ambiguous or too complicated for respondents
to take in. Lengthy or complex questions can exceed respondents'
capacity to process them, resulting in misinterpretations .... The
question's meaning (or semantics) may elude respondents if they
misunderstand vague, unfamiliar, or ambiguous terms or if they are
misled by inapplicable presuppositions. Finally, the intended use of
the question (its pragmatics) may create difficulties .... 201
It is trivial to see that syntactic problems could affect welfare polls,
like all other surveys, and easy to see that semantic difficulties could
as well. The standard gamble and time tradeoff variants of the QALY
technique ask respondents to use an esoteric method that they may
197 Carson et al., Incentive and Informational Properties, supra note 175, at 13-14.
198 See, e.g., GILBERT A. CHURCHILL, JR. & DAWN IACOBUCCI, MARKETING RESEARCH:
METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 12-16, 212-30 (2005) (describing amount of marketing
research, and discussing use of surveys as one of main mechanisms for collecting primary
data, along with observation of behaviors).
199 E.g., id. at 210; William J. Infosino, Forecasting New Product Sales from Likelihood
of Purchase Ratings, 5 MARKETING Sci. 372, 375 (1986).
200 CHURCHILL & IACOBUCCI, supra note 198, at 209-11; Diamond & Hausman, Is Some
Number Better than No Number?, supra note 106, at 54.
201 ROGER TOURANGEAU ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SURVEY RESPONSE 25 (2000).
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not grasp, while the rating scale asks respondents to locate health
states on a 0-1 scale whose cardinal properties they may not under-
stand. That latter problem affects happiness surveys too. And while
respondents presumably do understand what dollars are, they may
misconstrue the precise CV question posed-for example, the fre-
quency of the payment (annual/monthly/lifetime WTP), maximum
versus minimum, and so on.
As for the "pragmatics" of meaning, the problem here is that
respondents may grasp the syntax and literal semantics of the survey
question, but may interpret it nonliterally by virtue of communicative
norms. For example, a general question about life-satisfaction that
follows a specific question about life-satisfaction in some domain
("How happy are you with your marriage?") is naturally read to
exclude that specific domain. Synonymous questions about happiness
will tend to receive the same answers if separated in a survey; but if
such questions are asked in succession, they are likely to receive dif-
ferent answers, since respondents-avoiding an interpretation that
creates redundancy-will try to read them differently.
202
The problem of misunderstood questions is, of course, a very gen-
eral one for survey research, and a wide range of responses to the
problem has been deployed. Traditionally, pollsters designed surveys
using informal techniques such as "pretesting": giving the survey to a
small group and developing an informal sense of the survey's
problems.20 3 Focus groups are a more elaborate way to do this. "Cog-
nitive interviewing" is yet more elaborate.
Ordinary interviews focus on producing codable responses to the
questions. Cognitive interviews, by contrast, focus on providing a
view of the processes elicited by the questions. Concurrent or retro-
spective think-alouds and/or probes are used to produce reports of
the thoughts that respondents have either as they answer the survey
questions or immediately after.
204
Think of pretesting, focus groups, and cognitive interviews as second-
order polling techniques-not techniques for eliciting valuations, but
techniques for designing the first-order techniques. Second-order
techniques also include second-order experiments: administering dif-
ferent trial surveys to different groups. There is now a large scholarly
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
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203 See Stanley Presser et al., Introduction to METHODS FOR TESTING AND EVALUATING
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 1, 2 (Stanley Presser et al. eds., 2004).
204 Id. at 4.
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literature on second-order techniques, 20 5 and some of the more
sophisticated approaches have percolated into welfare polls.
20 6
Second-order techniques allow survey designers to identify and
then reformulate misunderstood questions. More generally, they have
diagnostic value with respect to most of the problems surveyed in this
Part. Cognitive interviews, for example, can help reveal whether
moral preferences are driving valuations; whether respondents lack
relevant information; whether they are confused about probabilities,
loss-averse, or otherwise irrational; and whether they are making a
mental effort.
G. Representativeness
There is a straightforward answer to worries about whether the
respondents to welfare polls are representative of the relevant popula-
tion: Use random sampling techniques. These techniques, like those
for ensuring question comprehension, are part of the general
armamentarium of survey design.20 7 Indeed, the origins of polling in
the United States are bound up with random sampling: George
Gallup became famous because his random sample of a few thousand
people accurately predicted the outcome of the 1936 presidential elec-
tion while the Literary Digest's sample, a large but self-selected
sample consisting of millions of postcards sent in by subscribers, did
not. 208
Random samples can be expensive. Nonrandom samples cost
less-for example, the notorious convenience samples of college stu-
dents used in many psychological surveys; or a "quota sample" of
shoppers intercepted at a mall, which is sometimes the sampling
format for CV studies. 20 9 But the expense of random sampling is pre-
sumably justified for a welfare poll that is meant to inform major gov-
ernmental decisions, let alone a general schedule of valuations-at
205 E.g., PAUL P. BIEMER & LARS E. LYBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SURVEY QUALITY
258-304 (2003); COGNITION AND SURVEY RESEARCH (Monroe G. Sirken et al. eds., 1999);
ROBERT M. GROVES ET AL., SURVEY METHODOLOGY 241-53 (2004); METHODS FOR
TESTING AND EVALUATING SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES, supra note 203; GORDON B.
WILLIS, COGNITIVE INTERVIEWING: A TOOL FOR IMPROVING QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN
(2005).
206 See, e.g., BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 151-56; Champ, supra note 19, at 85-87.
207 See, e.g., BIEMER & LYBERG, supra note 205, at 305-50; GROVES ET AL., supra note
205, at 93-135.
208 FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7, at 76-78.
209 See BIEMER & LYBERG, supra note 205, at 309-12 (distinguishing between random
sampling and different kinds of nonrandom sampling, such as convenience, purposive, and
quota sampling).
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least to the extent that it is important for the sample to be
representative.
Why this last caveat? Variation in valuations may reflect (1) vari-
ation in objective circumstances, or (2) variation in preferences. In
the first case, having a representative sample is crucial. Imagine, for
example, a CV survey to value some policy that will clean up a park.
The population of park users will vary in their objective circum-
stances-how they interact with the park. A sample skewed toward
intensive users or users who are especially sensitive to aesthetics will
tend to overstate the average WTP/WTA of the overall population of
park users. By way of contrast, consider a QALY survey where all the
participants are told about a particular hypothetical health state and
asked to value that (not their own health). Here, there is variation in
preferences but not objective circumstances, and it may be more
important to have a high quality sample (respondents who are well
informed, nondistorted, and so on) rather than a representative
one.210 In any event, to the extent that welfare polls ought to reflect
the valuations of the U.S. citizenry as a whole, or some geographically
or functionally defined subset thereof, random sampling techniques
are available-and indeed regularly employed by CV, QALY, and
happiness researchers alike.
H. Deliberative Welfare Polls as a Solution?
The previous sections surveyed specific obstacles to the enter-
prise of welfare polling and the matching techniques responsive to
each obstacle. This section considers whether a change in the format
of welfare polling from individual to group surveys might be generi-
cally useful in overcoming these obstacles.
Current practice is to administer welfare polls individually. Focus
groups may be used to fine-tune the questionnaires, but the ultimate
valuations and other data are derived from subjects responding solo,
each separated from the other respondents. This is, of course, the
general practice for policy surveys too, such as political opinion polls
that ask for a stance about an issue before the government. The cen-
tral thrust of the literature on "policy deliberation formats," as I term
them-citizen juries, deliberative polls, citizen advisory boards, plan-
ning cells-is that group deliberation about policy questions can
210 Cf. Paul Dolan, Aggregating Health State Valuations, 2 J. HEALTH SERVICES RES. &
POL'Y 160, 160 (1997) (noting that QALY surveys might be aggregated using median
rather than mean values).
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improve on solitary policy polling.211 Might not the same be true for
welfare polls?
Consider that the scholars who favor policy deliberation formats
do so because they believe that structured group discussion can over-
come informational, cognitive, motivational, and interpretive
problems that afflict individual polls. If the solo-to-group shift has
this benefit in the policy context, would it not also in the welfare con-
text? A single presentation by an expert to the respondents assem-
bled en masse is a cheap way to provide them with information.
Debiasing techniques can also be thus cheaply presented; further, and
more profoundly, group discussion itself is (or may be) a kind of
debiasing. Lazy or deceptive types may find these postures harder to
sustain in the face of group monitoring or collective enthusiasm for
the valuation task. Misunderstandings about the meanings of ques-
tions can be sorted out in conversation.
In short, we should consider the possibility of deliberative welfare
polls: survey techniques that involve collective discussions about the
numerical value of some welfare impacts as measured using QALYs,
CVs, a happiness scale, or some other scale, with ancillary informa-
tional, debiasing, and question-clarification techniques administered
to the group; and that culminate in a collective verdict or in individual
responses informed by the group deliberation.
In fact, this is not a new idea. CV scholars have toyed with this
very idea, calling it "deliberative monetary valuation."
DMV [deliberative monetary valuation] is the use of formal deliber-
ation concerning an environmental impact in order to express value
in monetary terms for policy purposes, and more specifically as an
input to CBA. For example, consider a proposal to build a new
road through a wilderness area .... A group of citizens would be
selected and meet to discuss information about the environmental
damages associated with the development.... The citizens would
form a jury aiming to provide a monetary value for environmental
damages which might be in terms of an individual willingness to
accept compensation to allow the project to proceed.
212
211 See sources cited supra note 7.
212 Simon Niemeyer & Clive L. Spash, Environmental Valuation Analysis, Public Delib-
eration, and Their Pragmatic Syntheses: A Critical Appraisal, 19 ENV'T & PLAN. C: Gov'T
& POL'Y 567, 576-77 (2001). For other scholarship on deliberative money valuation, see
sources cited id. at 576, and M. Sagoff, Aggregation and Deliberation in Valuing Environ-
mental Public Goods: A Look Beyond Contingent Pricing, 24 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 213,
223-27 (1998).
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A few of these group-deliberative CV studies have actually been con-
ducted, although they remain very unusual.
2 13
It has been objected, by authors sympathetic to policy delibera-
tion formats, that "the DMV approach... is restricted to producing a
monetary value.... The environment is still regarded as a commodity
under DMV which crowds out civic virtues." 214 But this is really a
generic objection to the CV format, equally applicable to both tradi-
tional solo CV surveys and group-based formats such as DMV. It
does not show why welfare polls, if justifiably undertaken, are best
conducted without inter-respondent deliberation.
A different objection, more to the point here, is that the valua-
tions produced by deliberative welfare polls are, on balance, lower
quality than traditional valuations-because groups will be too small
to produce statistically representative results; because groups can
work together to figure out strategic responses; because groups "go to
extremes. '215 This objection may be apt, but it is hard to see why the
objection would apply differentially to policy and welfare polling for-
mats. Plausibly, citizen juries trump opinion polls if and only if delib-
erative welfare polls trump solo surveys. Perhaps that is strong. In
any event, the literature on deliberative polling provides a rich set of
group-based techniques that might be incorporated into the practice
of welfare polling without abandoning its basic focus on well-being.
IV
WELFARE POLLS: A DEFENSE
The Article, up to this point, has been largely descriptive. Parts I
and II described the existing trio of welfare polls and the various roles
that they currently play, or might plausibly play, in administrative gov-
ernance-specifically, in guiding policy analysis, informing govern-
ment communications, and calibrating individual entitlements and
213 See Robin S. Gregory, Valuing Environmental Policy Options: A Case Study Com-
parison of Multiattribute and Contingent Valuation Survey Methods, 76 LAND ECON. 151
(2000); Lorna J. Philip & Douglas C. Macmillan, Exploring Values, Context and Perceptions
in Contingent Valuation Studies: The CV Market Stall Technique and Willingness to Pay for
Wildlife Conservation, 48 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGM'T 257, 259-60 (2005) (study using delib-
erative money valuation). Focus groups do seem to be fairly common in CV research, but
these are group-based techniques for designing the questionnaire, not for collecting the
data itself. See Michael D. Kaplowitz & John P. Hoehn, Do Focus Groups and Individual
Valuations Reveal the Same Information for Natural Resource Valuation?, 36 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 237, 237 (2001); see also Alan Shiell et al., Reliability of Health Utility Measures and
a Test of Values Clarification, 56 Soc. Sci. & MED. 1531, 1533-34 (2003) (employing delib-
erative, although not group-based, approach to eliciting QALYs).
214 Niemeyer & Spash, supra note 212, at 579.
215 See id. at 578-79; Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Delibera-
tion, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1004-06 (2005).
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obligations. Part III comprehensively reviewed the informational,
cognitive, motivational, communicative, and strategic obstacles to
using surveys in the elicitation of welfare valuations, and the possible
solutions to these difficulties.
This Part is normative. First, it provides a moderate, nonu-
tilitarian defense of the various uses of well-being information in
administrative governance described in Part I1-a defense grounded
in the moral framework of "weak welfarism." Then (here drawing
together the material presented in Part III), it responds to two
objections to welfare polls: the "revealed-preference" tradition in
economics, which is generally skeptical of surveys; and the
deliberative-democratic tradition in political theory, which is skeptical
of questions about preference, interest, or welfare, rather than the
public good.
A. Weak Welfarism and the Need for Welfare Information
Let us distinguish, to begin, between the moral relevance of well-
being to administrative choice, and its legal relevance. Eric Posner
and I have elsewhere argued at length for the moral view we term
"weak welfarism. '216 Weak welfarism says that overall well-being is
one of the moral considerations that bears on governmental choice,
but may not be the only such consideration. Formally, morality has
the structure {W*, F1, ... , FMI, where W* is overall well-being, and M
= 0. The F are possible moral considerations other than the max-
imization of aggregate well-being: for example, the protection of
moral rights, the promotion of intrinsic environmental values, or the
equitable distribution of well-being.
Weak welfarism, unlike utilitarianism or stronger variants of wel-
farism, eschews a monomaniacal focus on welfare. Utilitarianism
insists that overall well-being is the sole morally relevant considera-
tion. It has the structure {W*}. The strong kind of welfarism popular
among economists,217 and defended by Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell in a recent, high-profile book,218 allows for distributive consid-
erations but insists that only information about well-being is relevant
to moral evaluation. According to Kaplow and Shavell, morality has
216 ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 39-61; Adler & Posner,
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 39, at 204-16, 243-45; Adler, supra note 104,
at 288-319.
217 See, e.g., Philippe Mongin & Claude d'Aspremont, Utility Theory and Ethics, in 1
HANDBOOK OF UTILITY THEORY 371, 394-95 (Salvador Barbera et al. eds., 1998); Andrew
Moore & Roger Crisp, Welfarism in Moral Theory, 74 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 598 (1996).
218 Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
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the structure {W .. , WN}, where each W, is sensitive only to facts
about welfare.
Weak welfarism, by contrast, allows that morality overall may
well be sensitive to non-welfare facts-in the form of factors F1, .. ,
FM, which may well focus on aspects of individual lives or outcomes
other than well-being. Moral rights and intrinsic environmental
values would be the obvious candidates for such nonwelfarist moral
factors. 219 But weak welfarism insists that well-being is an integral
part of moral evaluation, in virtue of factor W*.
To be sure, this moral discussion does not directly address the
questions of legal obligation and authority that primarily concern gov-
ernment officials and legal scholars. Law and morality can come
apart. Only a pure natural-law view-generally rejected by modern
jurisprudents-would say otherwise. Weak welfarism is an account of
the structure of morality, not a legal framework. Weak welfarism, if
true, establishes that government officials are morally required to be
sensitive to well-being. It does not establish that they are legally
required or even legally permitted to do so.
In practice, however, administrative agencies are legally required
or at least permitted to take account of well-being. First, agency
organic statutes frequently use open-ended language that legally
directs (or at least permits) agencies to pick the policy that maximizes
overall welfare. 220 Second, statutes that do not take this open-ended,
balancing form still might focus agencies on some aspect of welfare-
for example, health and safety-and indeed frequently do.221 Third,
although statutes sometimes fit neither the first template nor the
second-for example, statutes that take the form of rules rather than
standards, directing agencies' attention to features of the world more
readily ascertainable than welfare impacts222-all statutes have some
degree of open texture, some area where agencies have legal discre-
219 Moral rights prohibit certain kinds of infringements (for example, intentional phys-
ical harms), and are nonwelfarist in that the degree of prohibition is not calibrated to the
welfare impact of the infringement. Intrinsic environmental values protect certain aspects
of the environment (for example, the continued existence of a plant species) independent
of the benefit of that aspect for humans or other entities (certain animals) that possess
well-being.
220 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651,
1666-67 (2001). Sunstein discusses statutes that instruct agencies to eliminate "unreason-
able" risks or balance costs and benefits. Given my view of cost-benefit analysis as a proxy
for overall well-being, see sources cited supra note 58, I would argue that this sort of lan-
guage requires or at least permits agencies to pick the policy that maximizes overall
welfare.
221 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
222 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 64-65, 73-80.
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tion.223 It is both morally and legally appropriate for agencies to take
account of well-being in resolving the discretionary choices that inevi-
tably present themselves. Fourth, and a bit more concretely, the presi-
dential cost-benefit orders, in place now for twenty-five years, have
imposed a legal obligation on executive agencies-flowing from the
President's legal powers to oversee executive agency decision-
making-to consider overall welfare where that is statutorily permis-
sible.224 Fifth, although administrative officials' legal and moral
obligations are distinct, Congress can always merge them. For
example, Congress can amend particular organic statutes, converting
them to the open-ended balancing form or the form that requires
agencies to focus on some aspect of welfare. Or it can pass (and
indeed has considered passing) a welfare supermandate that would
give statutory teeth to the general legal obligation to consider overall
welfare now embodied in the presidential cost-benefit orders.
225
In short, questions about human well-being have substantial rele-
vance, both moral and legal, to administrative governance. This basic
observation synthesizes the different functions for welfare surveys dis-
cussed in Part II. To begin, where legally permitted, agencies should
use policy-analytic techniques that help them ascertain which policy
maximizes overall well-being or, alternatively, which one maximizes
the particular aspect of well-being that is statutorily salient.226 Cost-
benefit analysis is the most obvious such technique and currently the
one most widely employed by agencies. But there are others: Agen-
cies might maximize QALYs. Or they might adjust longevity for hap-
piness rather than health, and maximize happy life expectancy.
Further, cost-benefit analysis is really a family of techniques, rather
than a single rigid formula: Thus a variety of welfare polling formats,
not just CV studies, can inform cost-benefit analysis-for example,
through QALY-to-dollar conversions (now a regular practice at the
FDA) or happiness-to-dollar conversions (currently a topic of schol-
arly work).
It may also be legally and morally appropriate for agencies to
take into consideration the distribution of welfare. This suggestion
raises large issues, which lie beyond the scope of this Article: What is
the currency for distributive justice-welfare, resources, or something
223 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36 (2d ed. 1994).
224 See supra text accompanying note 39.
225 See Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 89, 89-108
(2000) (discussing various proposed statutes requiring agencies to employ cost-benefit
analysis).
226 See supra text accompanying notes 39-68.
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else? And what is the optimal institutional structure for redistribu-
tion?227 Still, it is at least plausible that (1) fair distribution means the
fair distribution of well-being and (2) agencies in general, not just leg-
islatures or the specialized agencies involved with the tax-and-transfer
system, should concern themselves with the distribution of well-being.
Just as welfare polls can inform administrative policy-analytic tech-
niques that seek to maximize well-being or some of its aspects, so they
can inform distributive analysis by agencies or other governmental
bodies. 2
28
Agencies do more than analyze and implement policy choices.
They must often inform the public about the choices at hand, or about
the current state of the world. Choices and outcomes can be charac-
terized in various ways. Weak welfarism helps on this score, sug-
gesting that government communications to the public should,
morally, include welfare information; and such communications may
also be legally required or permitted. Concretely, the policy impact
statements such as those required by NEPA in the case of agency deci-
sions that affect the environment, or the general "statement of basis
and purpose" required by the Administrative Procedure Act when-
ever an agency proposes a legally binding rule, can and should
describe welfare impacts. And the periodic statistics about the polity
that government offices announce might include data about welfare,
for example in the form of national well-being accounts.
22 9
Nothing said to this point hinges on the specific content of admin-
istrative regulations. Those regulations might be opaque to welfare:
In some contexts, an agency maximizes overall welfare by promul-
gating a rule for private actors that does not itself make reference to
welfare-instead, for example, instructing those actors to use a speci-
fied technology, or to achieve a particular performance specified in
natural rather than well-being units. But, sometimes, regulations are
(partly or wholly) transparent to welfare. In other words, a private
actor's obligations or entitlements may be defined (at least in part) in
terms of the welfare effect of her actions. The clearest examples are
regulations that impose a monetary exaction on some private activity,
where the amount of the exaction (variously called a "tax," "fine,"
"fee," or "damages") depends on the welfare cost of the activity to
third parties. A related example is suggested by environmental
227 See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Welfare Should Be the Currency of Justice, 30 CAN. J.
PHIL. 497 (2000); Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001).
228 Cf supra text accompanying notes 62-64 (discussing possible use of welfare polls for
tax policy).
229 See supra text accompanying notes 90-103.
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trading markets. Private actors might be allocated tradeable credits
for beneficial activities (for example, refraining from pollution), with
the amount of the credit dependent on the welfare impact of the
activity. In both of these contexts, CV, QALY, or happiness surveys
can be useful in ascertaining what the welfare effects of private activi-
ties are.2
30
To be sure, welfare polls are not costless undertakings. The ele-
ments of a well-designed survey can be expensive: Academics or
other individuals with expertise in the relevant good, in valuation, and
in survey design must spend time in drafting the poll; focus groups or
other second-order techniques must be undertaken to test it; inter-
viewers may need to be hired to conduct the survey; respondents may
need to be compensated, and in any event the use of their time is an
economic cost; and econometricians will need to glean valuations
from completed surveys. But in some cases-for example, the design
of a major policy with large anticipated impacts-the expected wel-
fare benefits of conducting a specific survey will outweigh the
expected costs. And, more generally, the costs of surveys can be
spread over multiple decisions by applying a single survey to a multi-
plicity of similar policies, or by using a few very high-quality surveys
to estimate either a general schedule of valuations for different types
of impacts or a general "benefits function."
'231
B. The Revealed-Preference Objection to Welfare Polling
The argument thus far, synthesizing the material in Part II, shows
that government officials are (morally and legally) justified in securing
information about well-being, but it does not yet establish that the
government is justified in securing that information through welfare
polls. This brings us to the various obstacles to welfare polling sur-
veyed in Part III. Why welfare polls rather than other techniques-in
particular, deriving valuations from behavioral evidence?
A population's valuations for some good might be inferred in two
generic ways: through "stated-preference" techniques, which ask
members of the population to say what their valuations are; or
through "revealed-preference" techniques, which infer valuations
from the population's nonverbal behaviors, such as their transactional
activities or their locational, occupational, or recreational choices.
The most important revealed-preference technique in economics is, of
course, to use observed demand and supply curves in markets for pri-
vate goods to infer consumer and supplier valuations for these mar-
230 See supra text accompanying notes 69-89.
231 See supra text accompanying notes 44, 82.
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keted goods.232 This technique is so pervasive that scholarship about
the choice between revealed-preference and stated-preference
approaches to valuation often does not include it in the first category.
But it sits squarely there: Inferring P's value for X from the amount
that P actually pays or receives for X is the quintessential measure-
ment tool of applied welfare economists.
The other commonly employed revealed-preference techniques
seek to infer valuations of public goods, or of private goods that are
not separately marketed, from observed activities. The leading exam-
ples, here, are travel cost techniques (which infer the recreational and
other use values of sites such as wilderness areas from the costs in
time and travel expense that individuals are willing to incur to visit the
sites); property value approaches (which use the correlation between
housing prices at different sites and environmental quality at those
sites to infer valuations of environmental quality); hedonic wage tech-
niques (which infer worker valuations of job characteristics, typically
fatality risks, from the correlation between those characteristics and
wages); and defensive behavior techniques (which infer valuations of
health states from behavior to avoid or mitigate illness, such as
seeking medical care, purchasing safety devices such as bicycle hel-
mets or smoke detectors, or using bottled water to avoid contami-
nated water supplies).
233
Many economists, particularly outside the areas of environmental
and health economics, reflexively prefer these sorts of revealed-pref-
erence techniques to stated-preference techniques. Unlike main-
stream psychologists, who are perfectly comfortable with probing
mental states by asking patients to talk, much of the economics pro-
fession remains suspicious of surveys, at least surveys about subjective
states such as preferences.
Many surveys contain a wealth of subjective questions that are at
first glance rather exciting. Examples include: ... "How satisfied
are you with yourself?"; or "How satisfied are you with your
work?" Yet despite easy availability, this is one data source that
economists rarely use. In fact, the unwillingness to rely on such
232 On these techniques, see RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF
PUBLIC POLICY (2004).
233 See FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 95-136, 353-452; Nancy E. Bockstael, Travel Cost
Models, in THE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECON OMICS, supra note 191, at 655;
Mark Dickie, Defensive Behavior and Damage Cost Methods, in A PRIMER ON
NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 16, at 395; A. Myrick Freeman III, Hedonic Pricing
Methods, in THE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, supra note 191, at 672;
George R. Parsons, The Travel Cost Method, in A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION,
supra note 16, at 269; Laura 0. Taylor, The Hedonic Method, in A PRIMER ON
NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 16, at 331.
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questions marks an important divide between economists and other
social scientists.
234
This generic suspicion of subjective surveys has fueled much of the
opposition to the CV method.235 And it surfaces in the current OMB
guidance concerning cost-benefit analysis, which allows agencies to
use surveys but places them lower in the hierarchy of sources than
behavioral data.
Other things equal, you should prefer revealed preference data over
stated preference data because revealed preference data are based
on actual decisions, where market participants enjoy or suffer the
consequences of their decisions. This is not generally the case for
respondents in stated preference surveys, where respondents . . .
may be inclined to bias their responses for one reason or another.
236
The revealed-preference objection to welfare polling might be
framed in two forms: strong (noncomparative) or weak (compara-
tive). The strong, noncomparative objection is that welfare surveys
provide essentially no information about a population's valuations.
They are no more informative than responses to gibberish questions.
To put the noncomparative objection formally: The rational official's
beliefs about the population's valuations are no different after the
survey than before.
Although the noncomparative objection to welfare polls is a bit
of a straw man, some of the critical literature comes close to making
this strong claim.237 And the claim seems less extreme once it is rec-
ognized that valuations are a matter of idealized preferences, a point I
have already stressed. P's statements about what he currently wants
might be little better than noise as evidence of his hypothetical, fully
informed, fully rational preferences.
Still, the strong objection to welfare polls seems overstated. A
crucial point is that the consumers of the polls-government offi-
cials-are themselves imperfectly informed. An already omniscient
social planner's estimates of a given population's valuations would not
be altered by welfare surveys, but the head of the EPA's office of
policy analysis is not God. Imagine a policy analyst who wants to esti-
mate a population's valuations of some good and has not yet
examined any specific valuation studies, either revealed-preference or
234 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People Mean What They Say?
Implications for Subjective Survey Data, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 67, 67 (2001).
235 See Carson et al., supra note 16, at 176.
236 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIR-
CULAR No. A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 24 (2003), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omblcirculars/a004/a-4.pdf [hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR A-4].
237 E.g., Diamond & Hausman, Is Some Number Better than No Number?, supra note
106, at 46.
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stated-preference studies. Her current estimates are shaped by intro-
spection (a sense of what she would prefer); by the unsystematic
observation of others' value-revealing behaviors and utterances that
will occur over the course of any normal human life; and perhaps by
the general theoretical literatures, in economics, philosophy, and
psychology, on rationality, preference-formation, and well-being. Rel-
ative to this kind of "prior" information about a population's valua-
tions, welfare polls surely provide substantial new information.238
But what of the comparative objection that welfare polls are
dominated by revealed-preference studies? Think of the objection
this way: For the policy analyst whose estimates of a population's val-
uations are shaped both by the general background data just
described (introspection/experience/general theory) plus specific
revealed-preference studies, welfare polls do not typically furnish sub-
stantial new data.
One traditional answer to this sort of question is that welfare
polls can elicit valuations that will not be reflected in behavior. Spe-
cifically, proponents of CV studies often argue that these can be
employed to measure environmental nonuse values, which may be dif-
ficult or even impossible to estimate with revealed-preference
methods.
CV surveys measure the total value of the described good while
revealed preference techniques, which are based on observed
behavior in private markets related to the environmental good,
measure only direct use value. Revealed preference techniques are
usually only capable of capturing .. the direct use portion of total
value, because they rely on the availability of an implicit private
market for a characteristic of the good in question.... In contrast,
passive use value can be seen as simply a special case of a pure
public good.
239
The problem with this traditional defense of welfare polls is two-
fold. First, it does not apply to welfare polls that inquire about the
multifold aspects of welfare that are evidenced by behavior, for
example CV studies that focus on health, recreation, visibility, and
238 My discussion, here and below, is Bayesian in spirit. The policy analyst has subjec-
tive beliefs about valuations, which are updated through surveys. For a fuller description
of Bayesian approaches to the estimation of valuations, see Adler, supra note 25, at 54-56.
239 Carson et al., supra note 16, at 176. For similar defenses of CV surveys, see, for
example, Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4602-03
(Jan. 15, 1993); BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 21-22; FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 154;
and Nicholas E. Flores, Conceptual Framework for Nonmarket Valuation, in A PRIMER ON
NONMARKET VALUATION, supra note 16, at 27, 47-50. See also Boyle & Bergstrom, supra
note 113, at 191 (noting "conventional wisdom that CV is the only game in town when it
comes to measuring nonuse values").
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other use values, or QALY and happiness studies generally. Second,
as argued earlier, nonuse values often arise from moral or disinter-
ested preferences. Shocking as this may sound to the environmental
economists who have done much to develop the CV technique, a well-
designed study to estimate welfare valuations should try to screen out
disinterested preferences, and ignoring nonuse values is a practicable
way to do that.
What we need, in short, is an argument for why welfare polls have
substantial evidentiary value, as compared to revealed-preference
techniques, in estimating use values-preferences for features of out-
comes that derive from the subject's own self-interest, quintessentially
preferences that entail a physical interaction (a "use"). The existing
literature, focused on the comparative advantages of welfare polls for
estimating nonuse values, does not furnish this argument.
I believe such an argument can be furnished, as follows. 240 One
set of problems with using revealed-preference techniques to estimate
use values involves the idealizing conditions for valuation discussed in
Part III: The actors may be disinterested, uninformed, irrational, or
apathetic. A distinct set of problems involves the measurement of the
actors' valuations: That is to say, even if the observer is satisfied that
the actor's motivational, cognitive, and informational state is suffi-
ciently idealized, it may be difficult for an observer constrained not to
talk to the actor to estimate the actor's valuations from her behavior.
The ultimate objective of any valuation study is to estimate the
strength of some individual's subjective preference for some good, on
some numerical scale (QALY, dollar, happiness, or other). Welfare
polls inquire directly about the strength of preference and intervene
to shape the subject's perception of the good (by providing informa-
tion, by characterizing the good as a package of attributes, and so on).
Revealed-preference techniques eschew these questions and interven-
tions, and therefore run up against distinctive measurement obstacles
that welfare polls can avoid-at least if subjects are truthful and at
least if they absorb the information provided by the pollster, points to
be returned to in a moment.
1. Measurement Problems
I will briefly survey these two sets of problems for revealed-pref-
erence studies, beginning with the measurement problems. One large
measurement problem involves the gap between preferences (an
240 See also CHURCHILL & IACOBUCCI, supra note 198, at 212-30 (discussing pros and
cons of surveys versus behavioral data in marketing research, with particular focus on ver-
satility as main informational advantage of surveys).
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unobservable mental state) and action. Consider the very simplest
example: estimating average WTP for a marketed good among a pop-
ulation currently consuming the good in a competitive market. All
the consumers are observed paying the same price P for the good; but
of course it is not the case that each consumer is willing to pay P for
each unit of the good she purchases, or that P is each consumer's
average WTP for the goods she purchases. If we assume consumers
are rational, we might infer that each consumer values each unit of the
good at P or greater, and values her least valued unit at P; but we still
have neither observed, nor inferred, average WTP. In other words, P
reveals the consumers' marginal valuations (if they are rational), but
not their inframarginal valuations.
A slightly more complicated example, again from the heartland
of revealed-preference work: market behavior. Imagine that the
price of a marketed good X decreases from P to P'; consumer
incomes, and the prices of all other goods, remain the same. What is
aggregate consumer WTP for this change in price? It is tempting to
say that, at least if we can observe the demand curve for X, the aggre-
gate WTP is simply the change in area under the demand curve-the
change in ordinary consumer surplus. It turns out (for fairly funda-
mental reasons in demand theory) that this is not true. Rather, aggre-
gate WTP is the change in area under the "Hicksian" or "income
compensated" demand curve, an unobservable entity that separates
the substitution and income effects of a price change. A very substan-
tial literature in applied economics discusses the conditions under
which the change in consumer surplus is a good approximation for
aggregate WTP for a price change and, if not, what other techniques
(usually involving assumptions about the shape of utility functions)
can be used. 24
1
The problem of inferring the subject's beliefs about the good
being valued is a different, and equally pervasive, measurement
problem for revealed-preference techniques. The ultimate objective
of a revealed-preference study or welfare poll is to determine how
some good, with characteristics C1", . . . , C,*, or a change in some
good from characteristics C1*, . . . , C,* to C', .. , C,', is valued by
some group of subjects. But observing how a subject behaves in the
vicinity of a good that actually has those characteristics, or in response
to an actual change of that sort, does not directly evidence the valua-
tion, because the subject might misperceive the good or change. If we
eschew discursive measures (asking the subject how he sees the good),
241 A good review of this literature, and the basic theoretical flaws of ordinary consumer
surplus, is FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 49-72.
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then we must assume that the perception is accurate (an heroic and
unwarranted assumption) or somehow (again without discursive evi-
dence) posit a function correlating perceived and actual
characteristics.
This problem recurs in the literature on revealed-preference tech-
niques. Consider property value models. To quote a leading textbook
on applied economics, a crucial question to be asked in using these
methods is the following: "Is there sufficiently close correspondence
between [individuals'] perceptions of amenity levels (which presum-
ably govern the choices reflected in property prices) and the objective
measures of amenity levels that are available to the researcher? 2 42
The same question arises with respect to travel cost models.
Objective measures of [site] quality are reproducible .... However,
people might make choices about recreation on the basis of their
perceptions of quality rather than the objective measure. If individ-
uals' perceptions are functions of objective measures and personal
characteristics, then it may be possible to estimate a "perception
function" and to use this function to model choices and measure
welfare values.24
3
Or consider the standard use of hedonic wage models or defensive
behavior models to estimate WTP to avoid risk. Acritical problem
here is that the objective risk associated with a job or a defensive
behavior may differ from the risk perceived by the worker or actor.
"Valuation methods [for risk] based on revealed-preference have the
virtue of relying on actual behavior but can be applied only when the
analyst knows (or can reasonably infer) what decision alternatives and
consequences (including their pecuniary, health, and other attributes)
were perceived by the decision maker. '244
A third measurement problem for revealed-preference tech-
niques is that of determining valuations for counterfactual goods.
Imagine that a policy will change the attributes of some marketed or
nonmarketed good from C1, . . . , C, to C1', C2, ... , C,. If existing
goods of this sort never attain C1', or if CI' is attained but typically
bundled with changes in the good's other characteristics, using
revealed-preference techniques to measure the value of the hypothe-
sized good may be very difficult.
[Revealed-preference] methods ... suffer on the grounds that the
new situation (after the environmental quality change) may be
outside the current set of experiences (or outside the data
range) .... [They also] may suffer from colinearity among attrib-
242 Id. at 363.
243 Id. at 428.
244 Hammitt & Graham, supra note 140, at 34.
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utes. Colinearity precludes the isolation of factors affecting
choice.... For example, water quality attributes (BOD, turbidity,
etc) may be correlated but the economic valuation may only be
interested in valuing an improvement in one of the attributes.
245
A similar point holds about consumer preferences for currently non-
existent products that a firm might introduce, and indeed is a major
reason for the use of surveys in market research. "[I1f Doritos were to
create a new spicy salsa-flavor chip as a line extension, by definition
no purchase data would exist because the snack food would not have
been available yet for purchase.
'246
A final measurement problem involves the cost of goods.
Revealed-preference methods use information about the cost of a
good to some subject as a step in estimating the subject's valuations.
If the good is marketed and the consumer pays for it out of pocket,
the cost is pretty straightforward: its price. But if the good is not
marketed, estimating cost may be more complicated. This is a key
problem for travel cost studies, where cost equals the sum of the direct
and opportunity costs of traveling to the site. The solution has been to
survey site users about crucial travel details (for example, where the
trip originated and what the user's income is). And if the good is mar-
keted but the consumer is insured, the price will exceed her cost. In
particular, the wide existence of health insurance makes inferring
WTP for health from the prices of health care services or products
very tricky.
2. Idealization Problems
Let us turn, now, to the other set of reasons why welfare polls
have informational value even with revealed-preference studies in the
picture-namely, the idealizing conditions for valuation. Those condi-
tions, again, are that the subjects be self-interested; be well-informed;
have undistorted preferences; and exert sufficient mental effort. Real
world actors can, of course, fall short on all of these dimensions. And
while revealed-preference techniques offer some opportunities, by a
judicious selection of goods or subjects, to screen out problematic
preferences, they eschew the full range of interventions that welfare
polls can utilize.
245 W. Adamowicz et al., Combining Revealed and Stated Preference Methods for Val-
uing Environmental Amenities, 26 J. EN-vrL. ECON. & MGMT. 271, 272 (1994). The
problem of colinearity is a major one for defensive-behavior methods, often referred to in
that context as the problem of "joint production." See Cropper, supra note 17, at 335;
Dickie, supra note 233, at 412-13; F. Reed Johnson et al., Valuing Morbidity: An Integra-
tion of the Willingness-to-Pay and Health-Status Index Literatures, 16 J. HEALTH ECON.
641, 644 (1997).
246 CHURCHILL & IACOBUCCI, supra note 198, at 209.
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Consider, to begin, the problem of disinterested preferences.
Revealed-preference techniques can partly address this problem by
ignoring goods for which preferences are mainly moral or otherwise
disinterested. The classic example is nonuse values for environmental
goods. But preferences for experienced goods can also be partly dis-
interested. A good example is risk: Hedonic wage studies that infer
WTP from wage premiums for riskier jobs are problematic, in part,
because workers may be incurring risk out of a sense of responsibility
to family. 247 The same goes for individuals who purchase safety
devices (particularly if those devices directly benefit family members
and not just the individual, as in the case of safer cars or
appliances). 2
48
Admittedly, as discussed in Part III, welfare pollsters do not seem
to have experimented much with discursive devices for screening out
disinterested preferences.249 Currently, therefore, with respect to the
problem of self-interest, the choice between revealed- and stated-pref-
erence techniques is pretty much a wash. If successful discursive
screening devices are developed, these would be one comparative
advantage (among the others herein discussed) of welfare polls.
Turn, now, to the problem of information. Clearly, the actors in
revealed-preference studies may lack an idealized stock of informa-
tionl25 0-A problem already touched upon in my discussion of the gap
between the true and perceived characteristics of goods. 251 Focusing
the study on well-informed actors is a possibility, but the relevant facts
may not be widely known, or known only by a nonrepresentative seg-
ment of the population, creating potential problems of sample size or
statistical bias. Here, current welfare polling techniques, as described
in Part III, do offer important advantages. Those include telling
respondents more about the good at stake; deleting welfare-irrelevant
information; and characterizing the good as a bundle of locations
along different dimensions of welfare, as in conjoint analysis. A more
experimental possibility is switching from solo to group surveys, so as
to disseminate information cheaply.
252
A parallel analysis applies to the problem of preference distor-
tion. To begin, it is clear that preferences measured in behavioral
247 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 197-99 (1993).
248 Cf James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CON-
SUMER RES. 187, 197-99 (1998) (suggesting that consumers often must justify their choices
to others and use choice procedures that make justification easier).
249 See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
250 See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 236, at 20; Bettman et al., supra note 248, at
201-02.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 241-44.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 126-32, 211-15.
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studies are distorted. Consider the major distortions that affect wel-
fare polls, discussed in Part III: deviations from the expected utility
model for processing probabilities, loss aversion, and resistance to
trading off different dimensions of well-being. All of these are perva-
sive features of human decisionmaking 53 and are hardly confined to
welfare polls. For example, the literature on consumer behavior
shows that each of the distortions characterizes individuals purchasing
marketed goods. Consumers often make probabilistic decisions in
accordance with prospect theory, a model of choice that seems
descriptively much more accurate than expected utility theory.
254
"[D]ecision makers choose more optional features in a consumer
choice (e.g., air conditioning in an automobile) when they are given a
fully loaded model and asked to delete options they do not want than
when they are given a base model and asked to add options at addi-
tional cost" (loss aversion).25 5 James Bettman, Mary Luce, and John
Payne have extensively documented tradeoff aversion in consumer
choice. If a few simple axioms are satisfied, rationality would require
that consumers resolve purchase decisions involving products with
attributes along multiple dimensions by employing a "weighted addi-
tive" method: weighting each dimension, scoring the products on the
different dimensions, determining an overall score for each product,
and choosing the product with the highest score. 256 But consumers
regularly fail to engage in weighted additive decisionmaking and
instead use methods such as satisficing or lexicographic choice-either
to economize on mental effort or to avoid thinking about tradeoff
rates for dimensions (such as health or life) that are particularly
important.2 5
7
Some of the other distortions that have raised concerns about
welfare polls-such as framing, anchoring, and availability effects-
253 See, e.g., HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 142, at 289-312; PLOUS, supra note 139, at
84-188; Baron, supra note 110, at 82-84.
254 See Rong Chen & Jianmin Jia, Consumer Choices Under Small Probabilities:
Overweighting or Underweighting?, 16 MARKETING LETTERS 5, 5 (2005) (citing sources).
255 MARY FRANCES LUCE ET AL., EMOTIONAL DECISIONS: TRADEOFF DIFFICULTY AND
COPING IN CONSUMER CHOICE 43 (2001); see also Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman,
The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 119, 119-20, 125-26 (2005)
(describing research showing loss aversion in consumer choice and suggesting ways that
marketers may mitigate it).
256 See Bettman et a)., supra note 248, at 190. For a discussion of the "independence"
axioms that, together with the basic axioms of rational choice theory, entail weighted-addi-
tive decisionmaking, see DETLOF VON WINTERFELDT & WARD EDWARDS, DECISION
ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 331-41 (1986).
257 See Bettman et al., supra note 248, at 189-99. The analysis also includes ease of
justification as a choice goal. On tradeoff avoidance in particular, see id. at 205-06 and
generally LUCE ET AL., supra note 255.
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
December 2006]
H inOnline  -- 81 .Y.U. L. Rev.  1949 2006
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
have been observed in consumer behavior as well. 258 Further, all of
the distortions that characterize consumers also presumably charac-
terize visitors to parks, purchasers of properties with environmental
amenities or disamenities, workers considering risky jobs, and individ-
uals mitigating or averting disease states-the individuals whose
behaviors are studied by travel-cost, property-value, hedonic-wage,
and defensive-behavior techniques, respectively.
As with information, revealed-preference methods can try to cir-
cumvent distortions by focusing on the behavior of unusually rational
types-but that creates potential sample size and bias issues. By con-
trast, welfare polling currently offers a range of techniques for
reducing distortion, discussed in Part III. To recap the discussion
there: Direct debiasing techniques have had some mixed success. A
more successful response to preference distortions may be to change
the elicitation method within a given welfare polling format, or indeed
to change the format-for example, to switch from CV to QALY
surveys to overcome tradeoff biases in valuing health states or from
standard happiness studies to Kahneman's moment-based surveys to
overcome availability biases. Switching from solo to group surveys
may help to facilitate debiasing, just as it may help to disseminate
information cheaply. 2
59
Finally, real-world actors do economize on mental effort. In par-
ticular, as just mentioned, an important focus of research into con-
sumer choice has been to document how the fact of bounded
rationality-the fact that humans cannot instantly and effortlessly
retrieve items from memory, process new information, and perform
computations-produces heuristics.260 Admittedly, respondents to
welfare polls have an additional, strategic incentive to eschew effort
that consumers and other actors considering choices with significant
personal effects lack: Consumers will internalize the benefits of their
incremental mental efforts, while survey respondents will not. On the
other hand, as discussed in Part III, the polling format can presumably
intensify the internal and social pressures that induce additional
effort-by remunerating respondents for their answers, by using face-
to-face interviews rather than mail or Internet surveys, and (once
more) by shifting from solo to group formats.261
258 See Bettman et al., supra note 248, at 201-02 (availability); id. at 208 (framing);
Joseph C. Nunes & Peter Boatwright, Incidental Prices and Their Effect on Willingness to
Pay, 41 J. MARKETING RES. 457 (2004) (anchoring).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 153-64, 211-15.
260 See JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAMTVE DECISION MAKER 9-15 (1993); Bettman
et al., supra note 248, at 189-99.
261 See supra text accompanying notes 173-74, 211-15.
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 81:1875
H inOnline  -- 81 .Y.U. L. Rev.  1950 2006
WELFARE POLLS
In sum, the comparative objection to welfare polling fails. Wel-
fare polls can provide substantial new information to the (nonomnis-
cient!) policy analyst, given the limitations of revealed-preference
methods with respect to measurement and the idealizing conditions
for valuation (information, nondistortion, self-interest, and mental
effort). 26
2
My response to the revealed-preference objection assumes, to be
sure, that the communicative difficulties that may affect welfare
polls-respondent misunderstanding of the question asked, on the
one hand, and a lack of truthfulness in answering the question, on the
other-do not negate their informational value. If the respondents to
these polls assigned semantic content to the questions asked that did
not correlate with the semantic content intended by the pollsters, or if
the respondents understood the questions but provided untruthful
answers that did not correlate with their real preferences, the
revealed-preference objection to welfare polling (indeed, in its strong,
noncomparative form) would be persuasive.
To begin, it should be underscored that the possibility of respon-
dent misunderstanding and strategic deception, along with that of
strategic laziness, is hardly unique to welfare polls, but generalizes to
all sorts of surveys-political polls, psychological surveys, consumer
research, and so on. Presumably the various "consumers" of these
surveys, often quite savvy (e.g., politicians, firms), would not use them
if deception, shirking, and misunderstanding by respondents seriously
undercut their informational value.
Why does this not occur? Shirking has already been discussed.
Avoiding misleading questions has been intensively studied by polling
scholars, and a large set of second-order techniques (pretesting, focus
groups, cognitive interviews) are available.
263
262 Two other categories of generic problems that affect revealed-preference techniques
should also be noted. The first category includes problems of bias and self-selection: For
example, workers with a greater appetite for risk tend to take risky jobs, which means that
the observed wage premium for a given risk will tend to be lower than population WTA for
that risk. See, e.g., OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HUMAN
HEALTH METRICS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION SUPPORT TOOLS: LESSONS FROM
HEALTH ECONOMICS AND DECISION ANALYSIS 18-19 (2001), available at http://
www.epa.gov/nrmrl/pubs/600r01104/600R01104.pdf; OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 236,
at 20 ("[In revealed-preference studiesJ the specific market participants being studied
should be representative of the target populations to be affected by the rulemaking under
consideration ...."). The second category involves assumptions about market structure-
for example, the assumption in property value models that relocation costs are low. See
supra text accompanying note 53; OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 236, at 20 (stating that,
in revealed-preference studies, market should be competitive).
263 See supra Part III.F.
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As for strategic deception, the discussion in Part III suggested
that the attempt to design incentive-compatible formats is probably a
dead end. A better answer to worries about deception points to
bounded rationality and norms. Boundedly rational individuals may
find it too difficult to maintain a consistent pattern of lies (particularly
in the face of questions designed to test for the consistency of prefer-
ences), and anyone may feel internal or social pressure to tell the
truth. Surveys can be designed to intensify this pressure. Further, we
have seen that stated valuations correlate with behaviorally inferred
valuations, which underscores the informational value of surveys. If
respondents were not constrained (by norms, internal pressure, incen-
tive-compatible design, or whatever) to state their actual prefer-
ences-or at least valuations that (true or not) are systematically
related to their actual preferences-then this observed correlation
would be very puzzling. Finally, and reciprocally, stated valuations
need not be accurate to be informative. Inaccurate but nonrandom
statements also have evidentiary value. Ideally, survey design would
induce truthtelling, but a cruder, second-best solution is to use calibra-
tion factors to adjust for various factors that drive a wedge between
stated and actual valuations.264
A final thought: Might it not be possible to combine the advan-
tages of surveys and revealed-preference techniques by placing actors
in a favorable informational, cognitive, and motivational state, and
then inferring their valuations from their behavior (rather than their
statements)? Indeed, there is a small but growing body of scholarship,
in applied economics, that undertakes valuation "experiments. '265 In
these experiments, subjects in a controlled setup are given the oppor-
tunity to buy and sell goods. Thus far, valuation experiments have
been mainly used to learn about individual behavior or to test the
valuations emerging from CV studies. But one can imagine experi-
ments themselves becoming a primary source of valuation data.
An analysis of the potential value of controlled experiments
(including one kind of quasi-experimental setup that has recently
become popular, the "information market") 266 in producing informa-
tion about welfare is beyond the scope of this Article. It seems clear,
however, that controlled experiments would be applicable to a nar-
rower range of welfare impacts than welfare polls. This is because an
264 See supra Part III.E.
265 See Murphy & Stevens, supra note 113; Laura 0. Taylor, Experimental Methods for
the Testing and Design of Contingent Valuation, in HANDBOOK ON CONTINGENT VALUA-
nON, supra note 97, at 177.
266 See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and
Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004).
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experimental setup is one in which the welfare effect being valued is
actually allowed to occur. Where the effect involves a substantial
reduction in either an individual's well-being or in overall well-being,
the running of the experiment may itself be precluded by weak wel-
farism: Consider the use of experiments to value serious disease,
physical injury, or the environmental degradation of residential or rec-
reational areas. Whatever the potential informational advantages of
experiments vis-A-vis both traditional revealed-preference techniques
and welfare polls, there are presumably moral limits-cognizable
within the framework of weak welfarism-to the kinds of welfare
effects that they should justifiably be used to value. Thus, the possi-
bility of experiments as a source of valuation data certainly bears
additional research but does not undercut the case for welfare polls
presented here.
C. The Deliberative Democracy Objection
Let us turn, then, to the second general objection to welfare pol-
ling: Call it the "deliberative democracy" or "civic republican" objec-
tion. This objection, like the revealed-preference objection, has
emerged most clearly in the critical literature about CV surveys. One
set of critics has been traditional economists who agree that policy-
makers need information about preferences, but are suspicious about
surveys. A different set of critics has been environmentalists or polit-
ical theorists who have no aversion to surveys, polls, and discussions,
but deny that environmental or other policy issues should be resolved
through the monetary measures of preferences that CV studies yield.
They argue that policy should be sensitive to citizen deliberation:
processes where citizens adopt a public-regarding (rather than self-
interested) perspective and reach judgments about what policy best
serves the public good. And these critics claim that CV surveys, which
ask about exogenous preferences rather than judgments endogenous
to the process of reasoning about policy-and which use WTP ques-
tions that require or at least invite a self-interested perspective on the
part of respondents-have a structure inconsistent with citizen
deliberation.
The philosopher Mark Sagoff is probably the leading civic repub-
lican critic of CV studies (and of cost-benefit analysis more generally).
In a number of books and articles, Sagoff has argued along the fol-
lowing lines:
When individuals participate in the political process to determine
the common values and purposes that hold them together as a com-
munity or as a nation, they regard themselves as judges of public
policy, not merely as channels or locations at which wants can be
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found. Debates in which individuals or their representatives discuss
and decide upon public values need have no analogy, then, with
markets where individuals determine and pursue personal prefer-
ences. In a democracy the application of a cost-benefit formula
cannot replace the public discussion of ideas; it is not just what the
person wants but what he or she thinks that counts.
26 7
Similar criticisms of the CV technique are offered by other critics of
cost-benefit analysis, most recently Lisa Heinzerling and Frank
Ackerman in a high-profile book, Priceless:
Asking people in a shopping mall about hypothetical scenarios
involving bronchitis, or talking to people who answer the phone
about how much they would pay to protect the bald eagle, amounts
to elevating the consumer over the citizen. It also turns the very
idea of republican government on its head, suggesting that elected
representatives should no longer try, through deliberation, rea-
soning, and debate, to shape the mass of public opinion into a sen-
sible and lasting set of ideas, but should instead take their marching
orders from a small sample of nameless individuals who answer a
survey.
268
These quotations exemplify a standard line of critical scholarship
about CV studies, 269 but it should be noted that the criticisms would
also seemingly apply to welfare polls that seek to elicit nonmonetary
measures of respondents' self-interested preferences, such as QALY
or happiness surveys. Indeed, Heinzerling and Ackerman explicitly
criticize QALY measures.
270
The civic republican view of appropriate policymaking that
infuses Sagoff's and similar criticisms of welfare polls also motivates
the proposals for citizen juries, citizen advisory committees, and delib-
erative polling-what I have termed policy deliberation formats. For
example, James Fishkin, the leading proponent of deliberative polling,
sees deliberation as one of the central desiderata for political choice
that this survey approach instantiates.271 By deliberation, Fishkin
267 MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 100 (1988). This book draws on a
number of Sagoff's prior articles. Id. at x. For more recent statements drawing a similar
distinction between consumer preferences and citizen preferences or judgments, see
Sagoff, supra note 212, at 213-14, and MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PKINCIPLE, AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 2-3 (2004).
268 FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 213 (2004).
269 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 247, at 203-10; Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis: An Ethical Critique, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 33, 38; Lester B. Lave, Benefit-
Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 104,
116-17 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ide-
ology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 95-97 (1972).
270 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 268, at 98-102.
271 FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 7, at 40-43, 161-63.
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means public-regarding deliberation, or at least deliberation that is
open to claims about the public good rather than individual interest.
"Deliberation" approximates Habermas's ideal speech situation: "All
arguments deemed relevant by anyone in the discussion are given as
extensive a hearing as anyone wants and people are willing to consider
all the arguments offered on their merits. '272 Peter Dienel and
Ortwin Renn, who have been active in promoting "Planning Cells" (a
kind of citizen jury) in Germany, write:
Participants of Planning Cells have no defined constituents to whom
they are obliged. They are selected to embody and represent the
interests of all citizens rather than a specific group. It is interesting
to note that citizens occupy the role of advocates of the common
good almost from the beginning of the sessions.
273
Ned Crosby, who has spearheaded the development of the citizen jury
format in the United States, argues that it embodies a social contract
approach to policy choice, as opposed to a utility calculation or a
political power approach.274 This roughly tracks the familiar distinc-
tion between civic republicanism, cost-benefit analysis, and interest-
group pluralism.
Wendy Kenyon and co-authors, reflecting on the critical litera-
ture on CV surveys and on the proposals for policy deliberation for-
mats, write:
Economists and others have suggested that a CV questionnaire asks
respondents the wrong question, assuming that consumers think
about environmental goods (public goods) in the same way as they
do about private goods.... [T]he use of [citizen juries] as a method
of preference revelation allows ...deliberation on the environ-
mental issue in terms of what is best for society.
275
In short, the civic republican critique can be framed as a contrastive
claim: that citizen juries, deliberative polls, planning cells, and other
policy deliberation formats have the appropriate public-regarding
structure for citizen involvement in policymaking, and welfare polls do
not.
The response to this objection is, I believe, straightforward.
Policy deliberation formats and welfare polls are complementary, not
mutually exclusive. Policy deliberation formats ask what an appro-
272 Id. at 40.
273 Peter C. Dienel & Ortwin Renn, Planning Cells: A Gate to "Fractal" Mediation, in
FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra note 7, at 117, 126. On the
use of Planning Cells in Germany, elsewhere in Europe, and (in one instance) the United
States, and the authors' involvement, see id. at 130-36, and Kenyon et al., supra note 7, at
558.
274 Crosby, Using the Citizens Jury® Process, supra note 7, at 401-02.
275 Kenyon et al., supra note 7, at 559.
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priate policy would be; if the answer is that an appropriate policy
would be sensitive to considerations of well-being, in one or another
way, welfare polls can then be brought to bear (by the citizens them-
selves, or by the administrators implementing the citizens' policy
judgment).
To begin, it should be stressed that weak welfarism-the moral
framework I have relied upon in arguing for welfare polls-is per-
fectly consistent with the use of policy deliberation formats. There are
a range of possible arguments, intrinsicalist and instrumentalist, for
why some governmental decisions276 should be informed by policy
deliberation formats. Intrinsicalist arguments say that public-spirited
citizen participation is an intrinsic good. Instrumentalist arguments
say that policy deliberation formats advance important purposes that
are conceptually distinct from participation itself-in particular, pro-
ducing better governmental decisions.
277
Are these arguments persuasive? If so, what specific kinds of
decisions should policy deliberation formats be convened to address?
These are interesting and difficult questions that are well beyond the
scope of this Article. The point I wish to emphasize here is that the
intrinsicalist and instrumentalist arguments for policy deliberation for-
mats are arguments that the weak welfarist can accept. The argu-
ments do not entail nonwelfarism.
To begin, it is plausible that participation in government is an
intrinsic welfare good-in other words, that an individual's well-being
is enhanced by her participation, or, more precisely, that individuals
with full information and nondistorted preferences would self-inter-
estedly prefer participation for its own sake.2 78 And in any event the
weak welfarist will surely find very plausible the suggestion that, in
some contexts, policy deliberation formats are instrumentally valu-
276 1 say "some" because, clearly, policy deliberation formats cannot be used to address
all governmental decisions. These are too numerous and, in some cases (most obviously,
adjudicative decisions involving particular individuals), legal or moral constraints might
well preclude the use of such formats.
277 See Thomas Christiano, The Significance of Public Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 243, 244-46 (describing different kinds of instrumental and
intrinsic values that public deliberation might have).
278 1 have elsewhere argued that participation in government does not, in fact, have
intrinsic welfare significance. See Adler, supra note 104, at 283-88. But that position is
not entailed by weak welfarism. Weak welfarism, itself, does not necessitate the conclusion
that participation lacks intrinsic welfare value. That depends on whether individuals with
full information and so forth prefer participation-and one can adopt weak welfarism
without taking a position on that.
Therefore, the weak welfarist can accept the intrinsicalist case for policy deliberation
formats. And in any event, as discussed immediately below, she can certainly accept the
instrumental case for policy deliberation formats.
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able-instrumentally valuable as measured by the very criteria of
weak welfarism. In particular, someone who holds a moral view with
the structure {W*, F1,. .. , FM1, where W* is overall welfare and M=O,
can certainly believe that the use of policy deliberation formats, in
some area, will lead to policies that are better in light of {W*, F1,...,
FM}. This is true even if M=O-that is, even if the weak welfarist is a
utilitarian. Utilitarians might be confident, for example, that policy
deliberation formats will often (if not always) come to recognize the
moral significance of overall welfare and will help control bureaucra-
cies that too often promote their own interests rather than overall wel-
fare. But if utilitarians can support policy deliberation formats on
instrumental grounds-and I suggest they can-then, a fortiori, the
various nonutilitarian theories that are also subsumed within the
framework of weak welfarism certainly can.
All of this is a little abstract. Someone who holds a moral view
with the structure {W*, F1, .... , FM} can believe that policy delibera-
tion formats are morally required in some contexts. If so-given the
interplay, if not identity, between morality and law-she can also
believe that policy deliberation formats are legally required in some
contexts. But how, concretely, can she believe all of this and also sup-
port welfare polls?
Consider that the subset of governmental decisions appropriately
informed by "deliberative polls," "citizen juries," or other policy
deliberation formats might be first-order or second-order decisions.
279
First-order decisions are decisions to adopt particular policies-to
issue particular regulations, build particular projects, and so forth.
Second-order decisions are decisions about which procedures agencies
should employ in making their first-order decisions. Congress faces a
second-order choice in deciding whether to enact a statute that
instructs a health and safety agency to employ cost-benefit analysis or,
instead, some competing procedure for choosing regulatory measures.
Congress also faced a second-order choice when it debated the enact-
ment of a generic cost-benefit supermandate. 280 An agency faces a
second-order choice in deciding what general approach to take in
implementing its existing, open-ended, statutory mandate.
Clearly, second-order policy deliberation formats and welfare
polls are complementary, not mutually exclusive. 281 For example, a
citizen jury might be convened on the question of whether an agency
279 This should not be confused with my earlier distinction between second- and first-
order techniques for designing surveys. Supra text accompanying notes 203-06.
280 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
281 See, e.g., Crosby, Using the Citizens Jury® Process, supra note 7, at 413 (noting that
citizen juries can help design structure of policy analysis).
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should follow a procedure of QALY-maximization; if the jury and the
agency decide affirmatively, the agency will then (down the line) use
QALY surveys. In other words, the citizens participating in the
second-order policy deliberation format may come to the conclusion
that the agency should employ an administrative decision procedure
that attends to human welfare or aspects of welfare. The agency, in
line with the citizens' recommendation, will implement the welfare-
regarding decision procedure, and in so doing may well employ wel-
fare polls.
First-order policy deliberation formats and welfare polls are also
compatible, although this is less obvious. Imagine that a policy delib-
eration format has been convened to determine the content of an
agency regulation. For example, an environmental agency drafting a
pollution-control regulation for pollutant X might ask a citizen jury,
"What should be the permissible level of pollutant X?" The citizen
jury, if truly deliberative, would not decide that question blindly,
without mediating concepts. Nor, if truly informed, would it decide
the question as a matter of common knowledge, without outside data.
Instead-civic republicans would surely agree-the permissible level
ought to be picked in light of public goals and values, and the jury
should gather and discuss information so as to determine what pollu-
tion level best advances those goals and values. For example, the jury
might determine that optimal pollution policy should promote overall
well-being, should avoid large skews in the distribution of well-being,
and should protect moral rights.282 If so, the jury would then need to
consult welfare polls as well as revealed-preference data, to help
determine the extent to which lowered pollution levels (via lowered
fatality risks and fewer diseases) increase overall welfare and (if the
effects of pollution are disproportionately borne by the poor) diminish
distributive skews. CV or QALY valuations of fatality risk and dis-
ease would surely be helpful to the jury at this stage in its reasoning
process.
In sum: Welfare polls are only part of a broader process of
administrative decisionmaking. Administrative decisionmaking is a
kind of legal reasoning that should begin with applicable legal sources
(statutes, the Constitution, executive orders). At some point in the
reasoning process, the administrator may conclude that she is legally
required to invite citizen participation, or that doing so is legally per-
282 See supra Part IV.A (discussing "weak welfarism," which allows for moral relevance
of rights or distributive considerations as well as overall well-being); ADLER & POSNER,
NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 59-60, 155-56 (noting that well-being might be "cur-
rency" of distributive justice).
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 81:1875
H inOnline  -- 81 .Y.U. L. Rev.  1958 2006
WELFARE POLLS
missible and morally required.28 3 So, potentially, citizens as well as
the administrator will become involved in deliberations about what
the agency ought to do. But these deliberators, citizen or official, may
well conclude that facts about human well-being are relevant to their
decision-that they are legally required to attend to well-being, or
legally permitted and morally required to do so. If weak welfarism is
indeed the correct moral view then the official or citizen deliberators
should and (if not too misguided) will often reach this conclusion.
And once the official or citizen deliberators conclude that well-being
information is relevant, they may well then decide (for just the sorts of
reasons presented earlier in this Article) that welfare surveys are a
useful way to secure that information.
In other words, the civic republican critics of welfare polls are
attacking a caricature. The critics seem to assume that the polls are
self-bottoming-that they come into play from the beginning, dis-
placing public-spirited deliberation. But that is not how welfare polls
work, or at least not how they should work. The self-interested per-
spective that the respondents to welfare polls are asked to adopt is not
the starting point for policy. Rather, deliberating citizens or officials
should start from an impartial starting point. From that starting point,
however, they may deliberate their way to the proposition that the
effect of policies on the interests of some group of individuals is a
legally or morally relevant concern. Reasoning as public-regarding
citizens, and bracketing our narrow interests, we might conclude that
government should, inter alia, be sensitive to the effect of its policies
on our narrow interests. Welfare polls ask respondents to take a self-
interested perspective because the informational value of these polls is
in elucidating what individual interest consists in-information that a
fully moral and impartial deliberation process might well (indeed,
surely should) take account of.
V
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR WELFARE POLLS
The overwhelming majority of welfare polls to date have
employed three general formats: the CV, QALY, and happiness for-
mats. This Article has therefore focused on these formats-discussing
the role that CV, QALY, and happiness surveys currently play in
agency decisionmaking and other aspects of administrative govern-
283 To repeat, as argued above, see supra text accompanying notes 276-82, the proposi-
tion that citizen participation will be morally or legally required in some contexts is consis-
tent with weak welfarism.
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ance;284 canvassing other possible roles;285 describing a variety of pos-
sible improvements to the survey enterprise within this trio of
formats;286 and defending welfare polling from objections from two
quarters, the revealed-preference camp within economics and the
deliberative democracy camp within political theory.
287
But should the trio of CV, QALY, and happiness surveys be
changed-perhaps supplemented by different welfare polling formats,
or perhaps even pared back? The dominance of these three
approaches is, to a large extent, an historical accident. CVs originate
in the Kaldor-Hicks view of policy analysis long dominant, despites its
flaws, in applied economics.288 QALYs became popular, in substantial
part, because public health researchers were disinclined to monetize
health and longevity and wanted a scale that was different from the
WTPIWTA scale.289 And the rise of happiness surveys is largely a
matter of scholarly cycles within psychology, shifting from the tradi-
tional focus on negative states such as anxiety and depression to
include positive states as well.2 90 Only recently have economists and
others with an interest in policymaking latched on to happiness
surveys.
Despite their accidental origins, CV, QALY, and happiness
surveys turn out to be vital governmental tools, as discussed above.
QALY and happiness surveys capture important aspects of well-being;
CVs are yet more inclusive. But, at a minimum, there is much room
to supplement these standard welfare polling formats with new ones,
in at least four different ways.
First, more survey work should be undertaken to characterize the
multidimensional structure of welfare. Such a characterization is both
directly useful in policymaking-for example, in clarifying the full
range of well-being impacts that, ideally, a cost-benefit analysis or
annual well-being report should cover-and indirectly useful in
guiding the ongoing enterprise of welfare polling.
284 See supra Part I.
285 See id.
286 See supra Part III.
287 See supra Part IV.
288 For critical discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, with citations to other critical liter-
ature, see, for example, Adler, supra note 104, at 249. My defense of cost-benefit analysis
rests on the criterion of overall well-being, which is different from the Kaldor-Hicks crite-
rion. See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 21-23, 39-61; Adler &
Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 39, at 272-76; Adler & Posner,
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 39, at 190-91, 204-38. On the continuing
dominance of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion in applied economics, see, for example, JUST ET
AL., supra note 232, at 646.
289 See Adler, supra note 25, at 14.
290 See, e.g., Ryan & Deci, supra note 31, at 142.
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There is a long philosophical tradition, going back to Aristotle, of
drawing up lists of the different aspects of well-being. 291 Martha
Nussbaum, John Finnis, and James Griffin are prominent contempo-
rary philosophers who have continued this enterprise. Nussbaum's list
is: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, use of the "senses, imagination,
and thought," emotions, practical reason, affiliation, interaction with
other species, play, and control over one's political and material envi-
ronment.2 92 Finnis's is: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience,
sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion.2 93 Griffin's is:
accomplishment, autonomy, understanding, enjoyment, and deep per-
sonal relations. 294 Philosophers tend to work through reflection and
discussion with each other, not surveys, and their efforts to describe
the multiplicity of well-being dimensions can usefully be supple-
mented through systematic survey work.
For a rare example of such work, consider the World Health
Organization's efforts to develop a questionnaire-the so-called
"WHOQOL instrument"-designed to capture all aspects of quality
of life, not just health as traditionally conceived.295 Research groups
in fifteen different countries were involved in the effort. Each
research group conducted focus groups with the general population to
develop a preliminary list of the "aspects of life that they considered
contributed to its quality. ' 296 Based on these focus groups, a prelimi-
nary questionnaire was developed, consisting of numerous facets of
well-being and matching questions designed to determine the respon-
dent's achievement with respect to each facet. The preliminary ques-
tionnaire was administered to at least 300 respondents in each of the
fifteen countries. The WHO researchers then performed a statistical
analysis of this data-for example, looking at correlations within and
between facets-to arrive at a final facet structure and matching ques-
291 See, e.g., SABINA ALKIRE, VALUING FREEDOMS 78-84 tbl.2.12 (2002); L.W. SUMNER,
WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 45-80 (1996). This philosophical work grows out of
the objectivist approach to well-being, but the difference between that approach and one
that looks to fully informed preferences may be slight. See supra text accompanying note
105.
292 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 78-80 (2000).
293 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-90 (1980).
294 JAMES GRIFFIN, VALUE JUDGMENT 29-30 (1996).
295 For discussions of the structure, development, use, and psychometric properties of
the WHOQOL, see Amy E. Bonomi et al., Validation of the United States' Version of the
World Health Organization Quality of Life (WHOQOL) Instrument, 53 J. CLINICAL EPIDE-
MIOLOGY 1 (2000); Silvija Szabo, The World Health Organization Quality of Life
(WHOQOL) Assessment Instrument, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS IN
CLINICAL TRIALS 355 (Bert Spilker ed., 2d ed. 1996); and The WHOQOL Group, The
World Health Organization Quality of Life Assessment (WHOQOL): Development and
General Psychometric Properties, 46 SoC. Sci. & MED. 1569 (1998).
296 The WHOQOL Group, supra note 295, at 1570.
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tionnaire. The final WHOQOL structure consists of twenty-four
facets or dimensions of well-being, grouped into six domains.
297
TABLE 1
THE WHOQOL QUALITY OF LIFE DOMAINS (6) AND
FACETS (24)
Physical Psychological Independence Social Environment Spiritual
Domain Domain Domain Domain Domain Domain
1 4 9 13 16 24
Pain and Positive Mobility Personal Physical Safety Spirituality
Discomfort Feelings Relationships and Security
2 5 10 14 17
Energy and Thinking, Activities of Social Support Home
Fatigue Learning, Daily Living Environment
Memory, and
Concentration
3 6 11 15 18
Sleep and Self-Esteem Dependence on Sexual Activity Financial
Rest Medication or Resources
Treatments
7 12 19
Body Image Working Health and
and Capacity Social Care:
Appearance Availability
and Quality
8 20
Negative Opportunities
Feelings for Acquiring
New
Information
and Skills
21
Participation in
and New
Opportunities
for Recreation/
Leisure
22
Physical
Environment
23
Transport
Survey work such as the WHOQOL, together with more tradi-
tional philosophical efforts by philosophers such as Nussbaum,
Griffin, and Finnis, gives policymakers and welfare pollsters an over-
arching framework for categorizing welfare impacts and attendant
surveys and metrics. A second, new direction for welfare polling con-
sists of survey work designed to characterize the fine structure of par-
ticular well-being dimensions. Consider the WHOQOL domains:
297 The facet and domain structure of the current WHOQOL is summarized in Bonomi,
supra note 295, at 4. The full names of the twenty-four facets are provided in The
WHOQOL Group, supra note 295, at 1576-78.
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QALY surveys typically cover at most the first and third domains and
part of the second (omitting positive feelings, self-esteem, and body
image), and wholly ignore the last three.298 Happiness surveys, if
focused on the respondent's positive and negative affects, cover only
parts of the first and second domains. If focused on the respondent's
sense of satisfaction with his life, they cover the whole WHOQOL
map, but only in an indirect way.299 CVs cover the whole map, but
tradeoff biases may interfere with monetary valuation of goods such
as friendship, self-esteem, and spirituality.
Nonmonetary quantitative measures, such as QALYs, that focus
on a subset of the WHOQOL dimensions are useful (1) in reducing
tradeoff biases and other cognitive distortions that may especially
affect CVs, and (2) in circumventing the variable marginal utility of
money.300 In theory, both of these benefits could also be realized
through an inclusive nonmonetary measure of well-being-an idea I
will return to in a moment-but dimension-specific measures such as
QALYs have the further benefit of providing fine-grained information
about well-being. A QALY survey asks the respondent to imagine
changes in her health state, holding nonhealth characteristics fixed.
To put this in terms of the WHOQOL, imagine a QALY survey that
focuses on facets 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, which would be reason-
ably typical. These are the health dimensions; the other WHOQOL
facets are background dimensions. Then the QALY survey will
instruct the respondent that the number one means the best possible
state with respect to all of the health dimensions, together with some
set of backgrounJ characteristics (most straightforwardly, the respon-
dent's actual characteristics), and zero means the worst possible state
with respect to all of the health dimensions, together with that same set
of background characteristics. 30 1 The respondent will then be asked
298 Adler, supra note 25, at 50-51.
299 See supra note 60 (describing standard conception of happiness as mix of positive
affect, negative affect, and satisfaction with life). Some happiness surveys focus more on
affects, others on satisfaction with life. See Andrews & Robinson, supra note 34, at 62-63,
70-76. The respondent to a standard, global question about life-satisfaction (for example,
that used in the Eurobarometer series, see supra text accompanying note 33) could reason-
ably answer by thinking about his achievements with respect to the totality of WHOQOL
dimensions. However, the question does not ask him to do that, nor does it otherwise
draw his attention to those dimensions. Further, an answer to a question such as "How
satisfied are you with your life?" is not direct evidence of the respondent's overall evalua-
tion of his actual life circumstances, because the answer is mediated by the respondent's
perception of those circumstances. This is in contrast with the QALY method, which speci-
fies a state for the respondent to evaluate.
300 See supra text accompanying notes 46-47, 163.
301 This is not quite accurate. Zero on the QALY scale is usually used to mean death or
a state no better than death, as opposed to the worst possible health state. But the basic
point that the QALY approach asks the respondent to vary health characteristics, rather
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to place an actual or hypothetical health state of hers on this 0-1 scale,
using some technique such as the standard gamble or time tradeoff.
Contrast that with an inclusive exercise that tells the respondent that
one is an ideal state with respect to all of the WHOQOL dimensions,
and that zero is the worst possible state with respect to all of the
WHOQOL dimensions. Presumably the QALY scale is more sensi-
tive to relatively small differences in health states than the more inclu-
sive scale would be. To give one illustrative example: Respondents to
QALY surveys are able to distinguish angina and pancreatitis (a
recent collection of QALY scores includes a score of 0.75 for angina
and 0.81 for pancreatitis). 30 2 Would they be able to distinguish
between an ideal life marred only by angina and one marred only by
pancreatitis?
This is a long-winded way of arguing for the benefits of nonmone-
tary, dimension-specific well-being measures such as QALYs. But
presumably those benefits are not unique to the first three WHOQOL
domains (where we have at least partial coverage, with QALY and
happiness surveys) as opposed to the last three. Researchers should
experiment with social quality-of-life metrics and surveys, which
would correspond to the fourth WHOQOL domain and would quan-
tify on a nonmonetary scale (e.g., a 0-1 scale analogous to QALYs)
the contribution that different sorts of social interaction make to well-
being. The same goes for "personal environment" quality-of-life met-
rics, corresponding to the fifth WHOQOL domain, and maybe even
spirituality metrics.
A third avenue for new work in welfare polling involves altering
the respondent's perspective. QALYs, happiness surveys, and CV
polls all ask the respondent about her own life. QALYs (when admin-
istered to laypeople rather than doctors) ask the respondent to com-
pare outcomes in which she experiences a given health state with
outcomes in which she experiences death or perfect health. Happi-
ness surveys ask the respondent how happy or satisfied she is with her
life-or, in Kahneman's framework, how good her current exper-
iences are. 30 3 CV surveys (if appropriately restricted to screen out dis-
interested preferences) will focus on the respondent's WTP/WTA for
changes in the world that affect her.
than both health and background characteristics, and is therefore presumably more sensi-
tive to health changes, remains true. See Adler, supra note 25, at 47-52.
302 Tufts-New Eng. Med. Ctr. Inst. for Clinical Research & Health Policy Studies, Cost
Effectiveness Analysis Registry, Preference Weights 1976-1997, http://www.tufts-nemc.org/
cearegistry/data/phaselpreferenceweights.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
303 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68 (discussing Kahneman's approach to mea-
suring experience).
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Welfare polls need not adopt this respondent-centered focus. In
principle, a poll might ask the respondent to consider someone else's
life-the life of a hypothetical person, or the actual life of some other
person-and to express that life's well-being value on some quantita-
tive scale. Questions of this sort would seem to have both advantages
and disadvantages vis-A-vis the current formats. They might be partic-
ularly good at focusing respondents on the particular aspects of well-
being that the surveyor wants quantified. (Current formats, when
asking the respondent about a hypothetical state substantially at vari-
ance with her actual condition, risk triggering a protest reaction
wherein the respondent outright refuses to value the hypothetical
state or, more subtly, fails to fully consider it.) Relatedly, non-respon-
dent-centered formats might be particularly effective at encouraging
respondents to refine their general judgments and views about the
nature of well-being (since the task of evaluating their own particular
lives has been excised), and would be easier to mesh with group-based
well-being surveys than the current surveys.
30 4
On the other hand, non-respondent-centered formats risk inviting
answers that are not welfare-focused. For example, a respondent
asked to rank various health histories of other persons might express
his judgments about how "healthy" these individuals are in some
sense detached from well-being, or his moral judgment about a fair
allocation of health care resources among them, rather than a judg-
ment about the welfare-goodness of the different lives. 30 5 Whether,
on balance, non-respondent-centered formats provide substantial new
well-being information beyond that afforded by QALYs, CVs, and
happiness surveys is something we can only determine by experi-
menting with these novel formats.
A fourth and final area for experimentation with new welfare
polling formats involves developing a genuine interpersonal utility
scale. This scale would be inclusive, covering all of the dimensions of
well-being. And, ideally, it would be a cardinal scale, capable of rep-
resenting well-being levels (crucial for questions about the distribu-
tion of well-being) and well-being differences (crucial for determining
overall well-being). 30 6 Imagine that the interpersonal utility scale
ranges from zero to one. Then, if person A is at level 0.3 and person
B is at level 0.4, this means that B is better off than A. If a policy
changes A's level to 0.31 and B's to 0.37, this means that the policy
304 See supra text accompanying notes 211-15 (discussing possibility of group-based wel-
fare polls).
305 See supra text accompanying note 118.
306 See ADLER & POSNER, NEw FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 39-43 (discussing how
different moral theories require measurement of well-being levels and differences).
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decreases overall well-being (because the 0.01-unit positive difference
it makes to A's well-being is less than the 0.03-unit negative difference
it makes to B's).
Designing surveys to develop an interpersonal utility scale would
mean taking a view about the meaningfulness and content of interper-
sonal welfare comparisons-something I have written about exten-
sively elsewhere but lack space to discuss at any length here. 30 7 The
short answer is that interpersonal comparisons are meaningful and
(according to one plausible account deriving from work by Harsanyi)
reduce to convergent well-informed preferences regarding lotteries
over possible lives. Such preferences could, in principle, be elicited
through a standard gamble question analogous to the QALY standard
gamble: The respondent is told that the number one corresponds to
the best possible life and zero to the worst possible life. A particular
possible life is described, and the respondent is asked to place it on
the 0-1 scale by expressing the probability p that makes her indif-
ferent as between that life and a lottery with a p probability of the
best possible one and a I - p probability of the worst possible one. 30 8
Different respondents might express different indifference probabili-
ties for the same life, which raises a problem of aggregation. But that
problem is no different from the aggregation problem currently faced
by QALY surveys.3
0 9
A more troubling objection, already alluded to, is that the survey
protocol just described might be cognitively overwhelming for most
respondents. QALYs limit the cognitive demand by holding
nonhealth dimensions fixed. In contrast, a parallel but more inclusive
format that defined one as the best state with respect to all twenty-
four of the WHOQOL dimensions, and zero as the worst state with
respect to all twenty-four, might overtax the imaginative abilities of
many humans. One answer might be to use internal consistency
checks to screen out responses from those who are overwhelmed;
another, to use visual aids and other cognitive aids to help respon-
dents grasp the protocol and provide meaningful answers; a third, to
change elicitation technique. 310 What the change of technique would
be is itself a matter for experimentation. But just as the time tradeoff
307 See id.; Adler, supra note 25, at 17-24; Adler, supra note 104, at 289-302; Adler &
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 39, at 204-09.
308 Cf Andrews & Robinson, supra note 34, at 66, 74 (describing Cantril's Ladder Scale,
which asked respondents to locate themselves on ladder with top representing "the best
possible life for you" and bottom "the worst possible life for you").
309 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 25, at 41; Dolan, supra note 210, at 160.
310 See supra text accompanying notes 153-62; supra note 164 (discussing these devices
within context of existing welfare polls).
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method has emerged, within QALY research, as a better technique for
eliciting QALY values than the QALY standard gamble-once
thought to be the gold standard 3 11-so the standard gamble method
for eliciting interpersonal utility numbers that I have described might
not be the most practicable way to do so. If interpersonal compari-
sons are indeed a matter (as per Harsanyi) of preferences over lot-
teries of possible lives, then the standard gamble is theoretically most
compelling-but that does not preclude other utility-elicitation
methods that might be 6asier to use and might produce values that
approximate those obtained by the standard gamble method.
312
Why an interpersonal utility scale? We already possess, in dol-
lars, an inclusive scale-one that covers all twenty-four of the
WHOQOL dimensions. Why an inclusive nonmonetary scale? The
answer, above all, has to do with the variable marginal utility of
money. WTP/WTA values are only a rough measure of changes in
well-being. 313 If P is willing to pay $100 for a policy, and Q is willing
to accept $50 in exchange for the policy, it does not necessarily follow
that the policy increases overall well-being-that the positive impact
on P's welfare outweighs the negative impact on Q's. P's WTP might
exceed Q's WTA because P is wealthier, or an ascetic, or for some
other reason reaps a relatively small welfare improvement from incre-
mental dollars.
Despite the inaccuracy of WTP/WTA amounts in tracking well-
being, cost-benefit analysis is probably the best currently available
welfarist tool for policy analysis-either the traditional form of cost-
benefit analysis that values all impacts with WTP/WTA amounts, or a
hybrid form that values some using WTP/WTA and others using
QALY-to-dollar or similar conversions. 314 But survey data valuing
welfare impacts on an interpersonal utility scale could be very helpful
in structuring cost-benefit analysis-for example, by helping set dis-
311 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
312 One possibility may be to attempt to identify a plurality of well-being dimensions
that interact in a simple (additive or multiplicative) way to determine overall well-being; to
use surveys to establish weights for the different dimensions, for example by asking about
compensating changes in one dimension for changes in another; and then to calculate the
interpersonal utility number for a given state as a function of the dimension-specific mea-
sures for that state. See, e.g., Payne et al., supra note 120, at 257-58 (discussing multi-
attribute utility theory techniques, such as eliciting "swing weights" for different
dimensions).
313 Similarly, money measures are only a rough index of welfare levels. Consider
wealth, the most obvious monetary proxy for an individual's welfare level: P may have
more wealth than Q but be worse off, given his physical condition or lack of access to
public goods.
314 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 39, at 62-123, 142-46; Adler,
supra note 25.
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tributive weights, or by guiding the choice of QALY-to-dollar or hap-
piness-to-dollar conversion factors. 315 More generally, in any context
where money values might be skewed by unusually high or low mar-
ginal utilities, information from interpersonal utility surveys could
help recalibrate those values.
To summarize, the trio of QALYs, CVs, and happiness surveys
can be usefully supplemented by (1) surveys such as the WHOQOL
that attempt to characterize the multidimensional structure of well-
being; (2) dimension-specific analogues to QALY and happiness
surveys, covering dimensions such as social life; work life; housing,
neighborhood quality, and other aspects of an individual's physical
environment; or recreational opportunities; (3) surveys that ask
respondents to evaluate others' lives, not their own; and (4) survey
work to measure welfare impacts on an inclusive, nonmonetary, inter-
personal utility scale. And what of the thought that these novel for-
mats might displace QALYs, happiness surveys, or CVs? For now,
that thought is premature. In two or three generations, perhaps,
welfarist policy analysis might dispense with money as its commen-
surating device and express costs and benefits in terms of interper-
sonal utility units. But-given the huge amount of information about
money values provided by behavioral data as well as existing CV
studies, and the absence of a comparable body of interpersonal utility
information-that prospect seems distant. The enterprise of welfare
polling needs to be expanded, in the ways suggested in this Part,
rather than redirected away from the current three formats that have
proven so popular.
CONCLUSION
Scholarship about law and government sometimes leads, some-
times lags behind, real advances in governance. The latter is the case,
I want to suggest, for CV, QALY, and happiness surveys. CV
research now comprises a whole subfield of applied economics, with
dedicated practitioners, lots of primary surveys, a large secondary
literature, and a real role in governmental decisionmaking at a
number of federal agencies. QALYs are equally important in the
fields of public health and health economics, and the results of QALY
surveys now frequently figure in cost-benefit analysis at the FDA.
Happiness surveys have long been an area of interest for psycholo-
gists, and are now a hot topic for economists.
315 See Adler, supra note 25, at 57-74 (discussing use of interpersonal utility numbers in
setting QALY-to-dollar conversion factor).
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And yet, at a somewhat higher level of academic generality-at
the level of public-law scholarship and political theory, where general
normative questions of governmental design are pursued-these
survey enterprises have been largely ignored. The contrast with nor-
mative work on citizen juries, deliberative polling, and other policy
deliberation formats is striking. Here, the quantity of high theory
vastly outstrips the actual amount of polling work undertaken or its
actual impact to date on governmental decisionmaking.
This Article has sought to redress the theory-practice imbalance.
I have provided a new construct-the welfare poll-that, I hope, pro-
vides a unifying perspective on QALYs, CVs, and happiness research.
The construct is useful both in generating recommendations about
survey practices and governmental applications within this trio of
survey formats, and in suggesting new formats.
Welfare polls can provide substantial information about the
sources and nature of human well-being. This information is not fully
provided by revealed-preference studies, and its legal and moral rele-
vance is (I have argued) unimpeachable. The informational content
of welfare polls does, of course, depend on whether survey respon-
dents tell the truth, make a sufficient effort, have sufficient facts, have
preferences that are not too distorted, understand the question asked,
are focused on well-being, and so on. I have systematically surveyed
these sorts of conditions and have argued that they can be satisfied
sufficiently well.
I have also stressed that welfare polls are complementary with,
not opposed to, policy deliberation formats. The old duality of "cit-
izen" versus "consumer" needs to be transcended. The Article,
emphatically, is not an attack on citizen juries, citizen advisory com-
missions, or deliberative polls. But, reciprocally, the theorists of
policy deliberation ought to recognize that survey instruments that
secure information about well-being by inviting respondents to take a
self-interested perspective on policy also are morally and legally
defensible. Why assume that civic republican deliberation would end
up denying the normative significance of welfare? The institutions
and decision procedures that incorporate welfare polls-those
described in Part I of this Article-are justifiable on the basis of a
view, "weak welfarism," which citizens impartially deliberating about
the aims of government surely could endorse.
There is a second, deep link between the existing literature on
policy deliberation formats and the defense of welfare polling
presented in this Article. Both embrace the premise that good gov-
ernance will, at some point, require asking people what they think (be
it about policy or about well-being), and creating favorable motiva-
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tional, epistemic, cognitive, and communicative conditions for this dis-
cursive exercise. Both reject the traditional aversion within
economics to survey data, and both are committed to improving citi-
zens' judgments or preferences (about policy or well-being) by pro-
viding fuller information and by creating discursive structures that will
encourage rationality, mental effort, and truthfulness. The develop-
ment of survey techniques that improve preferences or judgments,
and the very exercise of questioning citizens-not just observing their
behavior-are vital to good governance. These are key premises of
my defense of welfare polls, and are just as central for the many
scholars who have argued in favor of citizen juries, citizen advisory
commissions, deliberative polls, and other citizen-involving formats
for policy deliberation.
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